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Abstract 
In this thesis I examine the relationship between women’s empowerment and fertility 
preferences of women in four Southeast Asian countries, including Cambodia; Indonesia; 
the Philippines and East Timor, using data from the Demographic and Health Surveys. 
First, micro data are utilized to create measurement models for women’s empowerment 
using principal axis factoring. Three factors of women’s empowerment are found, which 
are women’s labor force participation, women’s education and women’s household 
decision-making. Second, these three women’s empowerment factors are examined to see 
if they have any associations with women’s fertility preference, measured by the ideal 
number of children and the ideal number of sons. Results from OLS, Poisson and ordered 
logit models show that women’s empowerment has significant and negative association 
with the ideal number of children and the ideal number of sons in the four countries of 
study.  
This research overcomes current obstacles in the operationalization of women’s 
empowerment by moving from the aggregate to the individual level using data from 
developing countries. The results of this study suggest that female labor force 
participation is the key in keeping fertility at a balanced level, and son preference is 
mostly associated with inside-the-household factors such as household decision-making 
rather than outside-the-household factors such as education and employment. All in all, 
the impacts of women's empowerment on fertility decision-making are more 
differentiated than the theoretical literature might suggest, relating specific types of 
empowerment to specific types of fertility preference.    
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INTRODUCTION: WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT AND WHAT IT 
MEANS FOR FERTILITY 
Generally, a movement’s success is denoted by its achievement of the final goals. 
Nevertheless, the movement for women’s right, which began in the 19th century, has 
not yet reached its goal of equality of rights, resources and freedom between men and 
women. In most parts of the world, even in developed European and North American 
countries, women are suffering from unequal treatment at both domestic and social 
spheres (Sen 2001). Multiple global indexes of gender equality have never recorded a 
perfect equality between men and women in any country. In fact, Epstein (2007) 
argues that gender inequality creates the most fundamental social divide and the 
deepest divide in the world today.  
Scholars and policy makers have converged on the notion that the empowerment of 
women does not only benefit women, but also benefits the development of society as 
a whole (Batliwala 1994, Sen 1993, Coleman 2004, Malhotra and Schuler 2005, 
Blumberg 2015). Improving women’s status is strongly correlated with improved both 
men and women’s health outcomes, such as men and women’s mortality and 
morbidity rates, and activity limitations (Kawachi et al. 1999). The empowerment of 
women not only brings benefits to themselves but also to the next generation. Studies 
have suggested that women who have more equality in education, employment and 
decision-making tend to have lower fertility, their children have lower risk of 
malnutrition, their daughters are able to spend a longer time in education and have 
equal rights to sons in inheritance (Allendorf 2012, Dixon-Mueller 1993, Bongaarts 
2003, Brewster and Rindfuss 2000, Subbarao and Raney 1995, Axinn and Barber 
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2001). Higher women’s empowerment is also associated with more balanced sex 
ratios at births (Das Gupta 1996). For such remarkable benefits of women’s 
empowerment and the fact that women have not been granted the rights that they are 
entitled to, it is necessary to thoroughly examine women’s empowerment and its 
influences on aspects of fertility.    
The relationship between women's empowerment and fertility and fertility-related 
decisions has been a major research focus in theories of fertility decline. The 
improved status of women is hypothesized to increase their educational attainment 
and economic opportunities, leading to a higher prevalence of contraceptive use and 
thus, declining fertility. Even though the topic has been intensively studied, just how 
women’s empowerment affects aspects of fertility remains a matter of debate for 
several reasons. The first reason is the wide variation in the conceptualizations and 
frameworks to measure women’s empowerment. The second reason is how women's 
empowerment affects fertility and fertility decisions remains inconclusive.  
Some intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations define women’s 
empowerment as giving women choices and the ability to control every aspect of their 
life (UNDP, UNFPA), while others argues that women’s empowerment is not only 
about choices but also about what choices are being offered (SIDA). Despite the 
different definitions, all organizations that have intervention programs for women’s 
empowerment agree on the consensus that it is crucial to socio-economic 
development, in both rich and poor countries. It is not only NGOs that are struggling 
to define women's empowerment. How to define the term is equally debated among 
scholars. Numerous definitions of women’s empowerment have been proposed in 
scholarly literature. Most view women’s empowerment as a process (Bradley 1995, 
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Mosedale 2005, Kabeer 2005a, Lee-Rife 2010, Batliwala 1994), while others view it 
as a goal or both a goal and a process (Bradley 1995, Parpart, Rai, and Staudt 2002, 
Tengland 2008, Desai 2010). Additionally, the understanding of women’s 
empowerment is further complicated by the interchangeable uses of closely related 
terms like women’s status, women’s autonomy and gender equality. 
Different global indexes (GDI, GEM, GII, GGI) have been developed and adjusted to 
measure women’s empowerment. Some scholars criticize these indexes that they only 
relate to women’s empowerment at country level, magnifying the role of economic 
factors, and that they only provide very limited data for low-income countries (Beteta 
2006, Klasen 2006, Bardhan and Klasen 1999). In response, many researchers have 
proposed different refinements to the concept (Malhotra, Schulerm, and Boender 
2002, Charmes and Wieringa 2003, Kabeer 2001, Desai 2010). However, there has 
not been a well-rounded and widely agreed-on measurement that takes into account of 
women’s empowerment at both country level and individual level.  
 Despite the variation in the conceptualization of women’s empowerment, evidence 
suggests that there is a causal relationship between women’s empowerment and 
fertility and that the reverse is also true, i.e. that lower fertility leads to higher 
women’s empowerment. In particular, studies have shown that fertility is negatively 
associated with women’s education and employment (Axinn and Barber 2001, Mason 
1987). Improvement in women’s education increases their access to modern values 
and ideas that promote individualism and egalitarianism. Moreover, economic 
independence resulting from employment gives women the freedom to make 
decisions that affect their own lives, including decisions about their fertility, such as 
contraceptive use and the number of children they wish to have. Similar results have 
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been found in many different countries in the developing world such as India (Sarangi 
1998), Tanzania (Larsen and Hollos 2003), Taiwan (Lee 2009), and Turkey (Gore 
2010). In the reverse direction of the relationship, empirical results from China (Wu, 
Ye, and He 2012) and India (Allendorf 2012, Lee-Rife 2010) suggest that when 
family size is reduced, parents invest in sons and daughters more equally; which leads 
to more equal opportunities in education and employment for daughters.  
The literature on how women's empowerment affect different aspects of fertility can 
be grouped into four major pathways. First, women’s education is often associated 
with lower fertility. Second, women who have more involvement in the labor force 
have lower fertility than those who do not. Third, women who have more power in the 
household decision-making process are more likely to have lower fertility. And lastly, 
contraceptive use is strongly related to lower fertility.  
In countries where son preference is strong, there is a strong link to the low status of 
women (Arnold and Liu 1986). In facts, son preference is considered a rough 
indicator of gender equality in the society; societies with no sex preference are more 
likely to be gender egalitarian (Williamson 1976b). Das Gupta et al. (2003) propose 
that women’s paid employment increases household decision-making, and that 
women’s paid employment would reduce son preference. Similarly, Li and Lavely 
(2003) find that women who have higher scores on the index which includes items on 
autonomy, power, the extent that their husband shares housework, and exposure to 
media, are negatively associated with son preference. 
In addition, patriarchal cultural norms are important mediating factors for the 
relationship between women’s empowerment and women’s fertility. There are two 
major norms in this cultural domain that affect women’s empowerment and fertility: 
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first, the preference for high fertility, where children are viewed as sources of labor 
and a way for women to raise their status in the family, especially in patrilocal 
marriage where women move into their husbands’ family after marriage; and second, 
the preference for sons. These norms are closely related to each other. To secure their 
positions in the husband’s family, women may want to have more children, especially 
sons. And the preference for sons often leads to large number of children, since 
couples keep trying to have children until have a son or the desired number of sons is 
born. Therefore, it is important to take into account such cultural norms when 
studying the effects of women’s empowerment on fertility decisions and behaviors. 
In this thesis, I will explore what women’s empowerment means for the fertility 
preferences of Southeast Asian women. Even though the literature suggest that the 
effects of women’s empowerment and fertility can go both ways, in this thesis I will 
only attempt to operationalize the one-way association between women's 
empowerment and fertility preferences. Specifically, I examine how women's 
empowerment factors are associated with the ideal number of children and the 
preference for sons – measured by the ideal number of sons divided by the total 
number of children.  
The first chapter presents a background and an overview of current attempts in 
conceptualizing and measuring women's empowerment in the global literature. 
Different definitions and measurements proposed by non-governmental organizations 
and scholars are examined as well as their advantages and shortfalls. Distinctions 
between women's empowerment and common terms used equivalently are also briefly 
discussed. 
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The second chapter presents the framework, which shows four pathways from 
women's empowerment to changes in different aspects of fertility. Women's 
empowerment is believed to lead to changes in aspects of fertility including actual 
fertility and fertility preferences through female education, female labor force 
participation, women’s participation in household decision-making, and contraceptive 
use. The framework also specifies that even though cultural factors are not factors of 
women's empowerment, they mediate the relationship between women's 
empowerment and fertility.  
Chapter 3 of the thesis lays out the reasons why Southeast Asia is selected as the 
study region for this research. The chapter reviews the rapid fertility decline that is 
happening in the region and current trends of women's empowerment in three 
international empowerment indexes: the Gender Inequality Index, the Gender Gap 
Index, and the Social Institutions and Gender Index. This chapter also introduces the 
data selected for the research and a brief background of the four countries selected: 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines and Timor-Leste.  
Chapter 4 of the thesis is the development of a measurement for women's 
empowerment at individual level. Step-by-step operationalization of the indicators is 
presented before factor analysis models are run using orthogonal and oblique factor 
models. The measurement is implemented in each of the four countries. In the end of 
the chapter, I also discuss the three factors of women’s empowerment based on the 
findings from factor analysis.  
In chapter 5, I use women’s empowerment factors found in the earlier chapters to 
examine their associations with the ideal number of children. The chapter begins with 
the selection of variables and descriptive statistics then three types of regression 
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models are run, including OLS, Poisson and Ordered Logit regression in each country 
of study. At the end of the chapter is the discussion of whether women's 
empowerment factors are negatively associated with the ideal number of children. 
In chapter 6, women's empowerment factors are used to model son preference in 
Southeast Asia, measured by the ideal number of sons divided by the total ideal 
number of children. First, I present an overview of son preference in different parts of 
the world and its consequences, and how women's empowerment is associated with 
son preference. Then, I describe the operationalization of the variables and methods 
used for the analysis. The results on how women's empowerment is associated with 
son preference at country level and individual level are presented at the end of the 
chapter.  
Chapter 7 concludes my thesis by showing the significant findings found in this 
research. There is also a discussion of how women's empowerment differs from what 
the literature has noted, and its associations with fertility preferences of Southeast 
Asian women. Future research implications and applications are also proposed at the 
end of the chapter. 
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CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTUALIZATION AND MEASUREMENTS 
OF WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT  
1.1. Definitions of women’s empowerment 
Factors that empower women such as education and labor force participation have 
been thoroughly studied in the literature. However, only after being defined by the 
United Nations in 1995 has the term “women’s empowerment” been widely used in 
the literature on development studies. The concept and its positive effects on social 
processes have been studied and discussed extensively by both scholars and non-
governmental organizations. Nevertheless, there has been no consensus on how to 
define women's empowerment or a framework to measure the concept.  
Definitions by Non-Governmental Organizations 
Despite the fact that the women’s empowerment has been a major research topic for 
decades, there has never been a conclusive definition of the term. Different 
organizations have their own definition of women’s empowerment, depending on 
their goals and purposes. The concept also varies by type of organizations. 
Intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations define women’s 
empowerment differently from governmental organizations like the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency and non-governmental organizations 
like the World Economic Forum. Individual scholars have their suggested definitions 
of the concept as well. Table 1 presents a summary of definitions suggested by 
organizations and scholars with critical bullet points, followed by discussions of each 
definition. 
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Table 1: Summary of Definitions of Women’s Empowerment by Organizations and 
Scholars 
Authors Summary of Definitions 
United Nations (1995) Five components:  
• Women's sense of self-worth,  
• Right to have and to determine choices,  
• Right to have access to opportunities and resources,  
• Right to have the power to control own lives - both 
within and outside the home,  
• Ability to influence the direction of social change to 
create a more just social and economic order, 
nationally and internationally 
Oxaal and Baden (1997) - Swedish 
International Development Agency 
(SIDA) 
• Women's empowerment is not only about choice, but 
also about shaping what choices are being offered.  
• Viewed as a contextual concept - what may seem 
empowering in one context may not be in another.  
• Viewed as a bottom-up process that cannot be 
claimed by any agencies but only by women 
themselves. 
Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) 
(1999) 
• Empowerment is about people – both women and 
men - taking control over their lives: setting their own 
agendas, gaining skills, building self-confidence, 
solving problems, and developing self-reliance.  
• Not only a collective, socio-political process, but also 
an individual one.  
• It is not only a process but also an outcome.  
• Only women can empower themselves to make 
choices or to speak out on their own behalf. 
Cooperative for Assistance and 
Relief Everywhere (CARE) (2005) 
• Notions of self-worth and dignity (individual), 
• Bodily integrity; freedom from coercive forces over a 
woman’s very body (individual and structure), 
• Control and influence over household and public 
resources (structure and relations), 
• Experience with or appreciation of the value of 
collective effort and solidarity among women 
(relations). 
Batliwala (1994); Sen and 
Batliwala (1995); Kabeer (1999); 
Papart et al (2002); Mosedale 
(2005); Odutolu et al (2003); Lee-
Rife (2010); Desai (2010) 
Empowerment as a Process 
Bradley 1995; Papart et al (2002); 
Tengland (2008); Desai (2010), 
Batliwala (1994) 
Empowerment as a Goal 
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Development programs started to notice the role of women’s empowerment in 
economic development and human development since the 1990s. The term women’s 
empowerment was first defined by the United Nations after the 4th World Conference 
on Women: Action for Equality, Development and Peace in Beijing in 1995. The 
United Nations identified that women’s empowerment has five components: women's 
sense of self-worth, their right to have and to determine choices, their right to have 
access to opportunities and resources, their right to have the power to control their 
own lives - both within and outside the home, and their ability to influence the 
direction of social change to create a more just social and economic order, nationally 
and internationally (United Nations Population Information Network 1995).    
In the same year, the 1995 Human Development Report was released, emphasizing on 
the participation aspect of empowerment: “Development must be by the people, not 
only for them. People must participate fully in the decisions and processes that shape 
their lives [12].” This quote focuses on the changes that should be initiated by women 
themselves; no one else can be the center part of the process. The United Nations 
argued that improving women’s status is not only beneficial for themselves but also 
for overall socio-economic development:  “Investing in women’s capabilities and 
empowering them to exercise their choices is not only valuable in itself but is also the 
surest way to contribute to economic growth and overall development [2]” (United 
Nations 1995). 
Similar to the concept identified by the Human Development Report, the United 
Nations Population Fund insists that women's empowerment is vital to sustainable 
development and the realization of human rights for all (United Nations Population 
Fund 2012). UNFPA mentions women’s empowerment as a critical aspect to promote 
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gender equality, and claims it should focus on identifying and redressing the power 
imbalances and giving women more autonomy to manage their own lives.  
Most definitions of women’s empowerment by other organizations are derived from 
the core definition proposed by the United Nations, despite some minor variations. In 
the report prepared for the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), 
Oxaal and Baden (1997) argue that empowerment is a multi-faceted concept. The 
highlight of their definition is that women's empowerment is not only about choice, 
but also about shaping what choices are being offered. In their report, women's 
empowerment is viewed as a contextual concept - what may seem empowering in one 
context may not be in another. The authors adopt a similar approach to the Human 
Development Report, which suggests that women's empowerment is a bottom-up 
process that cannot be claimed by any agency, but only by women themselves.  
The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) states that women’s 
empowerment is central to achieving gender equality (Canadian International 
Development Agency 1999). Empowerment is about people – both women and men - 
taking control over their lives: setting their own agendas, gaining skills, building self-
confidence, solving problems, and developing self-reliance. It is not only a collective 
socio-political process, but also an individual one. Furthermore, it is not only a 
process but also an outcome. CIDA insists that outsiders cannot empower women; 
only women can empower themselves to make choices or to speak out on their own 
behalf. Still, CIDA also acknowledges the roles of institutions, including international 
agencies, in supporting the processes that increase women's self-confidence, develop 
their self-reliance, and help them set their own agendas.  In the recognition of the 
ambiguity in the definition of women’s empowerment, CIDA recommends a clear 
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definition of the term in order to measure it, and that personal, socio-economic and 
political factors be included in empowerment indicators. CIDA suggests both 
quantitative and qualitative indicators be used in measuring empowerment. 
The Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) has a different 
approach to define women's empowerment to other organizations. It defines 
empowerment through a self-defining process done by participants of group-
discussion in India, Ecuador, Bangladesh and Yemen in 2005. Similar to the 
definition by the United Nations, CARE suggests four common components of 
women’s empowerment: “(1) Notions of self-worth and dignity (individual), (2) 
Bodily integrity; freedom from coercive forces over a woman’s very body (individual 
and structure), (3) Control and influence over household and public resources 
(structure and relations), (4) Experience with or appreciation of the value of collective 
effort and solidarity among women (relations) [6]” (Cooperative for Assistance and 
Relief Everywhere 2012). This definition mentions women’s empowerment has to be 
at all three levels: individual, community, and larger collectives of women. Different 
from the definitions by the United Nations, this one does not emphasize the political 
aspect of women’s empowerment.   
Definitions by Scholars 
Attempting to define women’s empowerment does not only receive the attention of 
organizations that advocate for women’s rights, but also from many academic 
scholars. In the review of the Human Development Report 2010 which focuses on 
human development and women’s empowerment, Desai (2010) thoroughly reviews 
the definitions and measurements of women’s empowerment by various authors. She 
proposes the centrality of three common aspects found in definitions of women’s 
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empowerment. First, most definitions on women’s empowerment emphasize women’s 
control over resources and ideology.  Second, most definitions define women’s 
empowerment as women’s agency, i.e. women’s ability to make the right choices for 
themselves and their families. And third, women’s empowerment is a process, rather 
than an outcome (Desai 2010).  
Definitions of women’s empowerment suggested by scholars often belong to either 
category: empowerment as a process, or empowerment as a goal. The first viewpoint, 
which is shared by most scholars considers empowerment is a process. It is an 
ongoing process rather than a product; and there is no final goal to it. In an early 
examination of the term, Gutierrez (1990) argues that empowerment is the process of 
increasing personal, interpersonal or political power so that individuals can take 
action to improve their life situation. Empowerment is the process where the 
powerless gain control over the circumstances of their lives. It includes control over 
both resources and ideology (Sen and Batliwala 2000, Batliwala 1994). Kabeer (1999) 
emphasizes “power” as the ability to make choices, and “empowerment” as the 
process of acquiring the ability of make choices by those who are denied such ability. 
In other words, “empowerment entails a process of change” [437]. According to 
Kabeer (1999), the ability to make choices is made up of three elements: resources, 
agency and achievements. Resources are material, human and social assets ; agency is 
the ability to define one’s goals and act upon them; and achievements are the 
outcomes of the efforts.  
In a later definition of the concept, Mosedale (2005) defines women’s empowerment 
as a process in which women redefine gender roles in ways that extend their 
possibilities for being and doing. She emphasizes that empowerment has to be 
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claimed by the group that want to be empowered, specifically, by women. 
Development agencies can facilitate the process or create suitable conditions for 
empowerment, but they cannot make it happen. Empowerment means a group can 
decide what is important to them and be able to carry out related actions. Mosedale’s 
definition is similar to one that is adopted by the Canadian International Development 
Agency (1999). Her definition emphasizes extending what is possible, thus focusing 
on women’s achievement not only for themselves but also for women in general. 
While Kabeer (1999)’s definition is more about individuals acquiring the ability to 
choose, Mosedale (2005)’s definition focuses not only on individual women, but also 
on women as a collective group.  
The process of women’s empowerment is dynamic; it is not static over the course of 
life and may vary over time, subject to the accumulation of experiences, resources, 
and achievements as well as of time-varying characteristics like age, marital status 
and duration (Lee-Rife 2010). Empowerment is the transformation of power relations 
between men and women at four levels: household, community, market and state (Sen 
1993, Odutolu et al. 2003). However, since it is a challenging task, no study to date 
has successfully examined women’s empowerment at all four levels as ideally 
proposed.   
In the second viewpoint, empowerment is considered a goal. It is fundamentally about 
ability: women’s ability to control individual health; the ability to control their life; 
and the ability to change the world (Tengland 2008, Bradley 1995).  For example, 
Bradley (1995) views empowerment as the degree to which women are social actors, 
and thus be able to affect their own positions. Different dimensions of empowerment 
also include the abilities to control their homes, work, relationships, leisure time, and 
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values. One can argue that this point of view is not much different from a general 
human rights perspective since it does not highlight the gender aspect of women’s 
empowerment.   
Some authors view empowerment as both process and goal. As a process, it has 
fluidity over time; and as a goal, it can be measured against expected 
accomplishments (Parpart, Rai, and Staudt 2002, Desai 2010). Even though Batliwala 
(1994) views empowerment as a process, she also sees its goal as the “individual 
women’s capability to take charge of her life and her environment through her own 
greater sense of self-worth” [20] (Sen and Batliwala 2000). Even though some authors 
view women’s empowerment as an outcome or as an outcome and a process, more 
agree on the definition that women’s empowerment is a process. The etymology of 
“empower” itself indicates a process of gaining power and therefore women’s 
empowerment is about the self-enabling course of action by women to achieve rights 
that initially belongs to them.   
As a process or a goal, empowerment entails certain traits, especially its relativity and 
contextualization. People are empowered or disempowered relative to other people or 
to themselves at a previous time (Mosedale 2005, Tengland 2008). The term 
“empowerment” may indicate a redistribution of power to the less powered group. 
Empowering women challenges the existing system that gives superior authorities to 
men. Empowerment is relative in the way that “people have more or less power 
depending on their specific situation and they can be relatively powerless in one 
situation and relatively powerful in another [251]” (Mosedale 2005). Odutolu et al. 
(2003) argues that empowerment is context-specific; it differs in different cultures, 
situations and stages of women’s life cycles. For example, contraception use was once 
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considered empowering, but when more than half of the married women in rural 
Bangladesh have used it since 1990s, it has become normative and does not necessary 
imply a higher level of empowerment (Malhotra, Schulerm, and Boender 2002).     
 1.2. Concepts Related to Women’s Empowerment 
Criticisms of the concept of “women’s empowerment” often acknowledge its 
fuzziness in the development context. Gutierrez (1990) claims the term is often vague 
and can have different meanings. The word “empowerment” indicates that a lack of 
power belongs to women, and implies that subordination is built in (Eyben and 
Napier-Moore 2010). In the literature on women’s empowerment, three concepts – 
gender equality, women’s autonomy, and women’s status - are commonly used 
interchangeably with women’s empowerment. Mason (1987) notes the 
interchangeable and often confusing use of other terms like “gender inequality,” 
“status of women,” “sexual stratification,” “female autonomy,” “female dependency,” 
and “male dominance” [719]. She argues that the confusion makes it difficult to 
measure women’s status empirically.  
The concept most commonly confused with women’s empowerment is gender 
equality. Desai (2010) acknowledges the interchangeable use of gender equality and 
women’s empowerment in the literature. Similar to earlier observation noted by 
Grown (2008), Desai (2010) agrees that even though these two terms are related, they 
are not the same. She argues that gender equality is about women’s status relative to 
men’s while women’s empowerment is about the process whereby women achieve 
their abilities to control, power and choice over practical and strategic decisions. In 
the Millennium Development Goals, established by the United Nations, both terms 
are used in the third goal: “Promote gender equality and empower women,” with the 
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implication that promoting gender equality means narrowing the gap between men 
and women in education and formal employment sectors, while empowering women 
means increasing women’s representation in politics.  
Eyben and Napier-Moore (2010) note an interesting case where “gender equality” and 
“women’s empowerment” are used interchangeably by the United Nations. In the 
Beijing Platform for Action, the term “gender equality” appears 12 times, while 
“women’s empowerment” appears 30 times. However, when the book was published, 
the term “women’s empowerment” disappeared since the book targets a different 
audience, which is domestic and meant to be a response to the UK’s “gender equality 
duty” legislation. Nevertheless, not all organizations adopt the interchangeable use of 
these two terms. In the 2012 Global Gender Gap Report, the World Economic Forum 
explicitly specified its goal as measuring gender equality, not women’s 
empowerment, i.e. whether the gap between women and men has declined, rather than 
whether women are “winning” the “battle of the sexes [3]” (World Economic Forum 
2012). In WEF’s view, the two terms are distinctly different and cannot be used 
synonymously.  
The second term that is often used interchangeably with women’s empowerment is 
women’s autonomy. Most definitions of women’s autonomy often refer to the status 
or the outcome rather than an ongoing process as in definitions of empowerment. 
Women’s autonomy is defined as “the degree of access and control over material and 
social resources within the family, in the community and in the society at large [6]” 
(Dixon-Mueller 1978); the capacity to manipulate one’s personal environment (Dyson 
and Moore 1983); or the control over resources and information in order to make 
decisions about one’s own concerns or about close family members (Bloom, Wypij, 
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and Gupta 2001). Women’s empowerment includes both individual and collective 
aspects of power, whereas women’s autonomy mostly refers to individual power.  
The third term that is often conflated with women's empowerment is women’s status, 
referring to the position of women in relation to men. Similar to women’s autonomy, 
this term is more about the outcomes rather than a process. Women’s status refers to 
both the respect accorded to individuals and the personal power available to them 
(Bloom, Wypij, and Gupta 2001). Similar to the distinction between women's 
empowerment and women’s autonomy, women’s empowerment is more about a 
process, whereas, women’s status is more about the position. While status can be 
measured by objective indicators such as education, occupation and income; 
empowerment, on the other hand, is subjective and mostly depends on the perceptions 
of the actors. Women’s status and women’s empowerment may be related in the way 
that higher status is likely to facilitate empowerment, but it does not automatically 
lead to actual empowerment in all cases.  
Bradley (1995) unambiguously defines these three closely related terms: women’s 
status, women’s autonomy and women’s empowerment. She suggests that autonomy 
compares women’s power with men’s, usually in a single setting, while women status 
may be across settings. Status may be used diachronically; it is used more like a static 
category, like class or caste, whereas, empowerment implies agency or causal power 
where action is constituted [159-160].   
All in all, even though gender equality, women’s autonomy and women’s status are 
closely related to women’s empowerment, these three terms are more about the 
absolute power position of women in relation to men, whereas women’s 
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empowerment is more about an ongoing process. This is the major distinction to 
identify women’s empowerment and other commonly conflated terms. 
1.3. Current Measurements of Women's Empowerment  
Even though women’s empowerment is universally agreed to bring enormous socio-
economic and political benefits to development, measuring the concept is a 
challenging task. There have been numerous attempts by both organizations and 
scholars to capture and measure women’s empowerment.  
Measurement of Organizations 
International organizations have developed different indexes to measure women’s 
empowerment at the country level. In 1995, the United Nations developed the 
Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure 
(GEM), these two indexes were later replaced by the Gender Inequality Index (GII) in 
2011.  
The Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment 
Measure (GEM) are the first two indexes to measure women’s empowerment. They 
were developed by the United Nations Development Program, following the 4th World 
Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development and Peace in Beijing in 
1995. These indexes were first used in the 1995 Human Development Report and 
were used by the United Nations Development Program until 2010.  
The GDI was developed to capture gender inequalities in overall well-being of 
women. However, the GDI is not an independent index, it is closely related to the 
Human Development Index (HDI) and cannot be interpreted without the HDI. It takes 
the role of clarifying the HDI in aspects such as health, education and incomes, as it 
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records the gender inequalities in these aspects of development. Hence, the GDI has 
been subjected to many criticisms that it is not an appropriate independent 
measurement for gender inequality. For example, Bardhan and Klasen (1999) 
criticized the procedure for the computation of the GDI proposed by the UNDP 
(1995) for its inclusion of non-agricultural wage disparities. According to them, this 
variable does not reflect the gender disparities in overall economic opportunities in 
developing countries. This is because the concept of earned income excludes 
unremunerated work and reproductive labor, which is substantial in most parts of the 
developing world (Bardhan and Klasen 1999:992). 
The GEM was introduced to measure women’s representation in politics, economics 
and decision-making power in a given country. It measures the control over economic 
resources by men; women’s income; women’s economic participation and decision-
making; women’s share of administrative, professional, managerial and technical 
position; and women’s political participation and decision-making reflected in male 
and female shares of parliamentary seats.  
Despite their efforts to objectively measure women’s empowerment or gender 
equality, these indexes have serious limitations that have been pointed out by 
researchers. The most common criticism is that they only measure the empowerment 
at country level but not at the individual level. Wu, Ye, and He (2012) found that, in 
some countries, the GEM was inconsistent with the measurement of women’s status 
by education and labor force participation. For example, in China, despite five 
decades of policies promoting gender egalitarianism, the GEM was still only 0.533 in 
2006, compared to 0.726 in Taiwan, where the rate of female labor force participation 
was much lower. The authors also suggest that the GEM is lacking measurement at 
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household level and call for more attention in research on women’s relative status to 
their spouses within the family. 
Beteta (2006) criticizes the GEM as an “incomplete” and “biased” measurement of 
women’s empowerment since it only measures the most educated and economically 
advantaged; and it fails to include non-economic dimensions of decision-making 
power both at household level and at individual level, specifically, decisions related to 
women’s own bodies and sexuality. She thoroughly reviews the drawbacks of the 
GEM on three levels: government, local and household. According to Beteta (2006), a 
country can perform quite well on the GEM but gender inequality may still prevail. 
For example, Barbados shows high levels of gender equality in terms of women in the 
parliament and decision-making positions, but women still comprise the majority of 
the poor, female unemployment rates are still high and there has been an increasing 
misogyny toward women’s advancement in education and work. In addition, the 
GEM does not measure women’s political participation in local government.  
On the economic aspect of the GEM, Beteta (2006) argues that it lacks a uniform data 
base, thus cross-country comparison is problematic since different countries use 
different definitions about employment and labor, and there is very limited 
information on less developed countries. She points out that data on labor force 
participation is available in most developed countries but only available in 40% of the 
middle income countries and only 10% in low income countries. Furthermore, the 
GEM is based on measuring inequalities in the formal sector of the labor market as 
opposed to the informal sector, while in fact, the informal sector accounts for a large 
part of developing economies.  
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At household level, Beteta (2006) criticizes the GEM for a lack of information on 
household level decision-making, including women's decisions about their bodies and 
sexuality. She suggests using indicators such as the demand and use of contraception 
and the difference between wanted and actual fertility, which can be acquired from 
Demographic and Health Surveys, to measure women’s control over their bodies and 
sexualities.  
Even though the GEM was expected to measure women’s power in relationship with 
men, Klasen (2006) concluded in the 10-year review of the GEM that it had not been 
influential in shaping gender-sensitive policies nor had it provided an easily 
interpretable and internationally comparable measurement. 
In response to all the criticisms of the GEM and the GDI that were raised by various 
scholars, the United Nations Development Program discarded the use of these two 
indexes and introduced a new one in 2010, the Gender Inequality Index (GII). While 
the two earlier indexes measured the level of “empowerment” and “development” of 
women, the latter measures the disadvantages of women relative to men. The UNDP 
states that the GII reflects women’s disadvantages in three dimensions—reproductive 
health, empowerment and the labor market. The index aims to show the loss in human 
development due to inequality between male and female achievements in these 
dimensions. The health dimension is measured by two indicators: the maternal 
mortality ratio and the adolescent fertility rate. The empowerment dimension is 
measured by two indicators: the share of parliamentary seats held by each gender and 
secondary and higher education attainment. And finally, labor dimension is measured 
by women’s participation in the work force (United Nations Development Programme 
2012). Despite the expectation that the new GII is a significantly improved index 
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compared to the GDI and GEM, it is still limited by similar issues, especially due to 
the lack of available data. For example, there is no information on women’s 
participation in local government, women’s participation and income from informal 
sectors, asset ownership, gender-based violence and participation in community 
decision-making.   
The Global Gender Gap Index (GGI) is among the very few major indexes that is 
developed by an organization that is not under the United Nations. Introduced by the 
World Economic Forum in 2006, it is designed to capture the magnitude and scope of 
gender-based disparities and track their progress. The GGI benchmarks national 
gender gaps on economic, political, education, and health-based criteria (World 
Economic Forum 2012). In the 2012 Global Gender Gap Report, the World 
Economic Forum specified that the goal of their index is to capture the gaps in 
outcomes variables rather than the gaps in input variables. They also emphasized that 
their goal is to measure gender equality, not women’s empowerment, specifically, and 
to investigate whether the gap between women and men has declined, rather than 
whether women are “winning” the “battle of the sexes [3]” (World Economic Forum 
2012).  
The Gender Gap Index (GGI) measures five aspects of women’s empowerment: 
economic participation, economic opportunity, political empowerment, education 
attainment, and health and well-being. Data from different sources were compiled: the 
World Development Indicators by the World Bank, the Human Development Report 
by the UNDP, data from the International Labor Organization, and Executive Opinion 
Survey by the World Economic Forum. Some scholars note that there is a negative 
correlation between log of the country’s GDP and the gender gap rank; i.e. poor 
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countries tend to do worse on the gender gap index (Lopez-Claros and Zahidi 2005). 
Criticisms of the GGI index are that it is more about rich countries (OECD countries) 
while having very limited data on the developing countries, and similar to the GDI, it 
mainly focuses on economic aspects. It is very difficult for a low-income country to 
rank high on the Gender Gap Index.  
The Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI) is the newest index in 
measuring women's empowerment. It was developed by Alkire et al. (2013) for the 
International Food Policy Research Institute. Before the WEAI, there had been a 
series of proposals to measure women’s empowerment done by a group of scholars at 
the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) in 2007 (Ibrahim and 
Alkire 2007, Lugo 2007, Diprose 2007, Zavaleta Reyles 2007). Much of the WEAI 
was operationalized based on the previous proposal on agency and empowerment 
done by Ibrahim and Alkire (2007). The WEAI index was developed as a response to 
the need to measure women’s empowerment in agriculture as few of the current 
indexes covered this topic. It uses data from both survey-based and qualitative 
interviews with men and women in the same households in Guatemala, Uganda and 
Bangladesh.  
The WEAI includes two sub-indexes: the five domains of empowerment (5DE) and 
the Gender Parity Index.  The first one reflects “the age of women who are 
empowered in five domains of empowerment in agriculture” or 5DE, which includes: 
(1) the decisions about agricultural production, (2) access to and decision-making 
power about productive resources, (3) control of use of income, (4) leadership in the 
community, and (5) time allocation. This is the first index on women’s empowerment 
that includes time (in terms of workload and leisure time) as a reflection of women’s 
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ability to enjoy outcomes from agricultural production. The second sub-index is the 
Gender Parity Index (GPI), which reflects the age of women who are empowered or 
whose empowered score meets or exceeds that of the men in their households. The 
focus of the index is to measure women’s empowerment in agriculture relative to men 
in the same household. The WEAI is a carefully constructed survey-based index, 
which is much more comprehensive than earlier indexes. It also collects data from 
developing countries, which many earlier indexes lacked. However, it only focuses on 
agriculture production and not on other everyday life aspects of women. Another 
drawback is that it is impossible to see the pattern of the level of empowerment across 
individual women, since their empowered status is relative to their own household 
standing, but not standardized across the sample group.    
Measurements by scholars  
The method of measuring women’s empowerment has received attention not only 
from international organizations but also from scholars. Scholars have suggested 
multiple measurements and frameworks. For example, Kabeer (2005a) suggests that 
three components of women’s empowerment, education, participation in paid 
employment and political representation, should be measured. Beteta (2006), after 
portraying the weaknesses of the GEM, proposes a different index named the Gender 
Empowerment Enabling Environment (GEEE). She suggest that the GEEE may 
include attitude questions about gender aspects from the World Value Survey, the 
number of women’s organizations in a country and the country's legal framework 
(ratification and signature on the Convention Eliminating all forms of Discrimination 
Against Women - CEDAW, respect for women’s rights, and the tolerance of 
government for discrimination against women).  
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Some scholars have suggested more elaborate measures of women’s empowerment. 
Malhotra, Schulerm, and Boender (2002) proposes an expansion of the term 
empowerment to include six dimensions: economic, socio-cultural, 
family/interpersonal, legal, political, and psychological. Even more complex, 
Charmes and Wieringa (2003) conceptualize the Women’s Empowerment Matrix 
with six dimensions: physical, socio-cultural, religious, economic, political, legal; and 
at six levels: individual, household, community, state, region and global. Charmes and 
Wieringa (2003)’s matrix is a bit ambitious and idealistic; other scholars recommend 
more feasible measurements of women’s empowerment that they should be carried 
out at three levels: household, community, and broader areas (national and 
international) (Malhotra, Schulerm, and Boender 2002, Beteta 2006, Isamail, Rasdi, 
and Nadriah 2011).  
A summary of the indexes by international organizations and suggestions by scholars 
on measuring women’s empowerment is shown in table 2. 
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Despite numerous attempts and proposal to measure women's empowerment, their 
applications in empirical research is still very limited as it is not easy to measure 
Table 2: Summary of Indexes and Measurements of Women’s Empowerment  
Index Author Measures 
GDI (Gender-related 
Development Index) 
United Nations (1995) Gender aspects of health, education and 
income. 
GEM (Gender 
Empowerment Measure) 
United Nations (1995) Women’s representation in politics, 
economics and decision-making power in 
a given country. 
GII (Gender Inequality 
Index) 
United Nations (2010) The disadvantages of women relative to 
men in three dimensions—reproductive 
health, empowerment and the labor 
market. 
GGI (Global Gender Gap 
Index) 
World Economic Forum 
(2006) 
National gender gaps on economic 
participation, economic opportunity, 
political empowerment, education 
attainment, and health and well-being 
GEEE (Gender 
Empowerment Enabling 
Environment) (suggestion) 
Beteta (2006) Include attitude about gender aspects from 
the World Value Survey, the number of 
women’s organizations in a country and 
the country's legal framework (ratification 
and signature on the Convention 
Eliminating all forms of Discrimination 
Against Women - CEDAW, respect for 
women’s rights, and the tolerance of 
government for discrimination against 
women). 
WEAI (Women’s 
Empowerment in 
Agriculture Index) 
Alkire et al (2013) 5DE which includes: (1) the decisions 
about agricultural production, (2) access to 
and decision-making power about 
productive resources, (3) control of use of 
income, (4) leadership in the community, 
and (5) time allocation. 
Gender Parity Index (GPI): the %age of 
women who are empowered or have 
empowered score meets or exceeds that of 
men in their households. 
 Kabeer (2005) Female’s education, female’s participation 
in paid employment and political 
representation. 
 Maholtra et al. (2002) Six dimensions: economic, socio-cultural, 
family/interpersonal, legal, political, and 
psychological. 
 Charmes and Wieringa 
(2003) 
Six dimensions – physical, socio-cultural, 
religious, economic, political, legal. 
At six levels: individual, household, 
community, state, region and global.  
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women’s empowerment at all three levels. Desai (2010) points out that the major 
challenge in measuring women’s empowerment is the lack of gender-disaggregated 
data for most dimensions and levels. Unlike Beteta (2006), who says that most current 
data lacks measurement at household level, Desai (2010) argues that most data only 
exist for the aggregate or household level, while data for community, state and region 
exist for very few countries. The second challenge that she points out is the use of 
universal indicators in measuring women’s empowerment, while it is, in fact, a 
context specific concept (Odutolu et al. 2003, Mosedale 2005). The most difficult 
challenge, however, is to measure process and agency with respect to women’s 
empowerment. Process has been measured by changes in variables such as education 
and employment over time, and it also depends on the changes of behaviors (in 
fertility or household decision-making) over time. Agency is similarly difficult to 
measure. Since agency implies that women’s own consciousness has been 
transformed, it has to be measured based on women’s own interpretations of what 
they perceive as changes in their own knowledge and perspectives. Measurements on 
agency can only be done through ethnographic studies or surveys at local level (Desai 
2010). 
There have been numerous proposals for a precise framework to study women’s 
empowerment, nonetheless, how to accurately measure the concept remains a 
challenge. Most measurements have only quantified the dimensions of control over 
resources and outcomes, while women’s agency and process remains difficult to 
measure. Moreover, it is challenging to measure women’s empowerment at all 
relevant levels – individual, household, community and nation. Therefore, there has 
not been a well-rounded measurement that precisely captures women’s 
empowerment, especially at the individual level and in developing countries.  
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CHAPTER 2: FOUR PATHWAYS FROM WOMEN’S 
EMPOWERMENT TO CHANGES IN ASPECTS OF FERTILITY 
The relationship between increase in the level of women’s empowerment and 
decrease in fertility is commonly found in the literature. Different measurements of 
women’s empowerment have been operationalized to study its relationship to fertility. 
Macro level indexes have been using data that obtain from countries’ general 
statistics, for example, the country’s rate of women’s literacy, percentage of women 
who finish secondary education, percentage of women’s participation in the labor 
force, proportion of women in parliament, or the year that women were allowed to 
vote in that country. While the level of women's empowerment across countries is 
useful in appraising the country’s progression in improving women’s status over time, 
however, a country’s statistics may have little to do with the actual level of 
empowerment that an individual woman in the country is experiencing. Especially 
when fertility decision-making is the outcome variable, women's empowerment at the 
individual level is critical to the analysis.  
Four commonly studied components of women’s empowerment at the individual level 
are women’s education, women’s participation in the labor force, women’s 
contraceptive use, and women’s participation in household decision-making. 
Furthermore, patriarchal cultural factors are important mediating factors of the 
relationship between women’s empowerment and women’s fertility decision-making. 
The inter-relationships between women’s empowerment and aspects of fertility are 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Four components of women’s empowerment that are often suggested in the literature 
include women’s education, women’s employment, women’s household decision-
making power, and contraceptive use and family related policies. Aspects of fertility 
also include four components: actual fertility (such as the number of children), desired 
fertility (such as the ideal number of children), birth interval and gender preference of 
children. Even though patriarchal culture factors are not included as one of the 
dimensions of women’s empowerment, they act as important common cause factors 
in this two-way relationship. The cultural norms that affect women’s fertility may 
foster the preference for a large number of children or the preference for sons. 
Patriarchal norms may have direct effects on components of women’s empowerment 
as well as on aspects of fertility.  
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Previous studies often found that fertility was negatively associated with women’s 
education and employment (Mason 1987, Brewster and Rindfuss 2000, Axinn and 
Barber 2001, Larsen and Hollos 2003, Grown, Gupta, and Pande 2005). 
Improvements in women’s education increase the chances of women’s employment, 
which in turn brings them more economic independence, and initiates better access to 
health care and contraception use (Mason 1987, Nguyen and Dang 2002, Kabeer 
2005a). A higher level of household decision-making power is also significant to 
women’s ability to control their fertility (Afifi 2007, Upadhyay and Karasek 2012, 
Shoaib, Saeed, and Cheema 2012).  
Studies also find that the relationship between women's empowerment and fertility is 
a two-way one. Women’s empowerment result in lower fertility, and the reverse 
relationship is also valid; fertility decline may lead to increases in women’s 
empowerment. Malhotra (2012) points out that theoretical frameworks that link 
women’s empowerment to fertility also emphasize the reverse relationship in which 
fertility decline transforms gender system and empowers women. Wu, Ye, and He 
(2012) argues that while women’s empowerment is often hypothesized as a cause of 
fertility decline, the reverse relationship has been rarely studied. In their study, they 
examine the link between lower fertility and the empowerment of women in the next 
generation, i.e. the empowerment of daughters when fertility is reduced. The authors 
suggest that, in China, the decline in fertility actually leads to women’s empowerment 
in the way that smaller numbers of siblings in the family gives daughters better 
chances to continue their education, thus increasing their chances of having paid 
employment later on. Allendorf (2012) examines how fertility decline leads to a more 
symmetrical gender system in the family, thus empowering daughters in the natal 
family in India. She argues that as fertility declines, the number of families with 
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children of only one gender increases, thus brings more equal gender roles to sons and 
daughters. Consequently, daughters enjoy greater freedom and more equal 
opportunities to their brothers than previously.  
The literature appears to confirm a reciprocal relationship between women’s 
empowerment and aspects of fertility. Bernhardt (1993) uses the term “circular 
cumulative causality” to properly describe this spiral relationship between 
empowerment and fertility. The magnitude of the influence varies upon socio-
economic contexts and current fertility levels. For example, in societies where high 
fertility and high preference for sons prevail as the norms, a mother would try to bear 
as many sons as she could, thus women and girls would suffer even more.  
Different pathways of how women's empowerment affects aspects of fertility, 
including both actual and desired fertility, birth intervals and gender preference, have 
been suggested in the literature. Four commonly found pathways are: women’s 
education, women’s employment, women’s household decision-making, and 
contraceptive use.   
2.1. Female Education and Fertility 
Female education is generally considered a component of women’s empowerment 
and it has consistently been found as an important factor affecting women’s fertility 
and fertility decision-making. At the individual level, most studies have found that a 
higher level of female education is associated with lower fertility. Lower fertility 
helps women spend more time in education, thus shortening their potential 
reproductive time. At the macro level, indicators of women’s and girls’ education are 
very important ones that have always been included in all global gender-related 
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indexes. They show the progress of a country in terms of policy, incentives and 
encouragements towards promoting women’s education. Nevertheless, there are a 
growing number of studies that suggest that education alone is not the most influential 
factor in lowering fertility, in fact, education combined with paid employment after 
schooling is the critical factor.   
Dixon-Mueller (1993) suggests four ways in which education reduces fertility. First, 
in societies where sexual contact outside marriage is low, more time spent in 
education decreases the exposure time to conception through delayed marriage. 
Longer time spent in education may also increase the probability of non-marriage. 
Second, couples with higher education may have higher aspirations for their children, 
and thus may want to reduce their family size. Third, education enhances the chances 
of women having activities outside the family, especially employment. As a result, 
childbearing becomes a larger sacrifice for women who want to pursue a career. And 
fourth, education exposes women to knowledge and practices of birth control and 
encourages a higher level of communication with their husband about the desired 
family size and contraceptive use. Furthermore, women with higher education are 
more likely to resist subjugation and acquire more power in decision-making.   
There have been quite a number of empirical studies that find higher level of 
women’s education is associated with lower fertility. Increases in time spent at 
schools are often linked to delay in women’s marriage and childbearing. In Turkey, 
results from the Turkish Demographic and Health Survey 2003 proposed that 
women’s completed education is the most important measurement that affects the risk 
of birth for each parity progression, especially for the transition to third birth (Gore 
2010). Lee (2009) suggests that public education and higher education have 
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contributed to women’s development and the fertility decline in Taiwan. In Taiwan, 
women’s higher education leads to the decrease in marriage rates, and in some cases, 
results in increased rates of celibacy. The mean age at marriage in Taiwan increased 
significantly from 22.1 to 28.1 years for women, and from 28.2 to 33.0 years for men 
in the period from 1970 to 2007 (Lee 2009). In Oman, women with higher education 
are more likely to have longer birth intervals (Al-Riyami and Afifi 2003). 
Increase in women’s education is also found to be a determinant of fertility preference 
for a smaller family. Bongaarts (2003) finds that fertility preference is inversely 
associated with education - women with higher education tend to desire a smaller 
number of children. Larsen and Hollos (2003), in their study in Tanzania, suggest that 
it is women’s education that shapes couples’ fertility preference. Surprisingly, the 
husbands’ education has no impact on the couples’ fertility preference. Schultz 
(2005), however, comes to a different conclusion, that education of both men and 
women is critical in demographic transition as well as changes in health and birth 
control practices. Women’s education increases the chance of women’s employment, 
and women’s employment in turn, encourages lower fertility (Mason 1987, Jejeebhoy 
1995, Brewster and Rindfuss 2000, Lim 2002). Employed women are contributors to 
the household’s income, thus have significant input in the family’s overall decision-
making process (Sarangi 1998, Al-Riyami and Afifi 2003).  
Female education is positively associated with higher rates of using healthcare 
services and modern contraception. Subbarao and Raney (1995) find that education is 
a key factor in the usage of prenatal care, delivery services and postnatal care. 
Women with higher education are more likely to have better understanding of their 
health, have fewer children, and take better care of them. Female secondary education 
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is found to be strongly associated with lower fertility (Axinn and Barber 2001, Mason 
1987, Grown, Gupta, and Pande 2005). For example, in Kenya, women with more 
than 4 years of education have a better understanding of the causes of diarrhoea, while 
those with less education only know how to use rehydrating salts without being able 
to explain the causes. Similar findings are found in Nigeria, where more highly 
educated women are more likely to know about family planning and have in-depth 
understandings about diseases and prevention (Kabeer 2005a). The study by Nguyen 
and Dang (2002) on Vietnamese women, using the data from the Vietnam 
Demographic and Health Survey 1997, reveals that women with higher level of 
education have higher odds ratios of using contraception compared to women with no 
schooling. Women with higher education also have higher odds of using modern 
methods rather than just relying on traditional methods.  
Education has been consistently found to be a strong predictor in the decline of 
fertility at both individual and country level. Hayase (2005) studies women’s 
illiteracy rates and total fertility rates in 82 developing countries, using data from the 
World Bank 2000. The results show that, at the country/macro level, there is a 
positive correlation between female illiteracy and the total fertility rate of that 
country. Countries with higher rates of illiterate women are those with higher fertility. 
Subbarao and Raney (1995) study 72 low- and middle-income countries and estimate 
that doubling girls’ secondary education from 19% to 38%, holding all other variables 
constant, would have cut down the 1985 fertility rate from 5.3 to 3.9 children per 
woman.  
Much of previous research on women’s empowerment and education has shown that 
higher education gives women greater control over their bodies and better access to 
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birth-control services, nonetheless, some authors propose that education alone may 
not have such an important role. There has not been a consensus in the literature about 
the relative importance of education and employment for fertility (Mason 1987). 
Some authors argue that female education and employment are irrelevant to women’s 
positions, while others argue that levels of schooling or rates of employment are 
indicators of the autonomy or dependency that women are likely to experience in 
relation to men (Mason 1987). Evidence can be found in developing parts of the 
world, for example, Grown, Gupta, and Pande (2005) found that primary education 
alone is usually not enough for women to overcome gender constraints. For societies 
with strong son preference, where girls face substantial discrimination and higher 
mortality risks than boys, post-primary education for women is needed to enable 
women to reject gender-bias norms or to find alternative opportunities. Similarly, Wu, 
Ye, and He (2012), in a study on fertility decline and women’s empowerment in 
China, concluded that the improvement of women’s social status (in education 
enrolment and labor force participation) was not the key factor in the fertility decline 
in China since 1970s. Instead, it was the result of family planning policies put in place 
by the Chinese government. White, Djamba, and Anh (2001) also suggest that 
government policies were the most influential factors in the fertility decline of 
Vietnam from the late 1980s to the early 2000s.  Bradley (1995) claims that the 
mechanism through which education leads to lower fertility is often attributed to 
Westernization, and there is evidence that education alone may not lead to lower 
fertility [159].  
The overall theme in the literature on women’s empowerment and education is that 
education is an influential factor in lowering women’s actual fertility and desired 
fertility. Higher education delays women’s marriage and childbearing, gives them 
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greater control over their economic status and better access to health care. 
Nevertheless, the precise mechanism through which education lowers fertility has not 
been conclusive. Some authors propose that education may not have such an 
important role after all, but female education in combination with female employment 
is more critical. Still, the weight of evidence suggests a significant impact of 
education on fertility decline.  
2.2. Labor Market Participation and Fertility 
To date, the percentage of women in the population who participate in the labor force 
has been included in all the measurements of women’s empowerment. Female labor 
force participation is considered a major factor that affects fertility. The relationship 
between female labor force participation and lower fertility is an “ecological fallacy”, 
which means at country level, countries with higher rates of female labor force 
participation are countries with higher TFRs, however, at individual level, women 
who have employment are ones with lower fertility.  
At country level, women’s employment is found to be an important factor that lies at 
the heart of most explanations on fertility and fertility changes. In a comparative 
study of TFRs and female labor force participation rates in 21 developed countries, 
Brewster and Rindfuss (2000) revealed that countries with low levels of fertility are 
those with relatively low rates of female labor force participation, and countries with 
higher fertility levels tend to have relatively high rates of female labor force 
participation. Italy, Spain, Greece, and Japan are countries with lowest TFRs, around 
1.2 to 1.3. These countries also have some of the lowest female labor force 
participation rates in the developed world (around 40 per cent). In other high-income 
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countries, TFRs vary from 1.6 to 2.0 and the female labor force participation rates 
range from around 60 to 80 per cent.  
More interestingly, Brewster and Rindfuss (2000) show that in 1970, the relationship 
between female labor force participation and TFR was statistically negative, i.e. high 
fertility indicated low female labor force participation. However, by 1996, the 
relationship reversed; low fertility rates were statistically correlated with low female 
labor force participation. Sweden, Finland, Demark and the United States had almost 
no change in their TFR between 1970 and 1996, while their female labor force 
participation had increased by 15 percentage points. Italy, Spain and Greece 
experienced similar increase in female labor force participation rates, however, their 
fertility rates had declined by more than 1.0 child per woman in the same period. In 
the 1980s and early 1990s, labor force participation rates grew substantially faster for 
women than for men for every region of the world except for Africa, where women’s 
female labor force participation was high in most Sub-Saharan Africa due to their 
importance in horticultural production. In developed countries, increase in female 
labor force participation has been linked to the completion of the fertility transition. 
At the individual level, most studies find that women’s participation in the labor force 
lowers fertility in several ways. First, women’s participation in the labor force 
increases the role incompatibility between being mothers and being workers. Second, 
having paid employment brings more economic independence to women, enhances 
their decision-making power, and encourages their access to healthcare and 
contraception. Third, increase in economic independence also leads to lower rates of 
remarriage and childbearing after marital dissolution. And finally, extensive labor can 
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deteriorate women’s health, increase their burden both at home and the workplace, 
thus replacing their potential for high numbers of children.  
The first pathway, which specifies role incompatibility as the main determinant of 
fertility decline, has received much attention from scholars. When women are 
employed, the opportunity cost of having children is greater for them, as childbirth 
and maternal leave may hinder their career development and social advancement. 
Thus, women with employment tend to delay their childbearing and have fewer 
children than those who have no employment.  
 In their early speculation on the topic, Rindfuss and Brewster (1996) raised an 
interesting notion on childcare norms. According to the authors, beliefs about 
appropriate supervision needed for children are the underlying factor for the 
incompatibility between the roles of women as caregivers and as workers. The more 
maternal supervision the norms describe, the greater the role incompatibility. Hence 
the negative association between fertility and female labor force participation 
becomes stronger. Rindfuss and Brewster (1996) concluded that the incompatibility 
between work and fertility was in fact a variable in the relationship between fertility 
and female labor force participation [292]. Even though the “childcare norms” 
argument is an interesting and reasonable proposition, determining how to measure 
childcare norms and identifying how they vary across contexts remains a difficult 
task.  
Previous literature has noted that as industrialization proceeds and living standards 
improve, children that were once viewed as a potential source of social security for 
parents, now are increasingly viewed as costs rather than benefits (Cain 1984, Davis 
1973, Caldwell 1982, Becker 1960). Bradley (1995) hypothesizes that lower fertility 
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is the result of the competition under economic scarcity, especially in the competition 
for employment. Preference for low fertility may prevail, as children become more of 
a burden than a benefit. In other words, it becomes more expensive to have children. 
The prospect of having several unemployed children may look like a long-term cost 
rather than a potential benefit. Unemployed or underemployed parents may also feel 
reluctant to have large families. 
In the second pathway, paid employment is hypothesized to bring economic 
independence for women, thus enhancing their decision-making power and increasing 
their access to health care and modern contraceptive methods. Women’s fertility is 
hypothesized to decline as a result of such improvements. Previous studies have found 
that women’s empowerment, measured by educational attainment and labor force 
participation, has contributed significantly to the fertility decline (Jejeebhoy 1995, 
Kabeer 2005a). Women’s employment is considered an important factor in improving 
women’s status since it facilitates their capacity to make economic contributions to 
the family. Blumberg (1984, 1988, 2015), in her theories on gender stratification and 
gender and development, emphasizes that the single most important factor – though 
not the only one – to the gender equality is women’s economic power. Similar results 
are found in other developing countries like Turkey, Oman, Kenya and India (Gore 
2010, Al-Riyami and Afifi 2003, Bradley 1995, Sarangi 1998).  
However, not all types of women’s labor are considered empowering. Desai (1994) 
explicitly identified that unpaid activities like fetching fuel, fetching water, helping in 
agricultural operations or raising children, are not considered economic activities by 
men, thus they do not enhance the women’s status in the household. And even though 
women have paid employment, sometimes their incomes are controlled by someone 
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else, not themselves, thus paid employment in this case does not really empower 
women in their household. The study by Batliwala (1994) found that in India, in 
households where wives work for money, their incomes are usually controlled by 
their husbands. Nevertheless, women’s paid employment is not necessarily associated 
with lower fertility. Lim (2002) suggests a number of important factors in female 
labor force participation that lead to fertility transition, including: status in 
employment, employment rates, informal or formal economy, sector of employment 
(industry/agriculture), location of employment (home/ office based), occupational 
segregation, size of enterprise, child labor (contribution of children in family work), 
migration for employment, and other predictors like government regulations. 
In the third pathway from female labor force participation to fertility, economic 
independence may encourage marital dissolution and lower rates of remarriage, both 
of which may reduce overall fertility (Mason 1987). While most studies examine the 
relationship within marriage, Mason (1987) examined the impacts of women’s 
economic independence to their fertility at both during and post-marriage stage. In 
this articulation, Mason used the term “women’s autonomy” to refer to women’s 
independence.  She argues that women’s autonomy increases the chance of women’s 
employment after marital dissolution, as well as the chance of remaining single after 
divorce, and thus diminishing the need of more children. This argument suggests a 
very interesting and rarely studied topic on the demand for children after marital 
dissolution. Empirical evidence shows that sometimes employment actually reduces 
fertility by lessening marriage duration through marital delay or separation. In 
countries where women make up the majority of international labor migration flows, 
like Nicaragua, Philippines, Indonesia and Bangladesh, unmarried women may delay 
marriage, while married women may have lower fertility due to marital separation 
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(Lim 2002). It is notable to acknowledge that the relationship between fertility and 
female labor force participation is not a simple one-direction; each component has its 
own effect on the other and in turn creates a two-way relationship. Women may 
decide their fertility as a result of their economic activity in the labor market, or they 
may choose jobs that accommodate their fertility choices.  
In the fourth and also the final pathway, female labor force participation may affect 
the status of women’s fertility in two ways. Labor-intensive employment may 
increase the burden on women and lead to deterioration of women’s health. Paid 
employment can be exploitative to women. Studies on women working in industrial 
factories in China, Vietnam and Bangladesh suggest that long working hours is the 
major complaint among working women, which brings negative consequences to their 
health as well as to their family lives. Some women take up paid employment but 
household chores and childcare are still their responsibilities. Thus, the burden on 
women is even more intensified. Examples can be found in the case of most 
developing Asian countries and countries with high levels of gender expectation for 
women (McDonald 2000). Data in China show that women with more children tend 
to perform more housework than their husbands, with one additional child increasing 
the net odds by 14.1 per cent; they also have lower levels of satisfaction about their 
family’s status (Wu, Ye, and He 2012).  
Many studies have found that women’s employment is one of the key factors in 
fertility transitions. However, not all types of women’s employment lead to more 
empowerment or lower fertility. Lim (2002) concludes that women’s employment is 
likely to lead to sustained declines in fertility when:  
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• “Women’s employment is empowering or “status enhancing”, so that they 
have control over income and resources and a greater say in family decision-making, 
including in fertility decisions;  
• The conflict between women’s productive and reproductive roles significantly 
raises the opportunity cost of having children; 
• Childcare arrangements are not easily available and the time intensity and 
quality of childcare desired seriously constrain women’s economic activities; 
• The interruption effects (of a period of labor force withdrawal to bear and 
raise young children) involve heavy costs; 
• The returns and satisfactions women derive from participation in economic 
activities are substantially higher than the returns and satisfactions of having 
additional children; 
• Women’s employment and income-earning capacity enhances their economic 
or financial independence and reduces the need to have children as a form of security 
for old age or against adverse economic conditions; 
• Women’s economic role and contribution to family welfare lead to reduced 
sex preference for children and changing attitudes toward the value of daughters; 
• Women’s increasing participation in the labor force is linked to increasing 
investments in girls’ education, and age at first marriage and age at first pregnancy go 
up; and 
• Women work and build up careers before marriage, and age at first marriage 
and age at first pregnancy go up.” (Lim 2002) [204]. 
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The literature seems to converge on the notion that women’s labor force participation 
is a critical factor that enhances women’s empowerment and also leads to lower 
individual fertility and fertility preference. Women’s participation in the labor force 
brings more economic independence to women, enhances their decision-making 
power, and encourages their access to healthcare and contraception. But it can also 
potentially make women less willing to sacrifice their career for childbearing, lower 
rates of remarriage after marital dissolution and women’s health can deteriorate due to 
extensive labor, thus reducing their potential for a high number of children.  
2.3. Women’s Participation in Household Decision-Making and Fertility 
Women’s participation in household decisions can be grouped into two major 
categories: general decisions related to the household and its members, and decisions 
specifically related to health, including fertility and birth control. Decisions on health 
and fertility decisions are considered personal and ideally should be made by the 
cohabiting couple. Generally, a higher level of female participation in household 
decision-making is linked with lower fertility. However, the level of women’s 
involvement in this decision is not uniform across contexts. Senarth and 
Gunawardena (2009) found that in South Asia most of the decisions on women’s 
health are made without their participation.  Berer (1993) claims that “it is often men, 
families and society who decide how many children women have, not women 
themselves, while it is the women who take the responsibility.” [10] Wives’ 
participation in decision-making can range from a passive compliance to their 
husband’s decision, to a marginal contribution, or it can be an equitable participation 
to the decision-making process.  
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Women’s participation in general household decisions is usually the result of age, 
female education and employment. Kabeer (2005b) found that in rural Bangladesh, 
educated women participate in a wider range of decisions than uneducated ones. 
Women with no education participate in an average of 1.1 decisions. The number 
increases to 1.6, 2.0, and 2.3 among women who have primary, middle and secondary 
education, respectively. In Oman, Al-Riyami and Afifi (2003) found a relationship 
between education and employment with a decision-making index. Women with 
university education have the highest scores on this decision-making index compared 
to those who are illiterate or only have primary and preparatory education. In addition 
to education, employment is also a strong indicator in predicting women’s decision-
making index. Paid employment significantly increases women’s scores in this index 
compared to those who have no paid employment.  
Upadhyay and Karasek (2012) used DHS data for four Sub-Saharan African countries 
and found that greater participation in household decision-making was associated 
with a smaller ideal number of children in Guinea. Nevertheless, the study did not 
find a similar result for Zambia, Namibia, or Mali. In Egypt, a study of 3,447 women 
examines the link between women’s use of passive lactation amenorrhea 
(breastfeeding after childbirth) as a family planning method and how it relates to 
women’s empowerment in household decision-making. The results show that 
women’s empowerment in household decision-making is found to be significantly 
and negatively associated with the use of breastfeeding as a contraception method. 
This means that women who have low empowerment in household decision-making 
are more likely to use passive lactation amenorrhea as a contraceptive method, and 
lower use of modern methods (Afifi 2007). It also implies that less empowered 
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women may have more children since using exclusive breastfeeding as a birth control 
method is not as effective and reliable as modern methods.  
Regarding fertility-related decisions, women who participate at higher levels in 
fertility decisions tend to have fewer children. Mason (1987) suggests that higher 
levels of women’s independence lead to better and more equal communication 
between wives and husbands and consequently, result in fertility regulation decision-
making and higher use of contraception. Therefore, wife’s educational level and 
working status are important factors affecting household fertility decisions.  
However, empirical research on women’s participation in fertility decision-making in 
the household is quite limited. Decisions on family size are made within the 
household, yet little research has been done in this area (Hollerbach 1980). Very few 
studies to date have used ethnographic/anthropological approaches. In 1996, 
Johansson et al. (1998) conducted in-depth interviews with 20 Vietnamese couples 
about fertility decision-making. The results show that both husbands and wives agree 
that the husband is the main decision maker regarding family size, including decision 
to have an abortion. Some men in the interviews held unequivocal views of 
supremacy in decision-making: “it is me who decides everything,” while others took a 
more egalitarian view to state that both husband and wife participate in the decision-
making process. Regarding decisions to have an abortion, some couples said they 
decided together and some said they discussed the matter together, but the husbands 
had the final decision. Only one woman explicitly stated that the wife should have the 
final decision in abortion, since she has to suffer all the consequences afterward. 
Despite these strong opinions on the husbands’ role in abortion decisions, in fact, 
some women in the study had undergone an abortion without consulting their 
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husbands first. These women said the potential objection of their husbands prevented 
them from discussing it. 
 A study in Pakistan shows that more than half of the women in the sample (54%) said 
they decided about family size, and 40% said they could participate in the decision to 
some extent (Shoaib, Saeed, and Cheema 2012). However, the results are self-
reported, it depends on how the women feel the level of autonomy they have, thus 
potentially is subjected to some personal bias.  
Only very few studies have focused on the direct impact of women’s household 
decision-making on fertility. Even though the dynamics of women’s participation in 
decision-making are not uniform across countries, generally, women who have more 
power, in both fertility decisions and other household decisions, seem to have higher 
rates of wanting fewer children and actually have fewer children than those who do 
not. 
2.4. Contraception, Population Policy and Fertility 
In the fourth pathway from women’s empowerment to fertility, contraception and 
population policy are among the factors that have significant impacts on fertility. The 
United Nations’ Human Development Reports have emphasized women’s right to 
their reproductive health as a basic human right, and so do scholars. According to 
Dixon-Mueller (1993), reproductive freedom lies at the core of individual self-
determination. It involves three components: “(1) the freedom to decide how many 
children to have and when (or whether) to have them; (2) the right to have the 
information and the means to regulate one’s fertility; (3) and the right to control one’s 
own body” [12]. 
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There is a strong emphasis in the literature on the relationship between 
sexual/reproductive control and women’s empowerment and egalitarian gender 
systems (Malhotra 2012). The invention of the birth control pill in the 1960s has 
contributed to the independence of women as it separated sexual intercourse from 
childbearing (Schultz 2005). Similarly, Malhotra (2012) agrees that an important 
breakthrough in women’s fertility control and the fertility decline is the separation of 
sexuality and procreation.  
Women’s empowerment, reflected through indicators such as education and 
employment, is positively associated with women’s use of contraception (Mason 
1987, Cosio-Zavala 2002, Kabeer 2005b). Much of the fertility decline in developing 
countries was achieved through an increase in contraceptive use. The percentage of 
women of reproductive age in developing countries using contraception rose from 9% 
in 1960 to 61% in 2009 (Allendorf 2012). Women who have low status in the 
household, however, are less likely to use contraception, and even when they do they 
are less likely to use modern methods. Afifi (2007) shows that in Egypt less 
empowered women are more likely to use passive lactation amenorrhea (exclusively 
breastfeed their under-six-month-old infants) as a contraceptive method, and they 
exhibit a lower use of modern methods.  
Despite the widespread use of contraception in many different parts of the world, 
unmet need for modern family planning methods still occurs in developing countries 
(Hayase 2005). Unmet need is defined as the percentage of women who do not desire 
pregnancy but do not use any contraception. In developing countries in the late 1980s, 
reports done by the Demographic and Health Surveys show that there was a high level 
of unwanted births and mistimed childbearing as the result of unmet needs for family 
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planning. More recently, the proportion of women with unmet family planning needs 
in selected Asian countries ranged from 39% in Yemen to 7% in Vietnam (Hayase 
2005). A study by Nguyen and Dang (2002) using data from the Vietnam DHS 1997 
shows that a very high number of women in Vietnam has accessibility to family 
planning. Specifically, 75% of women in the survey live within 1 kilometre from a 
facility that provides family planning services. Of the 5,310 women studied, 92.8% of 
women in urban areas and 91.5% of women in rural areas have met needs for 
contraception. Surprisingly, in Vietnam, the use of contraceptive pills is very low, 
only accounting for 5% of the total modern contraceptive methods use. The lack of a 
national promotion program on the benefits of contraceptive pills makes it less 
appealing to women so the most common belief among them is that the Intrauterine 
Device (or “copper T”) is a better method (Knodel et al. 1995). This evidence 
suggests the important role of national population programs in shaping the fertility 
control behaviors of women.  
Despite strong evidence in the literature which supports the notion that fertility 
control empowers women and thus more empowered women have fewer children, in 
some cases, the relationship between women’s empowerment, contraceptive use and 
lower fertility may be the result of other factors such as age. Data in Kenya show that, 
on the surface, factors which empower women are associated with family planning, 
nevertheless, family planning users tend to be older women and to have more 
economic power (Bradley 1995). It is possible that older women want to end 
childbearing at the same time they start to have more control over their life. Thus, the 
mechanism through which contraception is a result of women’s empowerment is still 
unclear, and the relationship should be examined carefully.  
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A large number of research studies suggest that the implementation of national family 
planning programs in developing countries lead to substantial increases in 
contraceptive use and contributed considerably to the decline in average fertility rates. 
There are an increasing number of countries that have population-intervention 
policies, either to increase or decrease the growth of the population (Hayase 2005). 
Schultz (2005) extensively discusses the role of public population policies in fertility 
behaviors. For example, population policies can subsidize sex education programs, 
provide information regarding best practices in birth control methods, subsidize 
supplies and medical services and promote reproductive health programs. The first 
official national family planning program was launched as early as 1952 in India. 
Government subsidy can lower the cost of contraception, thus making them more 
accessible to women who want to control their family size. Moreover, population 
propaganda and subsidy policies can help speed the diffusion of contraceptive use.  
Population policies can either change the incentives and opportunities that encourage 
people to voluntarily change their fertility, or they can set administrative limits on 
fertility (Schultz 2005). Some governments even adopt involuntary population 
policies such as setting birth quotas with the hope that they can significantly change 
fertility behaviors and quickly reduce birth rates. Two countries that adopted 
government restriction on the number of children per couple are China and Vietnam. 
In China, generally each couple is allowed to have only one child, this was changed 
recently, if either partner is an only child, then the couple can have two children. The 
number may depend on the couple’s location and social position. In Vietnam, each 
couple is allowed to have no more than 2 children. Some authors have raised doubts 
about the effectiveness of population control policies, especially on birth quotas, as 
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the fertility of China and Vietnam had already started to drop before the enforcement 
of the policies (Goodkind 1995b, Cai 2010).  
A number of studies have found that even though fertility in China and Vietnam 
would have decreased anyway, these policies contributed significantly to the rapid 
decline in fertility levels. Wu, Ye, and He (2012) claim that the dramatic fertility 
decline in China was rather directly caused by the government’s birth control policy, 
and surprisingly, not the result of increase in gender equality in both women’s 
education and employment. In Vietnam, family size has been declining since the 
1970s. By end of 1988, when the “one or two child policy” was enforced, the total 
fertility rate of Vietnam had already fallen to below 4 births per woman, compared to 
around 6 in the previous decade (Goodkind 1995b). Similar results are found in 
Taiwan, where the family planning program was launched in 1964 but Taiwan’s 
fertility already had started to decline 10 years before that (Lee 2009).  
Some authors suggest that the fertility decline in developing countries was initiated 
mainly by social development and the diffusion of innovative ideas rather than by the 
effectiveness of population policies (Pritchett 1994, Cleland 2001, Montgomery and 
Casterline 1993). Nevertheless, Lee (2009) argues that the governments' strong family 
programs and other incentives and disincentives were conducive to lower 
contraceptive costs and accelerated fertility decline. Government interventions indeed 
changed the supply of children, through which many unwanted births were prevented 
(Bongaarts 1994).  
Population policies are intended to reduce the growth of population in developing 
countries.  In developed countries with low fertility levels they are intended to 
increase the population growth rate. A review of population policies in 21 developed 
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countries shows that there are two types of national population policies: policies that 
support “nations of families” and policies that support “nations of individuals” 
(Brewster and Rindfuss 2000). Policies that support “nations of families” generally 
strongly support the model of breadwinner-father and homemaker-mother and their 
dependent children, so they actually make it more challenging for women who want 
to balance between being mothers and workers. This is the case in Italy and other 
Mediterranean countries, where family is viewed as a private domain immune from 
government intervention, and low rates of female labor force participation are 
accompanied by extremely low fertility (TFR of 1.2-1.3). Women in these 
Mediterranean countries bear the burden of taking care of extended family members, 
precluding labor force participation and limiting the time available for childrearing 
(Bettio and Villa 1998, McDonald 2000).   
Policies in “nations of individuals” such as Sweden and the United Kingdom tend to 
be supportive of women’s rights and concerned with children’s well-being; moreover, 
they often recognize a diversity of family forms, not just the breadwinner-homemaker 
model (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000). Scandinavian countries are exemplified as those 
with policies that target the well-being of individuals rather than family units. In fact, 
TFRs of Scandinavian countries have never fallen into the lowest-low group, and in 
recent years, they show signs of steady increase. It seems that these policies have 
been keeping the TFRs of Scandinavian countries above the lowest low levels found 
elsewhere (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000). Boling (2008) looks at the expenditures on 
family programs of Japan and France to explain why the TFR of Japan is much lower 
than that of France. She finds that in France, the total spending on family programs 
accounted for 2.5% of the GDP in 1990 and steadily increased to 3.0% in 2003. At the 
same period, the total spending on family programs in Japan was only from 0.4% to 
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0.7% of the total GDP. Nevertheless, not all family-friendly policies are effective in 
increasing fertility in developed countries. Child-care programs and flexible 
workplace arrangements are found to be most significantly correlated with TFRs in 21 
OECD countries, while no significance is found for maternity/childcare leave and 
social expenditures on families like cash benefits (Castles 2003).  
2.5. Cultural Factors in the Relationship between Women’s Empowerment 
and Fertility 
Even though the status of women has been improved significantly and fertility has 
been reduced as the result of the improvement, there are still barriers that both prevent 
women’s empowerment and foster high fertility. Patriarchal culture is an important 
common cause variable that affects both the status of women and fertility preferences. 
As Kabeer (2005a) points out, cultural perceptions play a contextual role in the 
empowerment process. Cultural or ideological norms may deny the inequalities, and 
subordinate groups may not think of inequalities as unjust. Similarly, cultural factors 
may shape fertility preferences, thus affecting contraceptive use and fertility behavior 
(Bélanger, Khuat, and Jianye 2003). 
Patriarchal cultural factors usually affect both women’s empowerment and fertility. 
They do not encourage women’s independence from their husbands and women often 
rely on producing high numbers of children to improve their status in the family. 
There are two ways that patriarchy may influence fertility. First, it may shape the 
preference for high fertility, and second, the preference for sons. These two fertility 
preferences are often correlated with each other: to secure their position in the 
husband’s family, women often want to have more children, especially sons. In 
societies where women are dependent on their husbands and have no outside 
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employment, having more children, especially sons, is viewed as a way for women to 
raise their status, especially in patrilocal marriage where they are cut off from close 
family and kinship. The preference for sons often leads to a large number of children, 
since couples keep trying to have children until they have the desired number of sons.   
For a long time, children were viewed as an important resource for the status of 
women as well as old age security, especially when a woman must marry into an 
extended household of strangers and must live without the economic or social support 
of her natal family or without an independent economic base. Exogamous women 
usually have less security or respect until they have borne at least one child or better 
yet, a son. Caldwell (1982)’s theory of fertility and economic perspectives is built on 
the notion that for a long time, children contribute labor as well as a variety of other 
goods and services to the household. High fertility is advantageous to peasant families 
as the agricultural production unit is the household in most developing countries in 
Asia and Africa. Children are demanded by not only women but also by their 
husbands. Data from Malaysia and Mexico and 18 other developing countries show 
that men actually want higher numbers of children than their wives (Hollerbach 1980, 
Bankole and Singh 1998). As a result, women have more children to please their 
husbands and to secure their positions in the family. 
In pre-transitional societies, women are motivated to marry and have children to gain 
status and ensure economic survival, first through the husband and in later life 
through their children (Hollerbach 1980). Dixon-Mueller (1993) notes that the woman 
is considered “one of the family” only after bearing a child and women who have 
exogamous marriage (marry outside their community) tend to have higher fertility. 
Her explanations suggest that marriage outside the women’s community deprives 
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them of potential resources; thus they have only their children to rely on as sources of 
support and to raise their status. In societies where women’s status is low due to 
socio-economic and cultural factors, producing more children, especially more sons, 
can earn old-age security and add to the prestige of women. On top of that, as an 
“outsider” in the husband’s family, they are less likely to have control of their 
fertility, instead, it is often decided by the husbands or the in-laws.  
In Vietnam, large families are considered a blessing, large families also mean stronger 
kinship and more support from relatives. The study by Goodkind (1995a) more than 
two decades ago notes the preference for a large number of children among rural 
Vietnamese women. He finds that some women in rural parts of Vietnam think the 
one- or two-child policy is out of place, and that they would want at least three 
children. He also suggests a “courtesy bias” in this study since the respondents know 
the government’s policy on family size (one- or two-child policy), so some of them 
tend to respond accordingly to show that their childbearing preference is in line with 
the government, while in fact they probably prefer higher numbers of children.  
The prevalence of patriarchal cultural norms can also affect fertility by encouraging 
the preference for sons, and consequently further lowering the status of women and 
girls. Gender preference, usually for sons, is shaped by cultural traditions and 
community norms, and may have a significant influence on reproductive decisions 
(Hayase 2005). Most studies of the relationship between fertility behaviors and 
women’s empowerment in areas with patriarchal cultural norms have focused on the 
number of children or the number of sons that a woman has. They have generally 
found that as women have larger numbers of children or sons, their levels of 
empowerment tend to increase (Das Gupta 1996, Jejeebhoy and Sathar 2001, 
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Malhotra, Vanneman, and Kishor 1995). A strong preference for sons may be 
associated with low use of contraception, since couples keep trying to have children 
until they have the desired number of sons (Belanger 2002). In India, strong son 
preference is found correlated to higher girls' mortality during childhood years. For 
girls who survive, son preference leads to discrimination against them, such as limited 
access to social and economic resources (Malhotra, Vanneman, and Kishor 1995).  
A comparative study of fertility patterns in North and South India finds that higher 
level of women’s autonomy in the South accounts for the lower fertility of the region. 
Son preference, as a result of patriarchy in India, is found to be the cause of the 
disparity in education, sex ratio at birth, age at marriage, and female labor 
participation (Malhotra, Vanneman, and Kishor 1995). Notably, according to the 
authors, patriarchy is not the only determinant of fertility in India: there is an overlap 
between patriarchy and other determinants such as social development and ethnic and 
class composition. Other researchers have found discrimination against women and 
son preference in different parts of the world such as Pakistan, Taiwan, Vietnam, 
China, Bangladesh, Kenya and indeed, Africa as a whole (Bradley 1995, Kabeer 
2005a, Shoaib, Saeed, and Cheema 2012, Lee 2009, Goodkind 1995a, Bélanger, 
Khuat, and Jianye 2003, Wu, Ye, and He 2012, Mason and Taj 1987). 
One of the countries where son preference is most prominent is China, especially 
under the strong influence of Confucianism. Moreover, the one-child policy makes 
son preference even more intense. Sex ratios at birth in China in the period 2005-2010 
were about 119-120 boys to 100 girls (Blumberg 2015). Researchers have raised 
concern over the extreme imbalanced sex ratios in China, which is predicted to cause 
profound problems for the country’s future population (Johansson and Nygren 1991, 
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Das Gupta et al. 2003, Ebenstein 2008). Wu, Ye, and He (2012) observed that 
Chinese couples with more children are more likely to be constrained by family’s 
resources for their children; thus they tend to invest more on sons than daughters. In 
Vietnam, an ethnographic study by Bélanger, Khuat, and Jianye (2003) reveals that 
the desire for sons stands out as a crucial issue that affects gender and 
intergenerational relations to a great extent. They observe that having a son is a social 
norm that exerts an enormous pressure on everyone participating in the study, 
regardless of education, employment, socioeconomic status, lineage and political role.  
The preference for sons is also attributed to the family and kinship systems (Skinner 
1997, Dyson and Moore 1983). Skinner (1997) believes that “decisions about 
marriage and reproduction are, more often than not, made in the context of families 
and in relation to family strategies” [53]. He suggests that family systems have 
impacts on demographic processes, particularly, the decisions on fertility, and that 
couples shape their fertility decisions in accordance with the family system norms. He 
explicitly states that the most egalitarian gender systems are characterized by 
matrilineal and ambilineal (or bilateral) stem family system and matrilineal joint 
family systems. Skinner (1997) believes that couple’s fertility behavior depends on 
the norms that are prevalent. He does not believe that couples have a target family 
size and stop when they reach it. Couples’ behavior of stopping childbearing, 
according to Skinner, is not simply based on the number alone, but also based on the 
reference to the gender combination of the children. Dyson and Moore (1983) notice 
that the difference in the sex ratios between North and South India was attributed to 
the different family and kinship systems. In the North, the sex ratios are high, i.e. 
higher number of sons than the number of daughters; but in the South, the sex ratios 
are low. The TFR in the North was also higher than the South. Dyson and Moore 
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(1983) explain the difference was the result of the types of kinship systems in the 
North and South India. Marriage in Northern India is strictly exogamous, a large 
dowry is required for marriage, family lines strongly lean towards the husband’s side 
and women do not inherit property. Whereas, in Southern India, marriage is preferred 
between cross-cousins or relatives, thus women are more likely to know the 
husband’s family, brides’ and grooms’ family may share the expense of the marriage 
equally. The authors note that brides in South have more frequent contacts with their 
family than their counterparts in the North.  The regional difference mentioned was 
supposed to affect the level of female autonomy in the two regions (Dyson and Moore 
1983).  
Nonetheless, the preference for sons may change as the preference for high fertility 
declines, which in turn creates a more symmetrical gender system in the family, and 
daughters are able to enjoy more resources. Allendorf (2012) notes that in India, as 
fertility declines, the number of families with children of one gender increases. She 
argues that the increased number of families with children of only one gender brings 
more equal gender roles to sons and daughters. Therefore, daughters are able to enjoy 
greater freedom and better opportunities. Having families with fewer children also 
means more resources for the children, more equal investments for both daughters and 
sons, and that inheritance will be passed down to daughters as well. In that same 
study, Allendorf (2012) observes that most of the respondents agree that daughters are 
equal to sons, and some even prefer daughters to son, with only one respondent who 
preferred sons to daughters. Though the ethnographic interviews are detailed and in-
depth, the sample size is very small (it includes only 20 semi-structured interviews), 
yet the study infers that son preference and preference for high fertility often leads to 
the disempowerment of women, and vice versa.  
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In addition to the gradual diminishment of son preference, the preference for high 
fertility has also diminished. In Taiwan, the preferred number of children has declined 
from 4.0 in 1965 to 2.6 in 1985 to 2.0 in 2002. The number of women who think that 
“there is no need to have children” increases as their education level increases; while 
only 0.93% of the women with elementary education agree with this statement, 7.20% 
of the women with university education do so (Lee 2009). The major reason is found 
to be the economic burden associated with child rearing.   
Recent studies have observed a major shift in fertility preference: in developed 
countries, people are wanting more children than the actual number of children they 
have. While in the past, it has always been the reverse: wanted fertility is lower than 
actual fertility regardless of the country. In Japan, Hayase (2005) found that even 
though the total fertility rate had decreased from 2.00 to 1.77 from the 1960s to late 
the 1970s, the ideal number of children increased in the same period, from 2.24 to 
2.44. Bongaarts (2002) examined the desired number of children and actual 
completed fertility among women of the 1960 birth cohort in 21 developed countries 
in Europe and U.S and Canada and also found similar trends. In all countries studied, 
the desired fertility ranges from 2.0 in Austria and Germany to 2.5 in Sweden, while 
actual completed fertility ranges from 1.65 in Germany and Italy to 2.18 in Poland. 
Relatively advanced developing countries like Thailand and Taiwan are experiencing 
similar patterns, where desired fertility is close to 2.5 while actual fertility is around 
1.7 to 1.9 (Bongaarts 2001). Nevertheless, in a study of 57 developing countries in 
Asia, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa he still finds that wanted fertility is 
lower than actual fertility (Bongaarts 2003).  
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Nearly two decades after the term women’s empowerment began to be used in 
development reports and academic research, there is still no clear framework to 
understand how women’s empowerment affects different aspects of fertility. The 
literature has noted that the improved status of women often increases their 
educational attainment and employment opportunities, more decision-making power 
and especially more autonomy in their fertility. Population policies that subsidize 
contraception and give support to families with children are also significant factors 
that adjust fertility desire and behavior. Yet there are still substantial constraints to 
women’s empowerment, such as the preference for sons and the preference for large 
numbers of children. These patriarchal cultural factors slow down the process of 
empowering women, thus affecting their decisions and behaviors on fertility.  
In order to understand the mechanism through which women's empowerment affects 
aspects of fertility, the first step is to precisely measure women's empowerment at the 
individual level. The gap in the literature has motivated this study to be done to 
validate if women’s labor force participation, women’s education, women’s 
household decision-making, and contraceptive use are four factors of women's 
empowerment as previously suggested. This study incorporates data from developing 
countries in Southeast Asia, which usually lack current measurements.  It also 
measures women's empowerment at the individual level. After being able to identify 
women's empowerment factors, the relationship between women's empowerment and 
fertility preferences as aspects of fertility is analyzed. 
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CHAPTER 3: REGION OF STUDY AND THE DATA  
There have been many studies on women’s empowerment in South Asian countries 
such as India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Microfinance has been extensively studied 
as a determinant for women’s empowerment in South Asia. Similarly, the 
tremendously fast demographic transitions in East Asia have been thoroughly studied 
by various scholars. Southeast Asia is a region with great diversity and dynamics; yet, 
there has been little research about the region on both women’s empowerment and 
fertility transitions. While studies on the demographic transitions of East Asia often 
reveal that population policy and economic growth of this region account for its sharp 
decline in fertility levels, Southeast Asia has been experiencing a similar fast pace of 
decline in fertility levels but the determinants are diverse. Southeast Asian countries 
have a mix of distinctive religions, cultures, population policies and levels of 
development; yet, fertility decline is still observed in every country in the region. To 
fill the gap in the literature on women’s empowerment and fertility in an under-
studied region, this study aims to examine the link between women’s empowerment 
and aspects of fertility in Southeast Asia, specifically the relationship between 
women's empowerment and women’s fertility preference.   
Southeast Asia has been experiencing enormous changes in demographic, socio-
economic and political aspects. It is also a region with fast growing promotion 
programs to empower women. It is an excellent region to study women's 
empowerment and how it relates to the major fertility transition happening in the 
region. In this chapter, first, I will present an overview on Southeast Asia as the 
region of study and review the current trends of demographic changes in the regions. 
Then I will discuss the current situation of women in Southeast Asian countries 
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reflected through international indexes. And finally, an introduction of the 
Demographic and Health surveys as the data used in this study is presented.  
3.1. Southeast Asia as a Region to Study Women's Empowerment  
The concept of Southeast Asia emerged almost by accident from World War II, at the 
Quebec Conference in August 1943, the Western Allies decided to establish a 
separate Southeast Asia Command, embracing Burma (currently Myanmar), Malaya 
(currently Malaysia), Sumatra (currently Indonesia) and Thailand (World Economic 
Forum 2012). This military expedient provided a cohesive framework for a region, 
which had never previously been recognized as a distinct geopolitical area. In the 
literature, only from the 1940s that the name Southeast Asia was used in scholarly 
works (Turnbull 1999, Emmerson 1984). Nowadays, the region consists of 11 
countries: Brunei, Cambodia, Timor-Leste, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Southeast Asia is a region with great 
diversity in socio-economic conditions, culture and religions.  
Southeast Asia is currently home of nearly 600 million people – which accounts for 
almost one tenth of the world’s population. Since the middle of the 20th century, 
Southeast Asia has been experiencing very rapid population growth, much more than 
what scientists would have expected. Average population increase in 1960-1965 was 
2.64% per annum but has been declining to 1.33% in 2000-2005 and then to 1.16% in 
2005-2010.   
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Southeast Asian countries vary greatly in population size. Indonesia alone has nearly 
240 million people, which makes it the most populous archipelago in the world and 
also the fourth most populous country in the world. On the other end of the spectrum, 
Brunei has the smallest population, approximately of 400 thousand people. There are 
small sized countries like Singapore, Timor-Leste, Laos and Cambodia, and medium 
sized countries like Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. 
Population growth rates are very different among Southeast Asian countries. In 2010, 
three countries, including Vietnam, Cambodia, and Indonesia, have population growth 
rates of 1.1% per annum. Thailand and Myanmar have population growth rates of 0 
.7% per annum while the rest of the region has quite high growth rates, from 1.5-3.5% 
per annum. The fastest population growth is observed in Singapore, at 3.5% per 
annum in 2010. However, as the country with the lowest rate of natural increase in the 
region, the population growth of Singapore is mainly attributed to immigration. 
 
Table 3: Background statistics of 11 Southeast Asian countries  
 
Source: World Statistics Pocket Book, United Nations (2012)  (data collected in 2010) 
Country Population 
(2010) 
Population 
growth rate 
2010 (% 
annum) 
Rate of 
natural 
increase 
2005-2010 
(per 1,000 
population) 
GDP (USD) 
(2010) 
(millions) 
GDP per 
capita 
(2010) 
(USD) 
Brunei 399,000 1.9 17.0 15,533 13,024 
Cambodia 14,138,000 1.1 15.1 11,272 797.3 
Timor-Leste 1,124,000 2.1 30.7 794 706.1 
Indonesia 239,871,000 1.1 11.9 707,448 2,949.3 
Laos 6,201,000 1.5 17.5 6,496 1,047.6 
Malaysia  28,401,000 1.7 16.3 237,797 8,372.8 
Myanmar 47,963,000 0.7 9.1 42,027 876.2 
Philippines 93,261,000 1.7 20.0 199,591 2,140.1 
Singapore 5,086,000 3.5 4.2 222,699 43,783.1 
Thailand 69,122,000 0.7 5.7 318,850 4,612.8 
Vietnam 87,848,000 1.1 12.0 103,902 1,182.7 
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Timor-Leste experienced negative population growth in the period from 1995 to 2000 
as the result of the war to gain independence. After claiming its independence in 
2002, the country experienced a dramatic population rebound from -0.5% per annum 
to 4% per annum, and stayed around 2.1% in 2010. With the highest natural increase 
rate in the region, at 30.7 per 1000 population, Timor-Leste is the country with 
highest population growth rate by natural increase in the Southeast Asian region. 
The 1990s witnessed the miracle growth of Asia as a whole and particularly Southeast 
Asia. From 1990-2000, Southeast Asian economic growth was 5.3%, compared to a 
2.8% global economic growth rate. Unfortunately, the economic crisis in 2008 
affected the economic growth of Southeast Asia quite severely. In this year, five out 
of eleven Southeast Asian countries experienced negative economic growth rates. The 
regional growth rate was only 1% compared to 4.3% just one year earlier (United 
Nations 2012). Even though exports to Europe have declined in recent years, 
Southeast Asian economies still manage to sustain moderate economic growth. In 
2011, the annual per cent growth in the GDP of Southeast Asia was approximately 
4.5% (United Nations - Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
2011). 
One of the aspects of Southeast Asia that amazes most scholars who study the region 
is the very fast demographic changes occurring in the region since the 1950s. 
Demographers refer to demographic transition as the change from a high fertility-high 
mortality model in the population to a low fertility-low mortality model. In Southeast 
Asia in the 1960s, mortality rates declined significantly while fertility rates also 
declined, “faster than any observer would have imagined in 1960” (International 
Monetary Fund 2012). The total fertility rate per women declined from 6.03 children 
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per woman in 1950s to 5.32 in the 1970s and further declined to 2.20 in 2010, which 
was 0.3 children lower than the world’s total fertility rate (Jones 1995, United Nations 
- Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 2011). Despite the lower 
fertility rates, the region’s population will continue to grow before it really levels off. 
High fertility in the past decades brings a high population in the working age to the 
current economy. For that reason, demographic transitions in Southeast Asia have 
been suggested as one of the reasons for the region’s miracle economic emergence.  
Southeast Asia is a region of great diversity in religions. Religion acts as a factor that 
influences social norms about the status of women, as well as the fertility norms in the 
society. Hence, it is noteworthy to take the religious diversity in Southeast Asia into 
consideration while studying the empowerment of women and fertility. Table 4 shows 
the percentage of the population by religions in Southeast Asia. 
 
Islam is most commonly practiced in Southeast Asia, mostly Brunei, Malaysia and 
Indonesia. More than 240 million people in the region are Muslim, which accounts for 
16% of the world’s Muslim population. Christianity and Buddhism are also 
commonly observed in Southeast Asian countries. The majority of the population in 
Timor-Leste and Philippines are Christian of different denominations, and only a very 
Table 4: Per cent of Population by Religions (Southeast Asian countries) 
Country Islam Christianity Buddhism Other Confucianism None 
Brunei 67 10 13 10   
Cambodia 2.1  96.4 1.3   
East Timor 1 99     
Indonesia 86.1 8.7  5.2   
Laos  1.5 67 31.5   
Malaysia 60.4 9.1 19.2 7.8 2.6 0.8 
Myanmar 4 4 89 3   
Philippines 5 92.5  2.5   
Singapore 14.9 14.6 42.5 0.7  14.8 
Thailand 4.6 0.7 94.6 0.1   
Vietnam 0.1 7.2 9.3 2.6  80.8 
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small part of the population is Muslim. Five out of eleven countries have Buddhism as 
the majority religion, including Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Singapore and Thailand. 
Vietnam seems to be an outlier in religion with surprisingly 80.8% of the population 
not being associated with any religion. This is likely due to the discrimination by the 
Communist party in the 1960s, which associated religion with superstition and 
backwardness. There is likely a large number of people who are in fact Buddhist and 
Confucians but do not officially register their religious beliefs. 
3.2. Demographic Trends in Southeast Asia  
The beginning of demographic transition in Southeast Asia took place as early as in 
the 1960s. The region has been experiencing dramatic demographic changes, most 
notably the fertility decline. The decline happens even in countries with low economic 
development, which is in contrary to classic theories on fertility transitions, which 
states that fertility decline often accompanies industrialization and economic 
development. There is also a major delay in women’s age at marriage and 
childbearing, attributed to better education and employment opportunities for women, 
which significantly contribute to the fertility decline in the region. 
Fertility Is Declining 
Demographic transition describes the change from high fertility – high mortality to 
low fertility – low mortality. Asia’s demographic transition follow this model, but at a 
very rapid pace, much faster than 19th century Europe (Bloom and Williamson 1998). 
In the classic model of demographic transition, the decline in child mortality would 
lead to a decline in fertility, since couples reduce the need to have high fertility to 
compensate for the number of children that may die. The population growth in 
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Southeast Asia has slowed down due to the decline in fertility (Bloom and 
Williamson 1998). Table 5 shows the population growth in Southeast Asia in terms of 
population increase, natural increase, total fertility rates and infant mortality rates. 
 
In six decades, from the 1950s to 2010s, the population growth rate of Southeast Asia 
has declined by about half, from 2.2% per annum to 1.2% per annum. During that 
period, the natural increase rates (calculated by the crude birth rate minus the crude 
death rate), which represent the portion of population change due exclusively to births 
and deaths, declined from 22.2% per annum to 12.5% per annum. For one decade, 
from 1960-1970, it peaked at 26% per annum, then fell steadily ever since. The infant 
mortality rate in the region has declined dramatically by more than 6 times, from 165 
infant deaths per 1,000 births to 27 infant deaths per 1,000 births in the period from 
1950 to 2010. The decline in the region’s population growth was mainly contributed 
by the decline in total fertility rates. Figure 2 shows the decline in Total Fertility 
 
 
Table 5: Population Growth in Southeast Asia, 1950-2010 
 
Source: United Nations Population Division (2010)  
Period Population 
increase 
(% per annum) 
Rate of natural 
increase 
(% per annum) 
Total fertility 
rate 
(per woman) 
Infant mortality 
rate 
(per 1000 births) 
1950-1955 2.222 22.2 6.05    165 
1955-1960 2.535 25.2 6.22    142 
1960-1965 2.648 26.5 6.25    123 
1965-1970 2.601 26.2 6.06    106 
1970-1975 2.452 24.7 5.62    94 
1975-1980 2.154 22.6 4.81    81 
1980-1985 2.255 22.5 4.22    66 
1985-1990 2.056 20.4 3.59    55 
1990-1995 1.736 18.3 3.11    45 
1995-2000 1.509 15.4 2.66    38 
2000-2005 1.331 14.1 2.45    32 
2005-2010 1.163 12.5 2.27    27 
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Rates in 11 Southeast Asian countries and the region as a whole during the period 
from 1950 to 2010. 
 
Source: United Nations Population Division (2010)  
 
Most countries experienced rapid fertility decline from 6-7 births per woman to 
around 2-3 births per woman in six decades. Compared to the East Asia, where the 
TFR has dropped to the lowest-low level of 1.3, the TFR of Southeast Asia is around 
2.2, which is very close to the sustainable level of 2.1. One of the reasons why 
Southeast Asia regional fertility does not drop to the lowest-low level is because 
Southeast Asian women tend to get more help from their kinship system and than 
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women in East Asia, even though they also have high female labor force participation 
rates (Blumberg 2015). The rapid decline of total fertility rate in Southeast Asia 
together with the overall fertility decline in Asia was considered faster than Europe at 
the onset of demographic transition (Bloom and Williamson 1998).  
Nevertheless, Singapore and Thailand are the two countries with the lowest total 
fertility rates in the region. These countries were also ones that first completed the 
fertility transition – a stage where high total fertility rate declines to around 2.1 
children per woman. The TFRs of these two countries are now around 1.0 in the most 
recent decade. Concerns about the consequences of below replacement fertility levels 
in these two countries such as population aging and the feminization of the elderly 
population, have been raised (Gubhaju and Moriki-Durand 2003) .  
Cambodia and Timor-Leste are the only two countries in the region that experienced 
increases in the total fertility rates during the period from 1950-2010. In the 1950s, 
Cambodia’s total fertility rate was close to 7.0, and later declined to about 5.0 in the 
beginning of 1970s, overlapping with the genocide by the Khmer Rouge in 
Cambodia. It was estimated that about 2.2 to 2.8 million Cambodians were killed 
during the Khmer Rouge regime, mainly by execution, starvation and illness 
(Heuveline 1998). The fertility rate was consequently lowered as the result of the 
massive loss in the population. After the end of the Khmer Rouge in 1979, the 
population of Cambodia increased dramatically; this phenomenon is often referred to 
as the demographic rebound. In the early 1980s, the total fertility rate of Cambodia 
increased from around 5.0 to 7.0. Nevertheless, the increase only lasted for one 
decade. Cambodia’s total fertility rate started to decline steadily since the 1990s to the 
present, and is currently around 3.0 children per woman. 
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Another country in Southeast Asia, which has a recent history of war and conflict, is 
Timor-Leste. The country’s total fertility rate experienced two sharp increases in the 
1980s and 2000s. Both were demographic rebounds after two periods of killings and 
excess deaths caused by hunger and illness. The first rebound happened after the 1975 
invasion by Indonesia, only 9 days after East Timor claimed independence. It was 
estimated that about 18,600 killings and 84,200 excess deaths resulted from this 
event. The 1980s fertility increase was the rebound effect of the excessive loss of the 
population. The sharp increase in this period boosted the total fertility rate to the level 
of the decade before. The second total fertility rate increase was in the 2000s, 
following the independence of Timor-Leste in 2002. The sudden increase in the total 
fertility rate was the result of reunions of couples separated during the resistance 
campaign for independence. It was also the result of new unions established after the 
independence of the country. East Timor’s fertility rate only showed signs of decline 
in the last decade, making it the latest country that joined the trend of fertility decline 
in Southeast Asia.  
The total fertility rates of Vietnam, Brunei and Indonesia have declined steadily since 
the 1950s and currently stay around replacement level (2.1 children per woman). 
Among these three countries, only Brunei is considered a middle-income country with 
GDP per capita of US$13,000. Vietnam and Indonesia are considered low-income 
countries. The completion of fertility transition in Vietnam and Indonesia is 
remarkable and unexpected to scholars in regard to their level of socioeconomic 
development. Similar to Cambodia and Timor-Leste, the demographic rebound was 
also observed in Vietnam in the 1970s post-war period, where fertility rose for one 
decade and started to decline right afterward. Some scholars suggest that the 
government’s population policy could be one of the major factors that contribute to 
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the significant decline in fertility. Vietnam was the first country in Southeast Asia to 
adopt a policy to reduce the population growth rate, which took place in 1963. Soon 
after, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines followed suit. 
Also experiencing rapid decline in fertility from 1950 to 2010, however, the total 
fertility rates in Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, and the Philippines are still currently 
around 3.0. Laos entered the onset of fertility transition quite late compared to other 
Southeast Asian countries except for Timor-Leste. The country’s fertility level did not 
show signs of stagnation or decline until the 1990s. Nevertheless, their rate of decline 
was extremely fast, at about 1.0 child fewer per woman per decade in the last three 
decades.   
Delayed Marriage and Childbearing  
Alongside the decline in the total fertility rate, age at marriage of Southeast Asian 
women is also increasing. Women’s age at marriage is a very important determinant 
of the decline in fertility in the region. Social and economic changes that happen 
rapidly in the region have created more opportunities for women in education and the 
job market. As women spend a longer time in education and participate in the labor 
force afterwards, their marriage and family patterns also have changed. Women are 
getting married and having their first child later than previous generations.  
Delayed marriage in Western societies is often associated with the rise in the 
cohabitation rate, whereas in Asian culture it is uncommon for women to cohabit 
before marriage. Most births in Southeast Asia happen within marriage, thus marital 
fertility accounts for the majority of the total fertility in the region. As a result, the 
trend of delaying marriage by Southeast Asian women has a significant impact on the 
regional decline in fertility. Jones (1995, 2007) views the delay in marriage and 
 79 
childbearing as one of the key factors that contributes to the fertility decline in 
Southeast Asia.  
The average women’s age at marriage has risen all over Southeast Asia since 
the1960s.  The median age at marriage of Malaysian women rose by 5 years, from 17 
to 22 in the period from 1957-1980 (United Nations Population Division 2010). 
According to the World Fertility Report 2009, the mean age at first marriage of 77 
countries rose significantly from 21.8 to 24.7 during the period from 1970 to 2008. 
Data are not available for all countries in Southeast Asia but in countries where data 
are available, mean age at marriage of women has increased over the years. For 
example, in Indonesia, women’s age at marriage has increased from 15.9 (in 1976) to 
19.2 (in 1998) and later to 20.8 (in 2007). In the Philippines, women’s age at marriage 
has increased from 19.6 (1978) to 22.0 (1993) and 22.2 (in 2003). In Singapore, 
women’s age at marriage increased from 25.7 to 27.1 in only one decade, from 1998-
2008, which makes Singaporean women the latest to marry in Southeast Asia. 
Concurrent with the increase in age at marriage, women’s average age at childbearing 
is also increasing. In all Southeast Asian countries but Thailand, women’s age at 
childbearing has increased, even though only slightly. According to the World 
Fertility Report 2009, the mean age at childbearing of Thai women has declined 
dramatically from 30.8 to 26.9 in the period from 1969 to 1996, while the TFR 
decreased from 6.1 to 2.0 in the same period.  
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As women delay marriage, the risk of them not getting married at all potentially 
increases as well. In 2000, 25.9% of Myanmar women and 16.1% of Thai women at 
the age of 30-34 were single. In some countries in the region, about 15% or more of 
women will remain single by the end of their reproductive period (Jones 2007). Other 
estimation shows that in 1990, in Thailand, the proportion of never-married women in 
the 40-44 age group was 7%, which is a 4% increase since 1970 (Ean 2002).  In 
Vietnam, about 7% of the women aged 35-39 and 7% of women aged 40-44 were 
never-married (Bélanger 2004). The proportion of Singaporean women who remained 
single at 45-49 has increased from 1% to 13% during the period from 1970 to 2000. 
In the same period, the proportion of Chinese Malayan women who remained single 
increased from 2% to 5%, and the proportion of Thai women who remain single 
increased from 3% to 8%.   
3.3.Women’s Empowerment In Southeast Asia in International Indexes 
In recent years, improvement in the status of women has been observed in all parts of 
Asia, including Southeast Asia. An analysis on the trend of global indexes on gender 
Table 6 : Mean age at child bearing of Southeast Asian women over time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data from World Fertility Report (2009) 
---: data not available 
Countries 
Year 
Age at 
Childbearing Year 
Age at 
Childbearing 
Brunei  1970 28.9 1996 29.9 
Cambodia 1986 --- 1993 29.6 
Indonesia 1969 27.9 1996 28.1 
Malaysia 1970 29.4 1995 30.0 
Myanmar 1973 --- 1994 29.8 
Philippines 1970 30.6 1996 29.2 
Singapore 1970 29.1 1995 29.8 
Thailand 1969 30.8 1996 26.9 
Timor-Leste 1972 --- 1993 29.8 
Viet Nam 1971 --- 1994 27.7 
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equality and women’s empowerment can picture the improvement of women’s status 
in Southeast Asia at a global scale. There are several indexes that are frequently used 
to measure the status of women in relation to men. The Gender Inequality Index (GII) 
was developed by the United Nations and is mostly used in the Human Development 
Report. The global Gender Gap Index (GGI), developed by the World Economic 
Forum, is reported annually since 2006. The Social Institutions and Gender Index 
(SIGI) was only recently developed by the Development Centre of the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2009.  
The Gender Inequality Index 
The Gender Inequality Index (GII) was developed and was first used in the Human 
Development Report 2010 by the United Nations. It was developed as an 
improvement from the Gender Development Index and the Gender Empowerment 
Measure Index, which had been used since 1995 in the Human Development Report. 
The new GII captures the loss due to gender inequality in three dimensions: 
reproductive health, empowerment and labor market participation. The GII takes 0 as 
perfect equality and 1 as perfect inequality. A higher score implies greater gender 
inequality and vice versa, a smaller score implies better equality for women.  
The 2012 GII includes rankings of 148 countries with data available. In Southeast 
Asia, Singapore is the country with the highest rank. In 2012, Singapore is 
remarkably ranked 13th globally in terms of gender equality. Malaysia, Vietnam, 
Thailand, Philippines and Myanmar are among the medium-high, with rankings 
ranging from 44 to 80. Cambodia, Laos and Indonesia are among the lower ranked 
countries, from 96 to 106, which indicate gender inequality is more prevalent in these 
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countries than in the rest of Southeast Asia. Their rankings are only better than those 
of countries in Africa and some in the Middle East.  
 
The country ranking in table 7 shows the trend of Southeast Asian countries’ rank 
from 1995-2012. The rankings may give the impression that Southeast Asian 
countries are doing worse in term of gender equality since the ranks have not been 
improved in recent years. For example, in 2011, Singapore ranked 8th, but down to 
13th place in 2012. Malaysia ranked at 28 in 2000 but down to 44 in 2012. The same 
trend is observed in all other countries in Southeast Asia. The biggest loss in ranking 
is Laos, whose rank was 57 in 2000 and down almost two folds, to 101 in 2012. 
However, all Southeast Asian countries are getting progress in gender equality in 
terms of actual GII scores. The lower rankings are due to the overall progress in other 
countries outside of Southeast Asia.  
The ranks are inversely correlated to the actual GII score, i.e. the higher the score the 
worse that country is in gender equality. In order to make the GII index easier to 
interpret and consistent with the ranks, i.e. higher ranks mean higher scores. The 
Table 7: Ranks by the Gender Inequality Index for Southeast Asian countries, 2000-2012 (by 
highest ranks first in 2012, out of 148 countries) 
Country 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 
Singapore  13 7 8  13 
Malaysia 28 40 42 43  42 
Vietnam 29 42 45 48  48 
Thailand 41 64 63 69  66 
Philippines 43 69 70 75  77 
Myanmar --- --- 77 96  80 
Cambodia 62 96 85 99  96 
Laos 57 95 93 107  100 
Indonesia --- 97 91 100  106 
Timor-Leste --- --- --- --- --- 
Brunei --- --- --- --- --- 
Source: Gender Inequality Index (ranks based on actual scores) 
---: no data available 
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actual GII score is recoded into a new score by taking 1 minus the country actual GII 
score, or [Recoded GII = 1- actual GII score]. This recode runs from 0 to 1, with 0 as 
the lowest value, and 1 as the highest value. Figure 3 shows the recoded GII scores 
over time, from 1995-2012. 
 
The recoded Gender Inequality Index from 1995-2012 reveals that more equality for 
women is being achieved in all Southeast Asian countries, despite the decrease in 
their rankings. According to the recoded GII index, from 1995 to 2012, Singapore 
always had the highest score, which is around 0.9, well above other countries in the 
region in terms of gender equality.  
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The second best ranked countries, Malaysia and Vietnam, stand significantly below 
Singapore, with the recoded GII in the 0.7s in 2012. Thailand scores around 0.6, a 
little above Philippines and Myanmar. Laos, Cambodia and Indonesia score the 
lowest, around 0.5 in the recoded index.  
Overall, most countries have increased by approximately 0.1 in their scores during the 
period from 1995-2012. Laos had a very dramatic improvement in the index from 
1995-2000. The country improved its score by almost 0.2 point in just 5 years, from 
1995 to 2000, and a total improvement of 0.3 point in the period 1995-2012. The very 
low score in 1995 (only 0.2) suggests that Laos’s GII score might have been suffered 
from lack of sufficient data for calculation in 1995.  
The Gender Gap Index 
The second most frequently used index in measuring gender inequality is the global 
Gender Gap Index, which has been developed by the World Economic Forum since 
2006. This index claims to capture national gender gaps in economic, political, 
education and health. The gender gap is measured by the female/male ratios in 
relevant aspects. For example, economic participation and opportunity are measured 
by the labor force participation rates of men and women, ratio of female-to-male 
earnings, and wage equality for similar work.  
Educational attainment is measured by the ratio of women to men in primary, 
secondary and tertiary education; the ratio of women to men in the literacy rate is also 
used. Health is captured by the sex ratio at birth and the difference between women’s 
and men’s life expectancy. The political empowerment aspect of the index is captured 
by the ratio of women to men in minister-level positions and the ratio of women to 
men in parliamentary positions. Additionally, the ratio of women to men in terms of 
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years in a prime ministerial or presidential office in the last 50 years is also included. 
The ranking does not include all the countries in the world due to the lack of data. 
Table 8 shows the rankings of Southeast Asian countries from 2006 to 2012. 
 
 
Similar to the GII, the GGI takes values from 0 to 1, but in the opposite direction, a 
score of 1 indicates perfect equality and 0 indicates perfect inequality. According to 
the Global Gender Gap Index, Cambodia is a low income country; Philippines, 
Vietnam, East Timor and Indonesia are lower-middle income; Thailand and Malaysia 
are upper-middle income countries, and Singapore and Brunei are high income 
countries. Despite criticism of the GGI that the country’s income is overcompensated 
for in the index, it does not seem that high income countries are more likely to score 
higher in this index.  
Southeast Asian countries can be divided into three groups depending on their 2012 
rankings in the index: high ranking – includes the Philippines (8); middle ranking - 
includes Singapore (55), Thailand (65), Vietnam (66), East Timor (68), Brunei (75); 
and low ranking – includes Indonesia (97), Malaysia (100) and Cambodia (103). The 
Table 8: The Global Gender Gap Index rankings for Southeast Asian countries, 2006-2012 
(by highest ranks first in 2012, out of 132 countries) 
Source: The Global Gender Gap report (2012)  
---:  data are not available. 
 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Philippines 6 6 6 9 9 8 8 
Singapore 65 77 84 84 56 57 55 
Thailand 40 52 52 59 57 60 65 
Vietnam --- 42 68 71 72 79 66 
East Timor --- --- --- --- --- --- 68 
Brunei --- --- 99 94 77 76 75 
Indonesia 68 81 93 92 87 90 97 
Malaysia 72 92 96 100 98 97 100 
Cambodia 89 98 94 104 97 102 103 
Laos --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
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trends from 2006 to 2012 show that all Southeast Asian countries except for 
Singapore have been moving downward in their rankings in this index. For example, 
the Philippines, ranked number 8th globally, which is a very remarkable ranking for a 
lower-middle income country. Nevertheless, it is 2 positions downward compared to 
its 2006 ranking. Thailand was ranked 40 in 2006 but moved down to 65 in 2012, 
making it the country with the largest drop among all Southeast Asian countries. 
Singapore moved up from 65 in 2006 to 55 in 2012.  
The rankings of Southeast Asian countries in the GGI by the World Economic Forum 
are comparable to the rankings in the GII by the United Nations, except for the 
dramatic difference between the rankings of Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia. In 
2012, the GGI ranks Philippines number 8th globally and the best in the region, while 
the GII ranks it 77. The difference between the two indexes seems to be too dramatic 
for the same country. In the same year, the GGI ranks Singapore 55th globally, and the 
GII ranks Singapore 13th, also the best in the region in terms of gender equality. Such 
striking difference between the rankings of the two countries in the two indexes raises 
the question why such difference exists.  
The GGI measures the gender gap without taking the level of development into 
consideration, while the GII does consider this indicator. This may explain why 
Singapore, as a developed country with high GDP and high GDP per capita is ranked 
very high in the GII index. The same explanation can be applied to Malaysia, which is 
ranked 44 in the GII while only ranked at the 100th place in the GGI. Malaysia has the 
third highest GDP per capita in the region, thus the country ranks higher in the GII, 
whereas the country’s level of development is not accounted for in the GGI. On the 
other hand, in the sub-index of representation of women in political participation, the 
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GGI accounts for the number of years that the country is led by a female head of state 
or a female president in the last 50 years, while the GII does not include this variable. 
In the last 50 years Philippines has had 2 female presidents, who served for a total of 
15 years while Singapore has never had a female president. This may contribute to the 
fact that Philippines is ranked very high in the GGI while Singapore is only ranked at 
the medium range. 
The GGI rankings over the years may give the impression that Southeast Asian 
countries are losing in their gender gap index, however, the actual scores of the GGI 
indicate otherwise. Most countries have shown increases in the actual scores during 
the period from 2006 to 2012, implying that the status of women is getting better in 
all countries in Southeast Asia.  
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Figure 4 shows the trends in GGI scores of Southeast Asian countries (where data are 
available) over time. While some countries like Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Vietnam and Thailand showed only a slight increase in the GGI scores, countries like 
Philippines, Singapore and Brunei improved their score quite significantly. From 
2006 to 2012, Singapore increased its score by 0.04, and Brunei and Philippines 
increased their score by 0.03 and 0.02, respectively. As the Index breaks down to the 
ratios between women and men in economic, health, education, and politics, the 
increase in this index of the region implies that more Southeast Asian women are 
participating in to these four major social aspects. 
The Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) 
The Social Institutions and Gender index was developed by the Development Centre 
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2009. 
There have been three SIGI reports, released in 2009, 2012 and 2014. The SIGI aims 
to “capture, quantify and measure social institutions that discriminate against women 
and girls”. The SIGI claims its difference to other indexes is that it tries to capture the 
underlying social institutions that influence gender roles and provides insights into the 
causes of gender inequality, while other indexes only capture the outcomes. Similar to 
the GII and the GGI, the SIGI takes values from 0 to 1, where 0 means a perfect score 
of gender equality.  
There are five sub-indexes in the SIGI, including: discriminatory family code, 
restricted physical integrity, son bias, restricted resources and entitlements, restricted 
civil liberties. Each sub-index includes detailed variables that measure the availability 
of laws that protect the rights of women, and the prevalence of discrimination against 
women. For example, the discriminatory family code sub-index includes variables on 
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legal age of marriage, early marriage prevalence, parental authority, and inheritance. 
The restricted physical integrity sub-index includes variables on violence against 
women, female genital mutilation, and reproductive integrity (unmet need for 
contraception). The sub-index of son bias includes variables that show the missing 
women issue, and fertility preferences. The restricted resources and entitlements sub-
index includes variables on women’s access to land, other property and credit. The 
last sub-index, restricted civil liberties, includes variables on access to public places 
and ability to raise a political voice.  
Table 9 shows the SIGI scores and rankings of Southeast Asian countries (where data 
is available) for the years 2009, 2012 and 2014. The 2009 and 2012 reports put 
countries in a global ranking, however, the 2014 reports only gives actual scores and 
put countries in groups based on the level of gender discrimination in social 
institution. There are four groups: low (0.04 < SIGI < 0.12), medium (0.12 < SIGI < 
0.22), high (0.22 < SIGI < 0.35), and very high (SIGI > 0.35). 
Table 9: The Social Institutions and Gender Index Rankings and Scores for Southeast 
Asian countries, 2009-2014 (by highest score in 2014 first) 
Countries 2009 
Rankings 
2012 
Rankings 
2014 
Scores 
Singapore 21 --- --- 
Malaysia --- --- --- 
Brunei --- --- --- 
Cambodia 27 13 0.0477 
Thailand 16 25 0.1056 
Laos 38 49 0.1445 
Indonesia 55 32 0.1532 
Philippines 7 12 0.1765 
Vietnam 31 42 0.1865 
Timor-
Leste 
--- --- 0.2550 
Myanmar 41 44 0.2935 
Source: Social Institution and Gender Index, OECD, 2013, 2014 
---: Data not available 
According to the 2014 SIGI index, Cambodia is the country that has the lowest gender 
discrimination of the eight Southeast Asian countries where data are available. 
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Categorization based on 2014 data puts Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, Indonesia, 
Philippines and Vietnam as countries with low gender discrimination, whereas Timor-
Leste and Myanmar are countries with high gender discrimination. The 2012 SIGI 
ranks Philippines in 12th place, highest among all Southeast Asian countries. Other 
countries in the region are placed in the medium range among 86 countries that were 
ranked in the SIGI. Cambodia is surprisingly ranked 13, despite it never having 
ranked that high in the GGI or GII.  
In all three indexes, the GII, the GGI and the SIGI, Southeast Asian countries are 
currently at the medium ranks, with some even at high ranks, implying that gender 
inequality in Southeast Asia is better than African and some Middle Eastern countries, 
especially those with current conflicts, but not as good as European, North and South 
American countries.  Nevertheless, there is an inconsistency among the highest 
rankings countries in the three indexes. Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia and 
Cambodia are ranked at high places in one index but not in the other. The 
inconsistency may be due to the difference in the variables and calculation of each 
index.   
How to precisely measure women's empowerment has always been a challenging 
task, especially in the case of Southeast Asia, a region with great diversity. Southeast 
Asia is generally considered the “historically more gender egalitarian” region of Asia 
(Blumberg 2015), however, with different socio-political and culture aspects at play, 
the situation of women’s empowerment varies greatly across countries.  
Examples from the current indexes that measure women’s empowerment in Southeast 
Asia have already shown different rankings and interpretations on gender equality in 
these countries. On the other hand, Southeast Asia has been undergoing enormous 
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demographic changes in fertility and fertility preference, and progressive 
improvement of women’s participation in education and labor force. Southeast Asia is 
indeed the perfect region to examine the relationship between women’s empowerment 
and fertility preferences.  
Even though at the macro level, some components of women’s empowerment, such as 
women’s education and women’s labor force participation, have been suggested as 
the determinants of the fertility transition, very few studies actually mention 
individual women’s empowerment as a factor of the demographic transition in 
Southeast Asia. The case of Southeast Asia challenges classical demographic 
transition theories, which state that socioeconomic development is the key factor to 
fertility decline. This research looks for evidence that shows it could be possible that 
women’s empowerment at the individual level is the driver for changes in fertility 
preference and actual fertility, well before socioeconomic development takes place.  
3.4. The Demographic and Health Survey Data 
Frequently mentioned as a multifaceted term, good measurements of women’s 
empowerment requires detailed information on various aspects of women’s lives and 
their decisions. Appropriate data should include details on four women’s 
empowerment components: female labor force participation, women’s education, 
household decision-making, and contraceptive use. Since it is hypothesized that 
women’s empowerment is one of the determinants that affect fertility preferences, 
data about fertility history and fertility related decisions like the number of sons and 
daughters born and the ideal number of children are also necessary. It also requires 
data sets to be comparable across countries for the purpose of the analysis.  
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One of the major challenges is the selection of quality data on Southeast Asia, since 
the region is much under-studied in terms of quantitative large-scale surveys. The 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) provides the most appropriate data sets for 
this analysis on women’s empowerment and fertility preferences. The surveys contain 
standardized core questionnaires that are comparable across countries, yet still take 
into account country-specific questions. They usually have large and nationally 
representative samples. Even though DHS surveys are not implemented in all 
countries in Southeast Asia, half of the countries in the region have had DHS 
implemented and high quality data have been obtained over the years.     
Data used in this study are from the countries’ Demographic and Health Surveys, a 
project established and funded by the U.S Agency for International Development 
(USAID). The DHS program, started in 1984, has provided technical assistance to 
344 surveys in over 90 countries, with a special focus on population health and 
development in developing countries. Countries that participate in the DHS surveys 
are primarily countries that receive USAID assistance with a few exceptions where 
countries receive support from non-USAID sources, but from other United Nations 
donors like UNICEF, UNFPA or the World Bank.  
The focus on developing countries of the DHS is also the reason why its data are 
chosen for the purpose of this research. The detailed survey questionnaires are mostly 
standardized across countries, making it particularly effective for cross-countries 
comparison. There have been six phases of the DHS surveys implemented since 1984 
to date. Each DHS survey takes on average from 18 to 20 months to finish from start 
to complete, which is executed in four phases. 
 93 
DHS surveys are implemented by a national agency of the country, usually the 
National Statistical Office, Ministry of Health, a family planning organization, a 
university, a government or private research group. In most countries, National 
Statistical Offices are often selected because they usually are the sources of the 
necessary sampling procedures and they frequently are the organizations that have the 
most experience in the execution of surveys that are national in scope. Family 
planning organizations and Ministries of Health are usually the primary users of the 
information gathered through the surveys. Involvement of Ministries of Health are 
common because of the increase in health content of the DHS surveys and the need to 
have access to specialized staff that can collect biological specimens such as blood 
samples (Demographic and Health Surveys Program 2016).  
Technical support is provided by the DHS program staff at critical stages of the 
survey implementation in order to ensure that the survey procedures are consistent 
with technical standards set by DHS and to ensure that survey activities are 
progressing at a reasonable pace. Assistance is provided during visits to the country 
and throughout the whole survey process. Local staff are the ones who actually carry 
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out all the survey activities, and in-country visits by DHS Program staff are only 
meant to provide technical back-up for local staff. The first one or two visits to a 
country by DHS Program staff are usually for the purpose of assessing the feasibility 
of conducting a DHS survey (Demographic and Health Surveys Program 2016).  
There are two types of Survey in the DHS, the Standard DHS Surveys and the Interim 
DHS or the Special Surveys. The Standard DHS surveys usually consist of large 
sample sizes (from 5,000 to 30,000 households), which are conducted about every 5 
years for comparison over time. The Interim DHS Surveys or Special Surveys often 
focus on special indicators but may not include all the data in the Standard surveys. 
Examples of these special surveys are the AIDS Indicator Survey, Malaria Indicator 
Survey or Anemia Indicator Survey. In this study, countries where standard DHS 
surveys were conducted are used since they include the most detailed questionnaires 
and the set of questions are almost similar across countries, which make cross-
countries comparison possible.  
The DHS surveys use comparable questionnaires to collect data across countries and 
in one country over time. The model questionnaires include core questions that are 
similar in most countries. Nevertheless, there are country-specific questions and 
answers. Depending on the context of the country, some questions may be dropped or 
added and answering options be modified to match with the context of specific 
country. Moreover, the questionnaires also change over time in each of its phases. 
The DHS includes three core questionnaires: the household questionnaire, the 
women’s questionnaire and the men’s questionnaire. First, the household 
questionnaire is used to collect information of the study unit, then eligible individuals 
in each household will be interviewed using the women’s questionnaire, and in some 
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cases, the men’s questionnaire. Eligible women often include women from 15 to 49, 
who are in reproductive age, and men from15 to 59, or in some cases 15 to 54. In this 
study, only data from the women’s questionnaire are used for analysis on women’s 
empowerment and their decisions on fertility.  
The women’s questionnaire includes various topics regarding women’s and their 
children’s life. Topics include:   
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The DHS In Southeast Asian Countries  
The DHS surveys have long been implemented in Southeast Asia, with the first DHS 
surveys carried out in 1987. To date, six countries in Southeast Asia have had DHS 
surveys conducted. The first two countries that participated in DHS survey were 
Indonesia and Thailand. Indonesia has been consistently carrying on with the surveys 
every 5 years in all 6 phases of the DHS worldwide. On the contrary, Thailand only 
participated in the DHS survey once in 1987 and has been carrying out its own 
national census on various topics. Philippines participated in phase 2 of the DHS and 
continued for the next 4 surveys (1993, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013). Vietnam 
participated in phase 3 of the survey (1997, 2002, 2005); Cambodia came in the last 
three phases (2000, 2005, 2010) and Timor-Leste participated in the latest phase 6 
(2010).  Table 10 shows the surveys available for Southeast Asia.  
 Among 11 Southeast Asian countries, there are 6 countries where DHS data are 
available, including Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste and 
Vietnam. All these data sets have large sample sizes, are nationally representative, 
and all include women’s questionnaires and in some cases, men’s questionnaires. In 
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Cambodia, Indonesia, and Vietnam, Special Surveys were also conducted in some 
phases. Table 11 shows the detailed sample sizes for each survey by countries.  
 
Out of 11 Southeast Asian countries, only four countries with the latest data available 
(Phase 5 and 6 of the survey) are selected for the purpose of this study. The samples 
include DHS Indonesia 2012, DHS Cambodia 2010, DHS Philippines 2008 and DHS 
Timor-Leste 2010. Other countries either have no data available (Singapore, Brunei, 
Malaysia), or the latest survey was too long ago (Thailand 1987); or the latest survey 
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is not a standard survey (Vietnam 2005 AIDS Indicator Survey; Laos Special Survey 
2011-12, Myanmar Special Survey 2015– ongoing). At the time this study was 
completed, data from the DHS Cambodia 2014 and DHS Philippines 2013 became 
available, unfortunately they were not available soon enough for the analysis done in 
this study.  
Even though DHS surveys often include the household questionnaire, the women’s 
questionnaire and in some cases the men’s questionnaire, this study uses only data 
from the women’s questionnaire since the focus is on women’s empowerment and 
their fertility preferences. Access to the data sets was officially granted by the 
Demographic and Health Survey program after request for accessing data for research 
purpose was submitted.  
3.5. Background of Four Countries Of Study 
Cambodia 
 Cambodia’s population in 2010 was 14,138,000, with an annual population 
increase of 1.1% per annum. The country has low GDP per capita, which is only 
797.3 USD (2010). The majority of the population is Buddhist, which accounts for 
94.6% of the population. Cambodia became a protectorate of France in 1863, and 
later gained independence in 1953. The 1970s were marked as a dark period in the 
history of Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge’s genocide. It was estimated that from 2.2 
to 2.8 million Cambodians were killed during the Khmer Rouge regime, mainly by 
execution, starvation and illness (Heuveline 1998). Cambodia has been independent 
since the end of the Khmer Rouge era in 1979. 
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The Cambodia Demographic and Health Survey 2010 (CDHS 2010) is the standard 
survey in Phase VI of the Demographic and Health Survey questionnaires. Data were 
collected from June 2010 to January 2011 in 14 individual provinces and 5 grouped 
provinces with stratification based on urban and rural areas. The survey was 
conducted by the National Institute of Statistics (under The Ministry of Planning), and 
the Directorate for General Health (under the Ministry of Health). It is funded by 
various international organizations including USAID, United Nations Population 
Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Cambodian Health Sector Program – Second 
phase (HSSP-2), with technical support from ICF Macro. The total sample includes 
15,667 households, 18,754 women aged 15-49 and 8,239 men aged 15-49 (National 
Institute of Statistics, Directorate General for Health, and and ICF Macro 2011).  
For the purpose of this study, only data from the Cambodia women’s questionnaire is 
used for analysis. The Cambodia DHS 2010 questionnaire is the Phase VI of the DHS 
and the third of its kind implemented in Cambodia. Women respondents aged 15-49 
were asked questions on their socioeconomic background, reproduction and family 
planning, pregnancy history and postnatal care, immunization, health and children’s 
nutrition, marriage and sexual activity, fertility preferences, husband’s background 
and women’s work, HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections, other health 
problems and adult and maternal mortality. According to the final report, the response 
rate was reported at 98% (National Institute of Statistics, Directorate General for 
Health, and and ICF Macro 2011).  
Descriptive statistics from the DHS Cambodia 2010 show that only one third of the 
sample are living in urban areas, whereas in most other countries’ surveys, half of the 
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sample are living in urban areas. The sample includes Cambodian women from 15-49, 
and one third have never been married, the rest are ever-married women. The women 
in this sample have an average of 5.1 years of education. 17% of the women have no 
education, 47% have some primary education, 33% have some secondary education 
and only 3.3% have higher education. About 71% of the women are currently 
participating in the labor force and 60% of them are earning either cash or cash and 
in-kind; 15% are receiving earnings in in-kind only. There is a small number of 
women (4.8%) working in unpaid jobs, almost half of them are working in agriculture 
for themselves. 
 The involvement of women in household decision-making is measured by the 
decisions made by themselves alone or together with their husband. About half of the 
women have involvement in the decision about their own health care, 60% have 
involvement in decisions on large household purchases and visiting family or 
relatives. 69% of Cambodian women in this sample (all women including married and 
unmarried) are not using any type of family planning methods and 21% are using 
modern methods. Among currently married women, 50.5% are using a method of 
contraception. The average number of children ever born per woman is 2.0. However, 
among ever-married women, the average number of children ever born is 2.92.  
Indonesia 
 Indonesia is the largest country is Southeast Asia in terms of both size and 
population. Indonesia’s population in 2010 was 239,871,000 (Central Intelligence 
Agency 2013), making it one of the most populated countries, with an annual 
population increase of 1.1% per annum. Indonesia’s GDP per capita is among middle-
income countries, which was 2,949 USD in 2010. 86.1% of the population is Muslim, 
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which makes it the one with the largest Muslim population outside the Arabic world. 
Indonesia was once a Dutch colony and then a Japanese’s colony for a brief period of 
time during the Second World War. The country gained full independence in 1949.   
The Indonesia Demographic and Health Survey 2012 (IDHS 2012) is the standard 
survey in the Phase VI of the Demographic and Health Surveys. It was conducted in 
33 provinces of Indonesia, which means every single province in Indonesia was 
surveyed. The survey was conducted by Statistics Indonesia in collaboration with the 
National Population and Family Planning Board and the Ministry of Health. It is 
funded by the Indonesian government with technical support from the Demographic 
and Health Survey program (Measure DHS and later renamed DHS programs). Data 
were collected between May and July of 2012. The survey includes the household 
questionnaire, the women’s questionnaire and the men’s questionnaire. The Indonesia 
DHS 2012 surveyed 43,852 households, 45,607 women aged 15-49 and 9,306 married 
men aged 15-54 (Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik—BPS) et al. 2013).  
In this research, only data from the women’s questionnaire are used for the analysis. 
The women’s questionnaire is largely based on the standard DHS phase VI 
questionnaires and it is the seventh survey of this kind implemented in Indonesia. 
Women respondents from 15-49 answered questions related to their socioeconomic 
background, reproduction, contraception, pregnancy and postnatal care, maternal and 
child health, marriage and sexual activity, fertility preferences, women’s work, 
childhood and adult mortality including maternal mortality, awareness, attitude and 
behaviors regarding HIV-AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections. According 
to the final report, the response rate is 96% of the women respondents. 
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In the DHS Indonesia 2012, half of the sample was living in urban areas and half in 
rural areas. The data include all women both never married and ever married; among 
those, 23% have never been married. In this sample, women have an average of 9.1 
years of education, which much higher than the average of 5.1 in Cambodian’s 
sample. Only 3% of the women have no education, 30% have some primary 
education, 52% have some secondary education and 14% have higher education. 
About 55% of the women are currently participating in the labor force and 44% of 
them are earning either cash or cash and in-kind; quite a number of women (16%) 
have unpaid jobs, and a very small number of women (0.7%) have earnings in-kind 
only.  
The most common jobs are in sales, agriculture, and skilled manual labor. About 60% 
of the women have some involvement in the decisions about their own health care, 
large household purchases and visiting family or relatives. 57% of Indonesian women 
in this sample are not using any type of family planning methods and 40% use 
modern methods. The average number of children ever born for all women in this 
sample is 1.83. This number is higher among ever-married women, which is around 
2.40.  
Philippines 
Philippines’s population in 2010 was 93,261,000, with a relatively high annual 
population increase of 1.7% per annum. The GDP per capita is also in the middle 
range, which was 2,140 USD in 2010. The majority of the population is Catholic 
(92.5%), which makes it the country with the largest Catholic population in Southeast 
Asia. Philippines was a Spanish colony from the 16th through most of the 19th 
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century and later occupied by the Americans since 1898 until its independence in 
1945.   
The Philippines Demographic and Health Survey 2008 (FDHS 2008) is a standard 
survey of Phase V of the Demographic and Health Surveys. It was implemented in 
each of the 17 administrative regions of Philippines. The survey was conducted by the 
National Statistics Office and funded by the Philippines government and USAID, 
with technical support from ICF Macro. Data were collected from August to 
September 2008. A total number of 12,469 households, and 13,594 women aged 15-
49 were interviewed (National Statistics Office (NSO) [Philippines] and and ICF 
Macro 2009).  
Data from the women’s questionnaire are used for analysis of this thesis. The 
questionnaire is largely based on the Phase V of the Demographic and Health Survey, 
and is the 9th of its kind. DHS surveys have been implemented every 5 years in 
Philippines since 1968. Female respondents answers questions on their 
socioeconomic background, reproductive history, knowledge and use of family 
planning, pregnancy, postnatal care and breastfeeding, child immunization and 
mother’s and children’s nutrition and health, marriage and sexual activity, fertility 
preferences, women’s work and husband’s characteristics, awareness and behaviors 
regarding HIV/AIDS and other health issues. Additionally, the Philippines DHS 2008 
also includes a Women’s Safety Module, which asks special questions related to 
violence against women. The total response rate of the women’s questionnaire is 
99%.  
In the DHS Philippines 2008 data, half of the sample is living in urban areas and half 
is living in rural areas. The data include never married and ever married women; of 
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those, 32% of the women have never been married. In this sample, the women have 
an average of 10.5 years of education, the highest in all four countries selected. Only 
1.6% of the women have no education, 21% have some primary education, 46% have 
some secondary education and 31% have higher education. The Philippines sample 
has the highest women’s educational attainment compared to three other countries 
(Cambodia, Indonesia, and Timor-Leste).  
In contrast, only 47% of the women are currently participating in the labor force, 
much lower than the three other countries; and 43.6% are not currently working or  
have not in the past 12 months. 51% of the respondents are earning either cash or cash 
and in-kind; 3.6% are having unpaid jobs, and a small number of women (0.9%) have 
earnings in-kind only. The most common jobs are in 
professional/technical/managerial, sales and agriculture. About 59% of the women 
have some involvement in the decision about their own health care, 54% have some 
involvement in decisions on large household purchases and 58% have involvement in 
decisions on visiting family or relatives. 67% of Filipino women in this sample are 
not using any types of family planning methods, 10% are using traditional methods 
and 22% are using modern methods. The average number of children ever born for all 
women in this sample is 2.10. It is much higher among ever-married women, which is 
3.08.  
Timor-Leste 
Timor-Leste is the smallest country in Southeast Asia in terms of both size and 
population among the four countries of study. Its population in 2010 was only 
1,124,000, but the country has the highest annual population increase in Southeast 
Asia, which is 2.1% per annum. The country’s GDP per capita is in the low range, 
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which was 706 USD (2010), the lowest GDP per capita in Southeast Asia. 99% of the 
population is Christian, which makes it the country the most homogenous in terms of 
religion in Southeast Asia. Like Cambodia, Timor-Leste has a recent history of war. 
Timor-Leste was dependent on Indonesia until 1975, when the country claimed 
independence but lost to Indonesia only 9 days later. Timor-Leste claimed full 
independence in 2002.   
The Timor-Leste Demographic and Health Survey 2009-10 (TLDHS) is the first DHS 
survey in the country that was conducted under the standard survey of DHS 
worldwide. The survey was done in all 13 districts of the country. It was carried out 
by the National Statistics Directorate of the Ministry of Finance with financial support 
from USAID, the Government of Australia (AusAID), the Government of Ireland 
(Irish AID), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) and the 
World Health Organization (WHO). Technical support was provided by ICF Macro 
and UNFPA. Data were collected from August 2009 to February 2010. A total sample 
of 11,463 households, 13,137 women aged 15-49 and 4,076 men aged 15-49 were 
interviewed (National Statistics Directorate (NSD) [Timor-Leste], Ministry of 
Finance [Timor-Leste], and and ICF Macro 2010).  
For the purpose of this research, only data from the women’s questionnaire are used. 
Female respondents answered questions related to their socioeconomic background, 
birth history and childhood mortality, knowledge and use of family planning methods, 
fertility preferences, pregnancy and postnatal care, breastfeeding and infant feeding 
practices and children’s health, marriage and sexual activity, women’s work and 
husband’s characteristics, awareness of AIDS and other sexually transmitted 
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infections, maternal mortality and domestic violence. Also, one third of the household 
with eligible women aged 15-49 and children aged 6-59 months were tested for 
anaemia (through blood testing) with respondents’ consent. However, this information 
is not used in my analysis since it does not fit the purpose of the research. The total 
response rate of the women’s questionnaire is 95%.  
In the DHS Timor-Leste 2010, only a quarter of the sample is living in urban areas. 
The data include never married and ever-married women; of those, 36% of the 
women have never been married. In this sample, women have an average of 6.5 years 
of education. A large proportion of women have no education (30%), 24% have some 
primary education, 35% have some secondary education and only 2.3% have higher 
education.  
Timor-Leste has quite low female labor force participation compared to other 
countries, with only 41% of women participating in the labor force; this number is the 
lowest among four countries selected. 59% of the women are not currently working or 
in the past 12 months. Only 7% of them are earning either cash or cash and in-kind; a 
striking 34% have unpaid jobs, and a small number of women (0.5%) have in-kind 
earnings only. Among four countries of analysis, Timor-Leste has the highest 
percentage of women who are having unpaid jobs. The most common job for women 
is in agriculture.  
About 53% of the women have some involvement in the decisions about their own 
health care, 51% have some involvement in decision on large household purchases, 
and 55% have involvement in decision on visiting family or relatives. 86% of women 
in this Timor-Leste sample do not use any type of family planning methods, and only 
13% are using modern methods. These statistics make Timor-Leste the country with 
 107 
the lowest number of women using contraception. The average number of children 
ever born for all women in this sample is 2.74. The number is strikingly higher among 
ever-married women, which is 4.27. Timor-Leste is the country with the highest 
average number of children ever-born among the four countries in the analysis.  
In conclusion, Southeast Asia is a very interesting region to study women's 
empowerment and the association between women's empowerment and fertility 
preferences. The four data sets selected, DHS Cambodia 2010, DHS Indonesia 2012, 
DHS Philippines 2008 and DHS Timor 2010, are the most appropriate to be used in 
this analysis of women’s empowerment and fertility preferences. The data sets 
include recent data and large, representative samples. They also include appropriate 
sets of variables for each of the components of women’s empowerment and women’s 
fertility related decisions.  
The questionnaires are almost comparable in all four countries, which make it 
possible for cross-country comparison. The four countries also have very diverse 
socioeconomic and cultural contexts. They have a great diversity in religion, which 
includes three major religions: Buddhism, Christianity and Islam. Two countries are 
low-income (Cambodia and Timor-Leste), and two are middle-income (Indonesia and 
Philippines). The country-specific socioeconomic characteristics also allow relevant 
contextual analysis which makes it possible to see how women’s empowerment varies 
across countries depending on these factors.  
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CHAPTER 4: MEASUREMENT MODELS AND FACTORS OF 
WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT  
The literature on women’s empowerment suggests that it depends on the variation of 
four identified components: women’s labor force participation, education, household 
decision-making, and contraceptive use. However, measuring all these four 
components of women’s empowerment has never been an easy task, it requires a 
coherent measurement scale to account for all the variation in the components. 
Furthermore, consistency in measurement while working with multiple countries is 
also a challenge. This chapter firstly presents the operationlization process of the four 
components of women’s empowerment using the DHS data from Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Philippines, and Timor-Leste. And after that a measurement of women's 
empowerment factors is proposed using principal axis factoring with orthogonal and 
oblique rotation.   
Principal axis factoring is an estimation method in exploratory factor analysis to 
identify the latent variable, which cannot be measured directly. Principal axis 
factoring is chosen over entering the variables directly in the model because women’s 
empowerment is proposed to be the latent variable that affects aspects of fertility. 
This latent variable can only be measured through the component variables on 
education, employment, household decision-making and contraceptive use. In this 
study, individual variables on education, employment, household decision-making 
and contraceptive use are not of particular interest. In fact, these four components are 
considered factors of the latent variable women's empowerment.  
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4.1. Operationalization of the Variables 
Downloaded data sets are in SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) data 
files. They include a fairly large number of variables. Depending on the questionnaire 
and optional modules, each data set may include from 3,500 variables to 4,500 
variables. To make these data sets more manageable, a subset of variables for each 
country is created. These subsets include only women’s demographic variables and 
variables related to four aspects of women’s empowerment that are theorized to have 
associations with fertility preferences including labor force participation, education, 
household decision-making, and family planning. The new data sets include from 70 
to 90 variables, depending on the country. All four data sets from the four countries 
selected have similar set of variables, or in some cases, the variable names may be 
different but still have the same information. 
In chapter 2, the framework on how women’s empowerment affects fertility identified 
four components of women’s empowerment, including women’s labor force 
participation, women’s education, women’s household decision-making, and 
women’s contraceptive use.  For each of these components, a specific set of variables 
that are available in the DHS survey data is identified for measurement.   
Women’s labor force participation 
The proportion of women who participate in the labor force has been included in all 
the measurements of women’s empowerment. Female labor force participation is 
considered a major factor that affects fertility. At country level, countries with higher 
rates of female labor force participation are often ones with higher fertility. However, 
at individual level, women who have employment are ones with lower fertility than 
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women who do not. The DHS women’s questionnaire includes a section on women’s 
work, which makes a good selection of variables for measuring women’s labor force 
participation.  
The first aspect of measuring women’s labor force participation includes questions on 
the women’s engagement in the cash economy.  The questions ask if the women have 
been working in the past 12 months, and the types of payment that they receive. Other 
indicators include types of occupation, if the women work full time or part time and 
their earnings compared to the husbands. The DHS questionnaires of all four 
countries include appropriate variables for measuring these three aspects of women’s 
labor force participation.     
Household Decision-Making 
It has been theorized that women who have more power, in both general household 
decisions and especially fertility decisions, also have higher rates of using fertility 
control and have fewer children than those who do not. Ideally, household decision-
making indicators should include both domestic-related decisions and fertility 
decisions. Women were asked who make decisions in their household, in matters 
related to their own health, spending for the household and visiting family and 
relatives. These variables are used for measuring household-related decisions. 
Unfortunately, in the DHS questionnaire, questions on fertility decisions are not 
exactly a good fit for measurement since there are not enough data related to the 
fertility decision-making process. The number of unwanted pregnancies could 
possibly be used as an indicator in the way that the higher the number of unwanted 
pregnancies, the lower decision-making power. However, this number is highly 
correlated with the number of children ever-born, which means women who have a 
higher number of children tend to report a higher number of unwanted pregnancies. 
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The issue is, that it is highly subjective for a woman to report her pregnancy history 
retrospectively as wanted or unwanted, it could change the meaning depending on the 
woman’s view at the time. Therefore, household decision-making indicators are 
mainly operationalized from domestic related decisions, but not from fertility 
decisions. 
Contraceptive use 
Contraceptive use is one of the key pathways from women’s empowerment to their 
fertility preferences. Higher level of women’s empowerment is usually associated 
with higher use of contraception and thus, lower fertility. For an ideal measurement of 
family planning, indicators are included on family planning use, having met need for 
family planning and exposure to family planning messages through the media. 
Even though some literature suggests that contraceptive use is one of the indicators 
for measuring empowerment, this analysis does not take this variable into 
consideration. The reason is that women interviewed for these surveys are from 15-
49, which means they are in their reproductive ages. For many of those who do not 
use contraceptives, it is simply because they are not sexually active so there is no 
need for contraception, or they want to have more children or have not reached their 
desired number of children. Therefore, there is no clear logic to determine if using 
contraceptives is more empowering than not or vice versa. As a result, the variable on 
current contraceptives use is excluded from this factor analysis. 
This analysis uses met need for family planning, exposure to family planning 
messages on the media and knowledge about family planning methods as the three 
indicators. All three of these indicators are available in the questionnaire. Met need is 
operationalized by the unmet need variable. Media exposure is the combination of 
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three variables on whether the women have heard about family planning on 
TV/radio/newspaper. Knowledge of the types of contraception is also available in 
detail in the questionnaire. 
Education 
Female education is generally considered a key component of women’s 
empowerment. At the individual level, most studies have found that a higher level of 
female education is associated with lower fertility. It has been widely agreed that 
women with a higher level of education often have a higher level of empowerment. 
Indicators of education are readily available in the data sets. Variables on literacy and 
the level of education attainment will be used for operationlization of the 
measurement. Figure 5 visualizes the schematic measurement model of four pathways 
of women’s empowerment to fertility decision, with indicators for each pathway.  
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Table 12 shows the operationalization map of how women’s empowerment factor 
scores are operationalized based on 12 indicators, which are operationalized from 19 
variables in the questionnaire. 
Previous studies have suggested four aspects of women’s empowerment. In this study, 
each of these aspects will be measured and later a women’s empowerment factor 
score will be assigned to each woman. Factor analysis is a statistical technique that 
assigns values to the variables, and then ranks them in the order that higher scores 
mean higher power. The logic of ranking is referenced from the previous literature 
with consideration of actual country-specific circumstantial factors. However, the 
variables in these data sets are not ready to be used for this analysis. First, variables in 
the new subsets of variables will be operationalized to make them eligible for factor 
analysis. Operationalized variables will then be used to create four separate sets of 
indicators: indicators of labor force participation, indicators of household decision-
making, indicators of family planning and indicators of education. Finally, an 
individual woman’s empowerment factor score is calculated based on these four 
separate indicators mentioned. Existing literature on factors of women’s 
empowerment will be used to determine high or low scores that should be assigned to 
each woman. 
Indicators of labor force participation 
The first factor, women’s labor force participation, includes four indicators which 
take into account the engagement of the woman in the cash economy through types of 
employment and types of payment that she receives; her occupation; her continuity of 
employment throughout the year (full time or part time); and her earnings compared 
to her husband’s earnings. The first and very important question, which acts as the 
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filter for this factor is, if she had done any work in the past 12 months prior to the 
time of survey, which only takes yes/no values. If her response was no, she is 
considered not working and given a score of 0 in employment status. If her response 
was yes, she is given a score of 1. As previous studies have suggested, women who 
have jobs are generally considered more empowered than those who do not. 
Who the woman works for is also an important indicator in her labor force 
participation factor score. The question asks if the woman has been working for a 
family member, someone else or for herself. Women who work for a family member 
are given the lowest empowerment score, women who work for someone else or for 
the government are given a higher score, and women who are self-employed are given 
the highest score since it indicates a high level of independence. 
Not only who does the woman works for but the types of payment that she earns is 
also given a score. The types of payment indicate how important her job is and how 
her employer values her as an employee. There are four kinds of payment options 
listed in the questionnaire: cash only, cash and in-kind, in-kind only, and not paid. 
Women who receive cash payment are given the highest score, women who receive 
cash and in-kind payment are given middle range scores, women who receive in-kind 
payment only have a bit lower score and those who are not paid are given a zero 
score. 
A new variable indicating women’s engagement in the cash economy through 
women’s employment and payment is created after combining the three question 
above on work status, working for whom and types of payment. This new variables, 
LFP1-Engagement include 13 categories with 13 ranked scores given to each woman 
depending on her scores on each of the questions above. 
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0: If she does not work or has not worked in the past 12 months 
1: If she works for a family member but is not paid 
2: If she works for someone else but is paid  
3: If she is self-employed but not paid  
 
4: If she works for a family member and gets paid in-kind only 
5: If she works for someone else and gets paid in-kind only  
6: If she is self-employed and gets paid in-kind only  
 
7: If she works for a family member and gets paid in cash and in-kind  
8: If she works for someone else and gets paid in cash and in-kind  
9: If she is self-employed and gets paid in cash and in-kind  
 
10: If she works for a family member and gets paid in cash 
11: If she works for someone else and gets paid in cash 
12: If she is self-employed and gets paid in cash 
The second indicator in labor force participation is occupation. The original variable 
includes 10 categories of the types of occupation: did not work; professional; clerical; 
sales; agricultural – self employed; agricultural – employee; household and domestic; 
services; skilled manual; and unskilled manual. 
To simplify the occupation variable, these 9 categories are recoded into 4 distinctive 
categories: people who do not work, people who have unskilled jobs, people who are 
professionals, and the rest. Seven categories, including clerical, sales, agricultural 
self-employed, agricultural-employee, household and domestic, services, and skilled 
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manual are grouped in “Other types of jobs”. This new variable, LFP2-OccStat, with 
four categories, are given scores based on the occupational rank.  
0: Not working 
1: Unskilled jobs 
2: Other types of jobs 
3: Professionals  
Generally, permanent jobs are treated as more stable and thus more empowering than 
seasonal jobs. Question on the continuity of her job throughout the year (V732: “Do 
you work throughout the year, part of the year or only once in a while?”) is combined 
with employment status (V731: working or have worked in the past 12 months) to 
create a new variable with lowest score for women who do not work, and highest 
score for who work throughout the year. The operationalized variable, LFP3-
ContEmp,  takes the following values: 
0: Do not work 
1: Once in a while 
2: Seasonally/part of the year 
3: Throughout the year 
The fourth and final indicator of the factor score of labor force participation is if the 
woman earns more or less than her husband. The original variable, V746: “Would you 
say that the money you earn is more than what your husband/partner earns, less than 
what he earns, or about the same?” has 5 answering options: more than him; less than 
him; about the same; husband/partner has no earnings; don’t know 
Since this question only asks women who earn cash for their joba, only women who 
received cash payment should be included in this variable. Three variables (V731, 
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V741, V746) are used to created this new LFP4-Earnings, which has 6 values (but 
only has 4 scores): 
0: If not working or not worked in past 12 months 
0: If working but not paid 
0: If working but paid in kind only 
1: If earning less than husband 
2: If earning equally to husband 
3: If earning more than husband 
Women who are working but not paid and women who are working but paid in-kind 
only are both treated as not working in this new variable since the focus of this 
variable is to measure women’s earning relative to their husband’s, not the types of 
payment since there is already a separate variable to measure types of payment. If the 
woman does not create any kind of income, thus she is at the lowest score on the scale 
of earning compared to her husband. And women who earn more than their 
husband/partner receive the highest score on this variable.  
Indicators of household decision-making 
The second factor score needed to measure women’s empowerment is women’s factor 
scores on household decision-making. This factor includes women’s power in three 
indicators: decisions related to health, decisions related to spending and decisions 
related to visiting family and relatives. Previous studies have consistently emphasized 
the role of women in making decisions related to their own health as one of the basic 
rights. Autonomy in spending decisions indicates her involvement in the household in 
economic responsibilities. More autonomy in spending decisions means a higher level 
of empowerment. And finally, autonomy in decisions on paying visits to family and 
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relatives indicates if the woman is restricted in her movements. More freedom of 
mobility without restrictions means a higher level of empowerment. 
 Decisions related to health are operationalized by four variables: if it is difficult for 
the woman to get permission to get help for herself, if it is difficult to get money for 
the treatment, if not wanting to go alone is a problem, and finally, the person who 
usually decides her health care.  
The first set of three questions is based on the question: 
 “When you are sick and want to get medical advice or treatment, is each of the 
following a big problem or not? 
• Getting permission to go to the doctor? 
• Getting money needed for treatment? 
• The distance to the health facility? 
• Not wanting to go alone?” 
The answer is dichotomous: big problem; or, not a big problem. Even though the 
question above is split into four smaller variables with dichotomous answers, the third 
one, “distance to the health facility” does not actually fit in the empowerment of 
women since it is more an environmental factor which the women does not have the 
power to change herself. Thus, this question is removed and the other three questions 
are combined into one variable with values that are the averages of the three 
component variables. If the answer is big problem, a score of 0 is given, and if the 
answer is not a big problem, a score of 1 is given. As the new variables HDM1-Health 
takes values of an average of the three variables mentioned, it includes the values 
listed below (higher scores indicate higher level of empowerment): 
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0: Big problems for all three questions 
1: Not a big problem for one of three questions 
2: Not a big problem for two of three questions 
3: Not a big problem for all three questions 
The fourth variable in the indicators of decision related to health is the person who 
decides the women’s health care: “Who usually makes decisions about health care for 
yourself?” (Respondent; Husband/partner; Respondent and husband/partner jointly; 
Someone else; Other). This question is operationalized into a new variable with only 
three categories with the logic that if the woman has all independent power to decide 
her own health care by herself, she has the highest empowerment score. And the score 
declines when the decision is made jointly with her husband and the lowest score is 
when she has no involvement in decisions about her own health. HDM2-Spending has 
three values: 
0: Decided by husband/partner alone or someone else or other 
1: Decided jointly by respondent and husband/partner  
2: Decided by respondent alone 
The second indicator in household decision-making factor is women’s autonomy in 
decisions related to household spending. This indicator is considered empowering 
since economic decisions are one of the most important aspects of household 
decisions. Freedom of women in decisions related to controlling income and spending 
strongly indicates that the level of power they have in the family. In this indicator, 
two variables are used: the first one asks about the person who usually decides on 
large household purchases and the second asks about the person who usually decides 
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what to do with the money that her husband earns. Even though one may suggest that 
the person who decides women’s earnings is also an important proxy for measuring 
women’s empowerment, this variable is not used for analysis in this study. In the 
setting of developing countries like the four countries studied, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Philippines and Timor-Leste, many women actually work but do not receive cash 
incomes. Their labor may be unpaid, or paid in-kind only or a mix of both cash and 
in-kind. The question on who decides the spending of the money that respondents 
earn only asks women who received cash income, thus a large number of women who 
work but do not have income will be excluded in the analysis. Meanwhile, this study 
aims to specifically take into consideration all types of employment and payment to 
measure individual woman’s empowerment factor, especially in developing societies. 
The context-specific of women’s empowerment has been emphasized by Malhotra, 
Schulerm, and Boender (2002) in their paper on measuring women’s empowerment as 
a variable in international development. There have been a number of other criticisms 
about how current measurements of women’s empowerment are not suitable for 
measurements in developing countries in practice and this research is trying to avoid 
such problems. Thus, it is reasonable to say that the use of this variable may be more 
applicable in countries where most labor market participation activities are paid, 
however, it is less relevant in this specific study. 
Two questions used for this indicator have similar answering options: “Who usually 
decides how your husband/partner’s earning will be used?”; and “Who usually makes 
decisions about major household purchases?”. Answer options include: Respondent; 
Husband/partner; Respondent and husband/partner jointly; Someone else; and Other. 
The same logic used in previous questions is also applied in these two questions. 
Women who can decide their husband’s earning and making major household 
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purchases are considered the most empowered, women who can decide jointly with 
their husband are considered having middle range empowerment, and women who 
have no involvement (decisions made by their husband, someone else or other) in 
these decision-making processes are considered having no empowerment. The new 
values for this variable HDM2-Spending are:  
0: Decided by husband/partner alone or someone else or other 
1: Decided jointly by respondent and husband/partner  
2: Decided by respondent alone 
The third indicator in household decision-making is decisions about visiting family or 
relatives, which indicates women’s freedom of mobility with no restriction. This third 
indicator is mainly based on the question: “Who usually makes decisions about visits 
to your family or relatives?” Answer options include: Respondent; Husband/partner; 
Respondent and husband/partner jointly; Someone else; and Other. The values of this 
variable, HDM3-Visiting, is later recoded into three answering options with scores 
given accordingly: 
0: Decided by husband/partner alone or someone else or other 
1: Decided jointly by respondent and husband/partner  
2: Decided by respondent alone 
Indicators of contraceptive use 
Contraceptive use is the third factor in the pathways of how women’s empowerment 
affect fertility. Previous studies have strongly emphasized on the role of contraceptive 
use in fertility changes, especially in developing countries. Contraceptives are 
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considered empowering since they enable women to control their own body and 
fertility. With contraceptives, women can make the decision when to have children 
and how many they want to have. The contraceptive use factor includes three 
indicators: if the woman has met need for family planning, if she has heard about 
family planning in the media and if she has knowledge about using contraception. As 
mentioned earlier, even though some literature suggests that contraceptive use is one 
of the indicators for measuring empowerment, this analysis does not take this variable 
into consideration for a major logical flaw. Women who were interviewed for these 
surveys are in their reproductive ages, from 15-49. But many of them do not use 
contraceptives simply because they are not sexually active so there is no need for 
contraception, or they are wanting to have children or have not reached their desired 
number of children. Therefore, there is no clear logic to determine if using 
contraceptives is more empowering than not using or vice versa. Thus, the variable on 
contraceptive use is excluded from this factor analysis.  
The first indicator in the contraceptive factor, met need, is operationalized based on 
the questions about women’s fecundity, their contraceptive use and unwanted 
pregnancy history in the questionnaire. According to the Guide to DHS Statistics, 
there are two kinds of unmet need for contraception:  
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Using the definition above, a variable “unmet need” was calculated in the data sets 
with answering options: 0: never had sex; 1: Unmet need for spacing; 2: Unmet need 
for limiting; 3: Using for spacing; 4: Using for limiting; 7: No unmet need; 8: Not 
married and no sex in the last 30 days; 9: Infecund, menopausal.  A met need variable 
is operationalized based on this unmet need variable. FP1-Metneed is a dichotomous 
variable which: 
0: If the woman has unmet need either for spacing for limiting 
1: If the woman is using contraception or having no unmet need 
It is noteworthy to keep in mind that women who never had sex, not sexually active 
and infecund (values 0, 8 and 9 in the original unmet need variable) are treated as 
missing values.  
The second indicator of family planning is if the woman has heard about family 
planning in either type of media in the past 6 months: “In the last 6 months have you: 
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Heard about family planning on the radio?” (Yes/No). “Seen anything about family 
planning on the television?” (Yes/No). “Read about family planning in a 
newspaper/poster/pamphlet?” (Yes/No). All these three questions are then 
operationalized into one variable, FP2-Media, with values are the combinations of all 
the answers. This FP2-Media variable includes 4 options below: 
0: Has not heard about family planning through any type of media 
1: Has heard about family planning though 1 type of media 
2: Has heard about family planning though 2 types of media 
3: Has heard about family planning though 3 types of media 
Higher scores are given to women who have heard about family planning through 
more types of media with the logic that hearing the messages about family planning 
on a more frequent basis will lead to higher knowledge about family planning and 
awareness about the right to have fertility choice. Women who have not heard about 
family planning in any of those three types of media are given zero scores. No 
exposure to media messages indicates the lack of access to mass media, lesser 
knowledge about family planning and lesser awareness about fertility choice than 
those who have better access. 
The third and last indicator in the contraceptive use factor analysis is knowledge of 
contraception. In the questionnaire, women are asked if they have heard about any of 
the 13 methods of contraception listed, with yes/no answer options: 1. Female 
sterilization; 2. Male sterilization; 3. Intrauterine Contraceptive Device (IUD); 4. 
Injectables; 5. Implants; 6. Pill; 7. Condom; 8. Intravag/Diaphragm; 9. Lactation 
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amenorrhea method (LAM); 10. Rhythm or periodic abstinence; 11. Withdrawal; 12. 
Emergency contraception; 13. Others 
Data from this question later is recoded as one variable in the data set with four 
groups of methods: respondent who knows no method, who knows at least one of the 
modern methods, who knows at least one of the traditional methods, and who knows 
at least one of the folkloric methods. Modern methods include: Female sterilization, 
male sterilization, Intrauterine Contraceptive Device (IUD), injectables, implants, pill, 
condom (male/female), intravag/diaphragm, and emergency contraception. 
Traditional methods include: rhythm or periodic abstinence, withdrawal, lactation 
amenorrhea method (LAM) or any country-specific traditional method of proven 
effectiveness. Folkloric methods include locally prescribed methods or spiritual 
methods such as herbs, amulets, etc. For measurement of empowerment scale, 
traditional methods and folkloric methods are treated the same, women who know 
either or both methods are given the same scores. Women who know no method are 
given zeros on the scale, and women who know modern methods are given the 
highest scores. The variable used for analysis after operationalization is named FP3-
Knowledge:  
Have you heard of any family planning method? 
0: Knows no method 
1: Knows traditional/Folkloric methods 
2: Knows modern methods  
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Indicators of education 
Education has been consistently viewed as one of the most influential factors in 
empowering women. Education for women and girls has been the main target of the 
United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals No. 3: Promote gender equality and 
empower women. It is both an outcome and a measurement of women’s 
empowerment. The factor score of education is calculated by two variables, women’s 
literacy and women’s completeness of level of education. Women’s literacy acts as 
the basic measurement in the empowerment of women and more educated women are 
considered more empowered than less educated women. These indicators have been 
agreed universally in previous studies. One might argue that years of education may 
be a better proxy for measuring education, however, even though this variable does 
exist in the data, it is not used for analysis for a number of reasons. First, years of 
education is a calculated variable based on two questions in the questionnaire: the 
highest level of school that the respondent attended, and the highest grade that the 
respondent completed at that level, then these two numbers are added to calculate the 
number of years of education. Thus, years of education and highest level of education 
completed are highly correlated. Including both of these variables in the analysis will 
create a correlation which makes the factor analysis give imprecise scores. Second, 
even if years of education is not a calculated variable, in the case of developing 
countries, the number of years staying at school does not necessarily mean a higher 
level of knowledge. If a person spent 2 years in each grade that he/she ever attended, 
he or she can have significantly higher years of education than someone who pass the 
grade in just one year, but the amount of knowledge that the two people receive are 
the same. In some cases, the person who spends more years at school but is slow at 
moving up to higher levels may receive less knowledge since it takes them more time 
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than those who are on time and are able to attend higher levels. Thus, it is notable to 
keep in mind that the respondents are from poor countries, and many live in rural 
areas, thus years of education may not have the same meaning as in richer countries. 
For such reasons, completeness of level of education is used for analysis in this study. 
The question on literacy is very straightforward. Interviewer shows a reading card 
written in the local language and ask the respondent to read the sentence on the card. 
Options to the answer include: 1: Can not read at all; 2: Able to read only parts of the 
sentence; 3: Able to read whole sentence; 4: Blind/visually impaired. 
For the ranking of scores, women who can read the whole sentence are given the 
highest scores, women who can read parts of the sentence are given middle scores and 
those who can not read at all are given zero scores. Blind or visually impaired people 
are coded as missing since these cases are rare and not applicable in terms of 
women’s empowerment measurement. The newly recoded variable ED1-Literacy, 
takes values as below: 
0: Cannot read at all 
1: Able to read only parts of the sentence 
2: Able to read whole sentence. 
The second indicator for factor scores of education is the completeness of level of 
education. This indicator uses information from the question: “What is the highest 
level of school you attended?” (1: Primary; 2: Secondary; 3: Higher). An important 
note should be made is that the answer for this question depends on the actual 
education scheme of the specific country. For example, in the Indonesia DHS 2012 
questionnaire, levels of education include: 1: Primary; 2: Junior high school; 3: Senior 
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high school; 4: Academy; 5: University. In the Cambodia DHS 2010 questionnaire, 
levels of education include: 1: Primary; 2: Lower secondary; 3: Upper secondary; 4: 
Higher.  
Despite the difference in the questionnaires across countries, the data include a 
standardized variable which is a combined variable involving the level of education, 
and if the person has completed or not completed the level. The new variable, ED2-
Level, which is the same in all four data set, takes values: 
0: No education 
1: Incomplete primary 
2: Complete primary 
3: Incomplete secondary 
4: Complete secondary 
5: Higher 
     The higher the level of education that a woman has, the more empowered she is 
compared to those with lower education. Women who have no education are given 
zero scores on this measurement scale. Since this variable in the data sets is already 
an ordinal variable, no change was necessary.  
After calculating factor scores of the four factors, only women who have scores in all 
four factors are included in the factor analysis of women’s empowerment. The new 
sub-samples are smaller than the original samples since they only include eligible 
women for this specific purpose of calculating factor scores of four components of 
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women’s empowerment. If a woman is missing one or more of the four scores, the 
analysis will be not meaningful if she is also included. Only women with scores on all 
four factors are included in the analysis. Table 13 below gives the original sample 
sizes and the sample sizes after calculating the factor scores that are being used for 
this analysis. 
 
4.2. Orthogonal and Oblique Factor Models  
Factor scores of women’s empowerment are calculated scores based on 12 
operationalized variables on four aspects of women’s empowerment. First, the scores 
are calculated by orthogonal factoring with the assumption that there is no correlation 
among the four factors. Second, the scores are calculated by oblique factoring, which 
allows the factors to be correlated to each other. 
Orthogonal factoring is based on the assumption that the factors are independent and 
not correlated to each other. The axes are set at an angle of 90 degree to each other 
and principal axis factoring is used with no factor rotation. Orthogonal rotation factor 
analysis gives easily interpretable results but it may not truly reflect how the data 
behave in real life since it does not allow correlation between the factors. In social 
sciences, generally there are some correlations among factors since the data are rarely 
neatly packed into clear-cut factors. Therefore, oblique rotation is a better technique 
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in factor analysis, which allows the axes to rotate freely and the factors are allowed to 
correlate with each other, which makes much more sense in reality. Examples can be 
drawn from these data, in which, orthogonal rotation assumes that education and labor 
force participation have their own impacts on women’s empowerment and are 
independent from each other, while oblique rotation allows education and labor force 
participation to correlate with each other. It makes a lot more sense if these two 
factors are correlated since the data are real-life data, which means women who have 
high education are more likely to participate in the labor market and have paid jobs. 
Results from principal axis factoring analysis with both orthogonal and oblique 
rotation are reported in factor models of women’s empowerment in the four countries. 
It is notable that if there is truly no correlation among factors, orthogonal and oblique 
rotation will give nearly identical results (Constello and Osborne 2005).  
 In this chapter, operationalized indicators using DHS data from four countries, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines and Timor-Leste, are analyzed using principal axis 
factoring, first with orthogonal factor rotation and then with oblique factor rotation. 
The analysis will identify women’s empowerment factors in these four countries of 
study. 	  
Cambodia 
Frist, twelve operationalized indicators of women’s empowerment are plotted using 
scree plots to conduct a visual test of the number of factors in women’s 
empowerment. Then the factor loadings are extracted using principal axis factoring 
with unrotated axis and rotated axis (orthogonal and oblique extraction). Finally, a 
factor correlation matrix is presented to determine if the factors are correlated with 
each other.  
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The scree pot in Figure 6 shows the fraction of total variance in the data. It is also a 
useful initial tool to decide how many factors should be included in the analysis. The 
first factor is the most significant and subsequent factors have lower impacts on the 
scores. Conventionally, the default cut-off is any value that is larger than or equal to 
1.0 initial eigenvalue to be considered meaningful enough. The sharp drop in the plot 
signifies that subsequent factors are not important to the analysis. In the scree plot in 
figure 6,the first three empowerment indicators have meaningful initial eigenvalues 
for the solution while there is not much difference among factors from the 4th factor 
onward even though it is barely over 1.0 eigenvalue.  
Using principal axis factoring, the eigenvalues after extraction show that the first 
factor has an eigenvalue of 3.18, which accounts for 26.5% of the total variance of 
women’s empowerment. The second factor has eigenvalue of 1.31, which explains 
10.9% of the total variance. The third and fourth factor have 0.87 and 0.25 
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eigenvalues and only account for 7.2% and 2.1% of the total variance, respectively. 
These eigenvalues after extraction are much smaller than the initial eigenvalues, even 
though all four factors are higher than 1.0. These first four factors after extraction 
cumulatively account for 46.9% of the total variance of the scores of women’s 
empowerment.  
 
Table 14 shows the unrotated (orthogonal) and rotated (oblique) factor loadings in the 
factor matrix and factor pattern matrix tables. The numbers represent both how the 
variables are weighted for each factor, and the correlations between the variables and 
the factor. The results are discussed first in orthogonal rotation (left-hand side of the 
table), and then in oblique rotation (right-hand side of the table). Both rotation and 
nonrotation analysis clearly produce four-factor tables. 
In orthogonal rotation, the first factor, which includes four variables on women’s 
labor force participation, show up as the highest factor loading. All the correlations of 
four variables indicate women’s engagement in the labor force, occupation’s status, 
continuity of employment and earnings compared to her husband. They have factor 
loadings above 0.7, with highest loadings in LFP1-Engagement (0.97). The second 
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factor shows up as education items, ED1-Literacy and ED2-Level with factor 
loadings of 0.57 and 0.89 accordingly. It shows that literacy and women’s level of 
education are the second factor that explains women’s empowerment scores. The 
third factor includes three household decision-making items (HDM1-Health, HDM2-
Spending, HDM3-Visiting) with factor loadings from 0.37 to 0.68. The fourth factor 
shows up a little bit tricky, which makes it difficult to identify the most influential 
items in the 4th one. Generally, it can be said that the 4th factor loads on labor force 
participation items, but the correlation are dispersed with no clear tendency. This 
cross-loading issue of the fourth factor, plus the borderline initial eigenvalue from the 
scree plot visual test suggests that the fourth factor may not be a good measure for 
this factor analysis.   
Similar trends are observed in the factor loadings results of oblique rotation on the 
right hand side of Table 14. The first factor strongly loads on the four labor force 
participation items, lowest loading is 0.63 (LFP2-OccStat), and highest loading is 
0.97 (LFP1-Engagement). The second factor in oblique rotation still heavily loads on 
education items (0.59 and 0.97). Similarly, the third factor also loads on household 
decision-making items, ranging from 0.43 to 0.71. In the second and third factor, the 
loadings are slightly higher than in orthogonal rotation. The fourth factor does not 
really show significant items loading on itself, except for the cross loadings on labor 
force participation items, with overall negative loadings. The low factor loading and 
the issue of cross loading in factor 4 suggests that even though it meets the initial 
criteria of larger than 1.0 eigenvalue, factor 4 may not be a good measurement factor 
in this analysis compared to the three other ones. After examining both orthogonal 
and oblique rotation factor extractions, it can be determined that there are three 
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factors in this analysis and items on family planning do not show up as one of the 
factors in either analysis.  
 
The factor correlation matrix table shows how each of the four factors correlates with 
each other. The diagonal of the table always include 1.0s, which indicates the 
correlation of one factor with itself, and the correlations among other variables are 
mirrored across the diagonal line. The table shows that the second factor is positively 
correlated with the first factor (r=0.211), which can be interpreted that labor force 
participation factor is positively correlated with education factor, higher involvement 
in the labor force indicates a higher level education and vice versa. The third factor is 
slightly correlated with the first factor (r=0.071) and the second factor (r=0.026), 
which implies that labor force participation and education only slightly correlate with 
higher household decision-making and vice versa. The 4th factor seems to have 
negative correlations with the first and the third factor, however, the negative 
correlations have to be interpreted in accordance with the negative coefficients in the 
oblique factor loadings table above, which makes the correlations become positive. 
Since the fourth factor is also heavily loaded on labor force participation factor, the 
correlation with the first factor is trivial since it is also labor force participation factor. 
Its correlation on the third factor can be interpreted that there is a correlation between 
labor force participation and household decision-making.   
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The relatively similar factor loadings of orthogonal and oblique rotation in table 14 
and the low correlation factor matrix suggest that there might be very little 
correlations between the factors. In other words, in the case of Cambodia DHS 2005, 
even though labor force participation, education and household decision-making are 
factors of women’s empowerment, they are relatively independent to each other.   
Indonesia 
Similar to the steps done in Cambodian data, first, twelve operationalized indicators 
of women’s empowerment are plotted using a scree plot to conduct a visual test for 
the number of factors in women’s empowerment. Then the factor loadings are 
extracted using principal axis factoring with unrorated and rotated axis factoring 
(orthogonal and oblique extraction). And finally, a factor correlation matrix is 
presented to determine if the factors are correlated with each other.  
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The scree plot shows the initial eigenvalues of the factors, and it is used as the initial 
criterion to determine the number of factors to extract in factor analysis. The scree 
plot shows that there are three factors with eigenvalues significantly above 1.0, and 
the fourth one is only barely above 1.0. From the 5th factor onward, the eigenvalues 
are not large enough to meet the criterion. The first factor has an eigenvalue of 3.16 
after the extraction, which explains 26.39% of the variance. It is also the most 
influential one. The second factor has an eigenvalue of 1.15, which explains 9.58% of 
the variance.  The third and fourth factor only explain 7.19% and 3.36% of the 
variance, repectively. Cumulatively, all four factors explain 46.5% of the variance.  
 
Results from the factor analysis with orthogonal (nonrotated) rotation show very 
similar trends to the results found in Cambodia. The first three factors neatly loaded 
on items of labor force participation, education and household decision-making. In the 
first group of indicators on labor force participation, all of the factor loadings except 
for LFP4-Earnings are higher than 0.9. The second factor mainly loads on education 
items ED1-Literacy and ED2-Level with factor loadings of 0.46 and 0.80 accordingly. 
The third factor shows up as loading positively on household decision-making items, 
HDM1-Health (0.59), HDM2-Spending (0.49) and HDM3-Visiting (0.39). However, 
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there is also a cross-loading issue in the fourth factor, which loads both positively and 
negatively on labor force participation items. This cross-loading issue of the fourth 
factor, plus the borderline initial eigenvalue from the scree plot visual test suggests 
that the fourth factor may not be a good measure for this orthogonal factor analysis.   
In oblique rotation, when the axes are allowed to rotate and the factors are assumed to 
correlate with each other, different results were found compared to the ones found in 
orthogonal rotation. In the labor force participation factor, LFP1-Engagement shows 
up very strongly in orthogonal rotation (0.91), now only has a loading of 0.28 in 
oblique rotation. The loadings of items LFP2-OccStat and LFP3-ContEmp stay 
relatively the same as in orthogonal results. Surprisingly, LFP4-Earnings shows up 
with high factor loadings in orthogonal rotation (0.78), but only has minimal loadings 
in oblique rotation (0.08). The second factor still loads mainly on education items. 
The factor loadings of the two items, ED1-Literacy and ED2-Level, remain relatively 
unchanged in both nonrotation and rotation. The third factor is most strongly loaded 
on household decision-making items, and the factor loadings are relatively the same 
in both analyses. Again, in oblique rotation, the fourth factor appears to be negatively 
cross-loaded with item LFP1-Engagement and has negative loading on LFP4-
Earnings.  The unclear pattern and the cross-loadings issue of the fourth factor 
suggest that this factor is not a reliable measure and should be dropped from analysis.  
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Table 17 shows the factor correlation matrix of the four factors extracted, it displays 
how the four factors are correlated to each other. The results from orthogonal and 
oblique rotation factor analysis both implies that the fourth factor is not a reliable 
measurement thus should not be included in the analysis, so only the first three factors 
in the table of correlation matrix are analysis-worthy. The table shows that factors 1 
and 2 are only slightly negatively correlated with each other; however, the correlation 
is very small, almost non-existent (r=-0.014). Factor 1 also has very marginal 
correlation with factor 3 (r=0.006). Similarly, factor 2 and factor 3 are only slightly 
positively correlated to each other (r=0.013). Overall, the matrix table indicates that 
the three factors have very marginal correlations with each other. The correlation 
matrix infers that in Indonesia, three women's empowerment factors, female labor 
force participation, education and household decision-making have little correlations 
to each other.  
Factor analysis of both orthogonal and oblique rotation produce three factors that 
have the most impacts on women’s empowerment in the Indonesia DHS 2012 data. 
Labor force participation, education and household decision-making are found to be 
the three factors in both analyses, while family planning items do not show 
significance in either one.  
Philippines 
In this section, twelve operationalized indicators of women’s empowerment are 
plotted using a scree plot to conduct a visual test for the number of factors in 
women’s empowerment. Later, the factor loadings are extracted using principal axis 
factoring with unrotated and rotated axis factoring (orthogonal and oblique 
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extraction). And finally, a factor correlation matrix is presented to determine if the 
factors are correlated with each other.  
 
Figure 8 shows the scree plot of the extracted factors of women’s empowerment in 
the Philippines 2008 data. The plot pictures two sharp drops in the data, which 
indicates that there are only three factors in women’s empowerment in the 
Philippines. After the third factor, there was no other significant drop. Initial 
eigenvalues also shows that there are three factors with eigenvalue above 1.0. After 
extraction, the first factor has eigenvalues of 3.41, which explains 28.47% of the total 
variance, makes it the factor with most impacts. The second factor has eigenvalues of 
1.14, which explains 9.55% of the total variance and other factors only explain 
insignificant amount of the total variance (less than 4.6%). 
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Table 18 shows the orthogonal factor loadings (in the left-hand side) and oblique 
factor loadings (in the right-hand side) of the factor analysis for Philippines DHS 
2008 data. Even though the scree plot only shows three factors and the eigenvalues 
only show three factors that make the 1.0 cut-off, the fourth factor (in grey columns) 
is still extracted to make cross comparisons with data from other countries.  
In orthogonal extraction, all the labor force participation items cluster in the first 
factor, which is similar to what was observed in Cambodia and Indonesia. LFP2-
OccStat shows the highest factor loading of 0.947. LFP1-Engagement, LFP3-
ContEmp and LFP4-Earnings have high factor loadings, all above 0.84. The second 
factor is loaded heavily on the two education items, ED1-Literacy (0.55) and ED2-
Level (0.70), which means that this factor is mainly loaded on education items. This 
tendency is also found in both Cambodia and Indonesia. The third factor, even though 
the factor loadings are smaller than the loadings of items in the first and second 
factor, still appears to be a cluster of household decision-making items. The fourth 
factor was extracted (in the grey shaded column) for cross-country comparison, even 
though it does not appear as a significant factor both in the scree plot visual test and in 
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the eigenvalue test using a cut-off point of 1.0. This factor appears to be cross-loaded 
on the first factor by labor force participation items.  
Oblique rotation results on the right hand-side of Table 18 show quite a significant 
difference in the factor loadings, especially of the first factor. Orthogonal results show 
relatively similar factor loadings of labor force participation items on the first factor 
with an average of 0.90 eigenvalues. Meanwhile in oblique rotation, the factor 
loadings of the first factor vary quite widely, from 0.12 in LFP4-Earnings item to 1.00 
in LFP2-OccStat item. The large range of factor loadings indicates that when the 
factors are allowed to correlate with each other instead of being affixed to a 90 degree 
angle, the factor loadings show more clearly how the factor is loaded on each item. In 
the case of the labor force participation items, the first factor is very highly loaded on 
LFP2-OccStat (factor loadings is equal to 1.00), highly loaded on LFP1-Engagement 
and LFP3-ContEmp, and not much so much on LFP4-Earnings (factor loadings is 
only 0.12, but still higher than other items on the table). The big difference in the 
factor loadings of the items after allowing the factors to correlate with each other 
indicates that there is a correlation and therefore, oblique rotation is a more 
appropriate technique for the analysis.  
However, not all the factors experience changes in the loadings when switching from 
orthogonal to oblique rotation; the factor loadings of factor 2 and 3 are quite similar in 
both rotations. Factor 2 is still loaded on education items, and factor 3 is still loaded 
on household decision-making items. Once again, the fourth factor show cross-
loadings results with the first factor on labor force items, which indicates the last one 
is not qualified as a good measurement.  
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The factor correlation matrix shows a slight correlation between factor one and factor 
two (r=0.27) and almost no correlation between factor one and three r=0.02) and 
factor two and factor three (0.12). The correlation matrix also implies that there is a 
small correlation between labor force participation and education while there is little 
correlation between labor force participation and household decision-making. The 
strong negative correlation between factor one and factor four basically shows that it 
is correlating with itself, since both factors are cross-loaded on labor force 
participation items, which makes the correlation not really meaningful.   
Results from principal axis factoring using Philippines DHS 2008 data shows that 
there are 3 factors extracted, in both orthogonal and oblique rotations. Labor force 
participation is the strongest factor, education and household decision-making line up 
as the second and third factor. In this analysis, family planning items again do not 
appear as a factor of women's empowerment.     
Timor-Leste 
In this section, twelve operationalized indicators of women’s empowerment are 
plotted using a scree plot to conduct a visual test of the number of factors in women’s 
empowerment. Later, the factor loadings are extracted using principal analysis 
factoring with nonrotated and rotated axis factoring (orthogonal and oblique 
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extraction). And finally, a factor correlation matrix is presented to determine if the 
factors are correlated with each other.  
 
The scree plot in Figure 9 shows there are three sharp drops, which indicates four 
factors in the 12 items of the factor analysis. The initial eigenvalues show that there 
are four factors that make the 1.0 cut-off, even though the last factor is only barely 
over 1.0. The first factor after extraction has eigenvalues of 2.99, which accounts for 
24.98% of the variance. The second factor after extraction has eigenvalues of 1.53, 
which explains 12.74% of the variance. Each of the third and fourth factor only 
explains 4-5% of the variance. Factors 5th onward only have minimal explaining 
power of the total variance. All together, the first four factors explain 47.37% of the 
total variance of women’s empowerment.  
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Table 20 shows the results from orthogonal and oblique rotations. In orthogonal 
rotation, the first factor is heavily loaded on four items of labor force participation 
with factor loadings all above 0.71 and the highest is 0.95. Education items line up as 
the second factor, with high factor loadings, from 0.60 for ED1-Literacy to 0.91 for 
ED2-Level. The results presented previously in the other three countries all show that 
the third factor is household decision-making, but in the Timor-Leste data, the third 
factor shows cross-loading with the first factor on labor force participation items 
while household decision-making items clustered in the fourth factor. The results are 
mixed with both positive and negative factor loadings. The cross-loading issue in the 
third factor is indeed unexpected. In other three countries, cross-loading issue often 
happens with the weakest factor that explains the least percentage of the total 
variance. The fourth factor is clearly loaded on household decision-making items, 
ranging from 0.30 to 0.48 factor loadings.  
Results from factor analysis with oblique rotation show similar overall trends with 
some difference in the factor loadings of individual items. The first factor only loads 
on three labor force participation items compared to four items in orthogonal rotation. 
LFP1-Engagement factor loading drops from 0.94 (in orthogonal rotation) to 0.41 in 
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oblique rotation. LFP2-OccStat and LFP3-ContEmp are relatively similar as in 
orthogonal rotation, and LFP4-Earnings is no longer an item in this factor loading. 
The second factor mostly loads on education items, which show similar pattern in 
orthogonal rotation. In the third factor, once again the issue of cross-loading is 
observed in the items of labor force participation: LFP1-Engagement and LFP4-
Earnings show up as the strongest negative factor loadings. Note that even though this 
is the third strongest factor, the cross-loading issue makes the results not meaningful 
for interpretation. The fourth factor is loaded on all three household decision-making 
items, with factor loadings from 0.34 to 0.52, which is quite similar to the results in 
orthogonal rotation.    
 
Table 21 shows the factor correlation matrix of the four factors extracted. Since factor 
3 is cross-loaded on factor 1, it does not result in meaningful correlations. The factor 
correlation matrix shows almost no correlation between factor 1 and factor 2 
(r=0.008), and factor 1 and factor 4 (r=-0.041), which implies that factor 1 is 
independent from factor 2 and 4. It also means that female labor force participation 
has very little correlation with education and household decision-making. There is a 
slight positive correlation between factor 2 and factor 4 (r=0.212). The correlation 
matrix shows that, in Timor-Leste, higher education may be slightly correlated with 
higher level of household decision-making.  
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The results from East Timor DHS 2012 data shows that there are 3 factors extracted 
from both orthogonal and oblique rotations. Labor force participation is the strongest 
factor, then education appears as the second factor, the third factor suffers from cross-
loading issue and should be dropped from analysis, therefore household decision-
making is the third factor in this analysis. Family planning items again do not appear 
as a factor in this analysis.     
4.3. Summary and Interpretations of the Results 
The results from factor analysis of four countries consistently show that labor force 
participation is the strongest factor in both orthogonal and oblique rotations. All the 
four items in labor force participation factor including LFP1-Engagement, LFP2-
OccStat, LFP3-ContEmp, LFP4-Earnings, consistently show up as the first factor. 
Nevertheless, individual factor loadings are often higher (in the high 0.80s to 0.90s) in 
orthogonal rotation and varied more greatly in oblique rotation (from 0.40s-0.90s). 
The reason for the difference is that orthogonal rotation assumes that there is no 
correlation among the factors while oblique rotation allows the correlations to exist.  
Similarly, in all four countries, education items (ED1-Literacy and ED2-Level) 
consistently show up as the second most influential factor in both rotated and non-
rotated analyses. Factor loadings are also more consistent in both orthogonal and 
oblique rotations; around 0.60 for ED1-Literacy, and around 0.90 for ED2-Level. 
Apparently, level of education shows higher factor loadings than literacy alone. The 
third factor in Cambodia, Indonesia and Philippines include of three items in 
household decision-making, which are HDM1-Health, HDM1-Spending, and HDM3-
Visiting. These items also show up as a factor in the results from Timor-Leste, 
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however, as the fourth factor.  The average factor loadings of the three items in all 
four countries are around 0.30-0.50.  
The fourth factor shows very interesting results, it is cross-loaded with labor force 
participation items in the first factor with negative factor loadings in all four 
countries. The cross-loading issue is experienced in both orthogonal and oblique 
rotations. In addition to the cross-loading issue, the fourth factor is barely over the 1.0 
eigenvalue cut-off, and does not even meet the cut-off in the Philippines’ results. The 
cross-loading issue and the low eigenvalues suggest that there may not be a fourth 
factor in this analysis since there is too much noise in the results.  
Despite the initial expectation that family planning is one of the four factors in 
women’s empowerment, it does not appear to be one in this study. None of the items 
in the list, including having met need, heard about messages of family planning on the 
media and knowledge about family planning, shows up as a factor in any country. The 
results are consistent in both orthogonal and oblique rotations. There are two reasons 
that may explain why family planning items are not a factor in the analysis. First, it 
may be data insufficiency; the analysis may not have enough data for proper 
measurement of the factor. The family planning factor at the individual level in this 
study used met need, access to media messages about family planning, and 
knowledge about family planning. Other variables, including contraceptive use and 
the types of contraceptives are not suitable for this analysis. As explained earlier, the 
reason is that women interviewed for these surveys are in their reproductive ages 
(from 15-49), and many of them do not use contraceptives simply because they are 
not sexually active so there is no need for contraception, or they want to have children 
or have not reached their desired number of children. Therefore, there is no clear logic 
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to determine if using contraceptives is more empowering than not or vice versa. As a 
result, a variable on contraceptive use is excluded from this factor analysis.  
The second reason why family planning may not show up as a factor in women’s 
empowerment of this analysis could be the context of family planning usage. Some 
previous studies have suggested that family planning should be examined more 
carefully as a component of women’s empowerment to fertility. Results in Kenya 
show that, on the surface, the factors which empower women are associated with 
family planning. Nevertheless, Bradley (1995) points out that family planning users 
also tend to be older women and have more economic power. It is possible that older 
women want to end childbearing at the same time that they start to have more control 
over their life. Thus, the mechanism through which contraception is a result of 
women’s empowerment is still unclear. Contraceptive use can be empowering in 
countries where the prevalence of usage is low, but it may not as empowering in 
countries where there is a high prevalence of family planning usage. The case of 
Bangladesh suggests that the use of contraception was once considered empowering, 
but when more than half of the married women in rural Bangladesh have used it since 
the 1990s, it has become normative and does not necessarily imply a higher level of 
empowerment (Malhotra, Schulerm, and Boender 2002).  
It might that the percentage of ever-married women currently using some methods of 
contraception or having intentions to use is relatively high in all four countries of 
analysis. There are 41% of ever-married women in Cambodia who are currently using 
contraceptives. Including women who have intentions to use brings the number to 
70%. In Indonesia, 56% are using and 78% of women are using or having intention to 
use. In Philippines, 50% of ever-married women are currently using some method, 
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and 73% ever married are using or having intention to use. Timor-Leste, being the 
country with lowest contraceptive use prevalence, has 21% ever-married women 
using contraceptives and 37% using or having intention to use. The high prevalence 
of contraceptive use may suggest that it is not necessarily an empowering factor 
anymore. Instead, it is becoming more of a norm. Evidence found in this study, that 
contraceptive use once considered an empowering factor but no long the case, 
supports the notion that women's empowerment is contextual; what is considered 
empowering may not be in other contexts (Malhotra, Schulerm, and Boender 2002).  
In this study, principal axis factoring was able to identify three major factors of 
women’s empowerment in Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines and Timor-Leste. Labor 
force participation appears to be the strongest factor, and then come education and 
household decision-making. Despite the initial expectation, family planning does not 
show up as a factor in women’s empowerment in the analysis of the data in any of 
these four countries. Higher education of women often coincides with higher chances 
of involvement of women in the labor force, which in turn, leads to higher economic 
independence and more involvement in household decision-making. All these factors 
increase the level of empowerment of individual women. However, the mechanism is 
undetermined in terms of women’s use of contraceptive and empowerment.   
Previous studies on women’s empowerment have suggested women’s use of 
contraception as a factor of women’s empowerment. However, evidence found in this 
study using recent data from Southeast Asia does not provide support for such 
conclusion. As discussed earlier, women’s use of contraception probably used to be a 
factor in women’s empowerment, when contraceptive use was limited to only a small 
group of innovative women who could afford it. With time, as contraceptives have 
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become more readily available even in developing countries, using contraception may 
not necessarily mean a higher level of empowerment. A woman may choose not to 
use contraceptive or choose to have a higher number of children based on her 
preference and her decision, it does not necessarily mean she has no or less control 
over her fertility.  
This study has overcome the shortcomings of current indexes, which mainly focus on 
developed countries where the perceptions of employment and labor can be very 
different than in less developed ones. The measurement of women’s empowerment 
using micro data also provides a solution for the problem of lacking household level 
data in current indexes (Beteta 2006). Furthermore, the construction of the 
measurement is practically applicable in more than 90 developing countries where the 
Demographic and Health Surveys are available. Most current indexes have been 
measuring women’s empowerment using the contraceptive use as one proxy to 
measure women’s empowerment, nonetheless, new measurements should be more 
cautious about treating this variable as a component of empowerment.  
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CHAPTER 5: USING WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT TO MODEL 
IDEAL NUMBER OF CHILDREN 
Previous studies have suggested different pathways through which women’s 
empowerment affects different aspects of fertility such as the preference for high 
fertility or preference for specific gender of the children. This chapter examines the 
associations between women's empowerment and fertility preference in terms of the 
preference for large family size, which is operationalized by the women's ideal 
number of children. Three women’s empowerment factors which have been extracted 
from principal axis factoring in the previous chapter, including women’s labor force 
participation, women’s education and household decision-making, are examined in 
four countries of study: Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines and Timor-Leste. Three 
types of regression models (OLS, Poisson and Ordered Logit) are used to find out if 
there are significant association between the three women’s empowerment factors and 
fertility preference, measured by the ideal number of children, after controlling for a 
woman’s and her husband’s characteristics.  
5.1. Selected Variables and Descriptive statistics 
This section describes how the variables, including the dependent, independent and 
control variables for the regression models, are selected and operationalized. Later the 
descriptive statistics of the variables are presented and discussed.  
The Dependent Variable 
Fertility preferences are the desire expressed by the couples about their childbearing, 
for example, the preference for high fertility or the preference for sons. The term 
fertility preference is often used interchangeably with ideal/ desired/ preferred/ 
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intended number of children or desired family size (Oxaal and Baden 1997). Since 
fertility preference is closely related to actual fertility, changes in fertility preference 
are often accompanied by changes in fertility behaviors (Pritchett 1994, Bankole 
1995, Freedman 1997, Bongaarts 1990, Freedman, Hermalin, and Chang 1975). In 
this study, data on women’s fertility preferences were collected through the 
Demographic and Health Surveys in four countries: Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines 
and Timor-Leste. The surveys use large and nationally representative samples with 
detailed questions on demographic background, fertility preferences and birth 
histories of all eligible women age 15-49 (more detailed description of the surveys is 
introduced previously in Chapter 3). The Demographic and Health Surveys have 
detailed sections on fertility preferences of the respondents, including questions on 
the respondents’ desire to have another child, the desired length of time before having 
another child, the ideal number of children, and the ideal number of sons and 
daughters.  
In the question on the ideal number of children, the women were asked if they could 
go back to before they had had any children, how many children would they ideally 
have. This question is standard in all DHS questionnaires in all the countries. The 
ideal number of children is a good measure for women’s fertility preference since it 
assumes that no birth is unintended, and all births are “wanted”.  
Even though fertility preferences may change over time and depend on different life 
stages of the respondents, this issue can be controlled for by adding variables on 
women’s age to the regression models. An advantage of using fertility preference as 
the dependent variable is that it is not much affected by whether the women have 
completed their childbearing or not. In contrast, using actual fertility such as the 
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number of children ever born would be greatly affected by this fact. Therefore, in this 
chapter, the ideal number of children is used as the dependent variable. 
One of the limitations of using the ideal number of children as the dependent variable 
is the issue of non-numerical responses such as “up to God” or “as many as God 
wants”, which DHS questionnaires encounter in some responses, especially in the 
Indonesia sample. One way to correct this problem is to use the average of the ideal 
number of children of all women in the sample to replace non-numerical responses. 
Nevertheless, women who responded “up to God” instead of numerical answers had a 
vague idea about their desired family size; they tend to prefer higher ideal numbers of 
children and tend not to try to limit their number of children. In this study, non-
numerical answers in the selected data sets are recoded as missing so only numerical 
answers are eligible for analysis.  
The second limitation with using the ideal number of children that Bongaarts (2001) 
points out, is that women with a high actual number of children might adjust their 
ideal number of children to rationalize their existing conditions. Unfortunately it is 
not possible to determine if their responses were affected by the rationalization issue. 
However, since the ideal number of children expressed by women in all four countries 
is higher than the current number of children ever born, it is reasonable to expect that 
the majority of births are wanted - some births may be mistimed but still fit in the 
desired family size. 
Key Independent Variables 
The three key independent variables are factor scores of women’s participation in the 
labor force, women’s education and women’s involvement in household decision-
making, which are extracted through principal axis factoring (as described in Chapter 
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4). The scores are actual individual scores based on how the women answered the 
questions regarding these three aspects of women’s empowerment. The fourth 
concept explored in chapter 4, women’s use of contraception, it did not show up as an 
identifiable factor in principal axis factoring. Therefore, it is not used as one of the 
key independent variables in this chapter.  
The women’s labor force participation factor is measured by four indicators which 
take into account the engagement of the woman in the cash economy through types of 
employment (if she works for herself, family members or someone else) and types of 
payment that she receives; her occupation; her continuity of employment throughout 
the year (full time or part time); and her earnings compared to her husband’s earnings. 
The education factor is measured by two indicators: women’s literacy and women’s 
level of education completed. The household decision-making factor is measured by 
three indicators: decisions related to health (issues when seeking medical help), 
decisions related to household spending (who controls how to spend the money) and 
decisions related to visiting relatives (who decides). The detailed operationalization of 
these factors is described in chapter 4. 
It is expected that increase in factor scores of all three women’s empowerment factors 
is associated with a lower ideal number of children. At the individual level, women’s 
participation in paid employment is associated with lower actual fertility and lower 
fertility preference (Mason 1987, Jejeebhoy 1995, Rindfuss and Brewster 1996, 
Kabeer 2001, 2005a). Previous studies have found that a higher level of women’s 
household decision-making is associated with a preference for lower fertility (Afifi 
2007, Upadhyay and Karasek 2012, Shoaib, Saeed, and Cheema 2012). Increase in 
women’s level of education has been universally found to be associated with a 
 157 
preference for lower fertility (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000, Bongaarts 2003, Larsen 
and Hollos 2003).  
Control Variables 
Fertility preferences are influenced by different socio-economic and demographic 
background characteristics of the respondents and their partners; thus, it is important 
to include a set of control variables in the regression models. In this study, the 
relationship between women’s empowerment and the ideal number of children is 
examined after controlling for age, residence, religion, the number of children ever 
born, husband’s education and husband’s occupation. The ideal number of children 
may change with women’s age and the number of children they have had. The 
location of women’s current residence (in urban or rural areas) may be associated 
with their preference for children as well. And, this number may also be associated 
with having certain religious values. Generally, both partners contribute to the 
couple’s fertility preferences and behaviors. Thus, the background characteristics of 
the respondents’ husband such as occupation and education, may have some 
associations with the woman’s ideal number of children, hence these variables are 
also included.  
Women’s age also is expected to be associated with their ideal number of children, 
thus it is included in the regression models. Even though the ideal number of children 
is sensitive to age and different stages in the life course, it may not necessarily show a 
linear relationship; thus, a variable age-squared is added to the models to examine if 
there is a curvilinear association of women’s age with their ideal number of children. 
Older women are expected to have a higher ideal number of children but the 
difference is more visible in younger age groups and will diminish once the women 
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reach a certain age. Therefore, the ideal number of children is expected to rise with 
age and then flatten out. Respondents’ current age is included in all DHS 
questionnaires. The variable is numeric and continuous so no further 
operationalization is needed.  
Urban residence has been consistently found to to associated with lower actual 
fertility and the ideal number of children (Singh and Casterline 1985, Phan 2014, 
Cochrane 1983, Duncan 1965). In this study, the effects of urban residence is 
controlled for by adding a dichotomous variable on current residence of the 
respondents, which has been recoded into a dummy variable with urban residence as 
the reference category.  
Linear correlation between fertility preference and actual fertility has been found in 
the literature (Bongaarts 1990), thus, a higher ideal number of children may indicate a 
higher average number of children ever born and vice versa. In this study, the number 
of children ever born (CEB) is controlled for in all models regressing the ideal 
number of children on women's empowerment factors. The number of children ever 
born is available in the DHS questionnaire as a numeric continuous variable; hence, 
the original variable is used with no modification. It is also expected that the 
relationship between the ideal number of children and the number of children ever 
born is moderated by age, which means the association between the number of 
children ever born and the ideal number of children changes as age changes. Thus an 
interaction between age and number of children ever born is controlled for in the 
regression models.  
Religion has been one of the major focuses in studies of fertility rates across 
populations (Morgan et al. 2002, McQuillan 2004, Heaton 2011). Heaton (2011), 
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while studying 30 developing countries using DHS data, finds that Muslim women 
have substantially higher fertility than Christian women, while there is not much 
difference between Catholics and Protestant women. Religion is significant to fertility 
in both developing and developed countries. In a study of 15 European countries 
using the European Values Study (1990, 1999 and 2008), Guetto, Luijkx, and Scherer 
(2015) find that religion is statistically associated with fertility in 10 out of 15 
countries. In this study, the effect of religion on the ideal number of children is also 
examined. 
The DHS religion variables are not uniformly coded in all four countries of study; 
thus an operationalization of the variables is necessary. The DHS question on religion 
is not available in Indonesia, in the Demographic and Health Survey 2012 
questionnaire there was no question on religion, though it was available in the other 
three countries. This might come from the assumption that almost the whole country’s 
population is Muslim, while in fact, the CIA World Fact Book reports that 87.4% of 
the population is Muslim (Central Intelligence Agency 2013). The reason for the 
omission of the religion question in the Indonesian questionnaire is unclear since it is 
not mentioned anywhere in the final DHS report. Therefore, in the results section 
reporting regression models for Indonesia, religion is not included in the models. 
In the three countries where the religion variable is available, each country has 
different response categories depending on the actual religions being practiced in the 
country. In Cambodia, response options of the religion question include: Buddhism, 
Islam, Christianity and Others, which is quite standard in capturing the major 
religions of the region; thus these options are used to standardize religion variables in 
other countries. The religion variable in the Philippines has different options for 
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Christian denominations. The majority of the population is Roman Catholic, however, 
there are also Protestant, Iglesia Ni Kristo and Aglipay, of which the latter two are 
Christian denominations that originated in the Philippines. None (no religion) and 
Others are combined into one category “Others” and Islam remain unchanged. 
Similarly, in the Timor-Leste questionnaire, there are 5 response options for the 
question on religion: Catholic, Protestant, Islam, Hindu, and Others. The new 
recoded religion variable combines Catholic and Protestant into “Christianity”, 
combines Hindu and Others into “Others”, and leaves Islam unchanged. 
Fertility decisions are usually jointly decided by the couples; therefore it is important 
to also include the socio-economic background of the husband in the regression 
models. In this study, husband’s education and occupation are controlled for. 
Husband’s years of education is a numeric standard variable in all four questionnaires 
so no recoding is necessary. The DHS variable on the occupation of the husband has 
10 categories, which have been recoded into a set of 4 variables: (1) husband works in 
agriculture (agriculture self-employed and agriculture employee) – treated as 
reference variable; (2) husband does not work (no transformation needed); (3) 
husband works in non-manual jobs (a combination of 5 categories in the original 
variable: professional/ technical/ managerial, clerical, sales, household and domestic, 
services); and (4) husband works in manual jobs (a combination of two categories in 
the original variable: skilled manual and unskilled manual). There are a very small 
number of men whose jobs are unknown to their wife (Don’t know); these cases are 
treated as missing.  
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Table 22 shows the descriptive statistics of the final eligible samples in four countries. 
Descriptive statistics of the three independent variables and 6 control variables that 
are used in the regression models on the relationship between women’s empowerment 
and the ideal number of children are presented.   
The average age of Cambodian women in the sample is 31.3; of Indonesian and 
Filipino women is 32.9 and 32.7 respectively, and of Timor-Leste women is 30.4. The 
proportion of women who live in urban residence varies among the four countries 
from one third to nearly half of the samples. Timor-Leste has the lowest proportion of 
women who live in urban areas (31%) while Indonesia has the highest number (48%).  
Despite the geographical closeness, the four countries studied have a great diversity in 
religions. 97% of the sample in Cambodia is Buddhist, and only a very small number 
is Muslim or Christian. The most dominant religion in Indonesia is Islam, 
nonetheless, there are no data available on religion in the Indonesia DHS survey. In 
the Philippines, 86% of the sample is Christian (including Catholic and other 
Christian denominations); a small proportion is Muslim and other religions; and 0% 
Buddhist. In Timor-Leste, the homogeneity in terms of religion is extremely high, 
99.6% of the sample is Catholic and only four-tenths of a per cent of the sample 
practices Islam and other religions. The four countries of study have very different 
major religions. The major religion in Cambodia is Buddhism, in Indonesia, it is 
Islam, in the Philippines and Timor-Leste, it is Roman Catholic. In the regression 
models for each country presented in later sections, the religion that is the dominant 
one in the country is treated as the reference group.  
The average ideal number of children, i.e. the dependent variable in this study, is 
lowest in Indonesia (2.69), and strikingly high in Timor-Leste (5.41). As a relatively 
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newly independent country, Timor-Leste is still at the beginning of the demographic 
transition, which displays in the high number of children ever born. The country’s 
TFR only started to show some signs of decline in the period from 2005-2010 and 
would be expected to further decline following other countries in Southeast Asia. The 
ideal number of children expressed by Filipino women is just above 3 (3.09), only 
slightly lower than Cambodian women’s ideal of 3.21. In all of the countries, the 
average ideal number of children is higher than the average number of children ever 
born (CEB). The difference ranges from a low of 0.4 children in Indonesia, to 0.7-0.8 
children in Cambodia and Philippines, and to an excessively high 1.58 children in 
Timor-Leste.  
Control variables for husband’s characteristics include husband’s years of education 
and husband’s occupation. The average years of husband’s education is lowest in 
Cambodia (7.12), then Timor-Leste (8.09), and Philippines (9.18). The Indonesian 
sample has highest average years of husband’s education (9.35).  
Husband’s occupation is recoded into four categories (from 10 original categories): 
husbands who work in agriculture (treated as the reference category), husbands who 
do not work, husbands who work in non-manual jobs, and husbands who work in 
manual jobs. In Cambodia, 41% of the women in the sample have husbands who 
work in agriculture jobs (which is the highest proportion out of all the job categories), 
31% of the women have husbands who work in non-manual jobs, and 25% have 
husbands who work in manual jobs. Only half a percent of the sample have husbands 
who do not work. In Indonesia, a quarter of the women in the sample have husbands 
who work in agriculture, 35% have husbands who work in non-manual jobs and 38% 
have husbands who work in manual jobs; only less than 1% of the women in the 
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sample have husbands who do not work. In the Philippines sample, 28% of the 
women have husbands who work in agriculture, 25% have husbands who work in 
non-manual jobs, a very high proportion (43%) of the women have husbands who 
work in manual jobs. In Timor-Leste, the distribution of the husbands’ occupation is 
quite different; 43% of the women have husbands working in agriculture, 47% have 
husbands who work in non-manual jobs, only 8% have husbands who work in manual 
jobs and none have husbands who do not work.  
Table 22 also shows the three key independent variables, which are the average scores 
of individual women’s empowerment factors in labor force participation, education 
and household decision-making. By construction, the means of all the factor scores 
are 0 since the variables are all standardized with average values centered at 0.  
The number of missing cases is relatively small in Cambodia, Philippines and Timor-
Leste. The number of missing cases in Indonesia is quite high due to the large number 
of missing data in the dependent variable (Ideal number of children). There are 2,282 
women in the four countries who had non-numeric responses such as “up to God” or 
“as many as God wants” when they were asked about their ideal number of children. 
Most of the missing cases (2,404) occur in the Indonesian sample. These answers are 
coded as missing since numeric answers are required to run the regression models. 
Nevertheless, since the selected samples for all four countries are quite large, the 
missing values still represent less than 10% of the total target sample by design for 
Indonesia (and much less for the other countries).  
5.2. Regression models 
Since the dependent variable is the ideal number of children, which is a count 
variable, ordinary least squares regression is not the most appropriate approach even 
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though it produces easy to interpret results. Poisson regression would ordinarily be the 
preferred approach for a count outcome variable that follows a Poisson distribution. 
One of the properties of the Poisson distribution is that the mean equals the variance 
and this characteristic is commonly used to test if the data follow the Poisson 
distribution. However, the mean and variance tests in each sample suggest that none 
of them follows the Poisson distribution. Another reason that Poisson regression is not 
perfectly suitable for analysis is that the ideal number of children stated by a woman 
is not a number that was actually counted, it is an imaginary number instead of a real 
number of births that have occurred.  
Ordered logit models can be used to model the ideal number of children if the 
dependent variable is treated as a categorical variable which follows ordered numbers 
starting from 0; and the distances between one category to the next are not equal. 
Specifically, the odds of increasing in one number of ideal of children increases with 
lower ordered number and decreases as the number goes up, since many women 
prefer to have 1-2 or 3 children but fewer would choose a higher number. Therefore, 
ordered logit regression is an acceptable approach.  
Nonetheless, all three types of regression have their significant benefits. Ordinary 
least squares regression makes it easy to interpret the results, which gives initial 
impressions on how the variables behave; Poisson regression is appropriate for a 
count outcome dependent variable; and ordered logit regression is appropriate for 
ordered outcomes. In this section, three types of regressions, OLS, Poisson and 
ordered logit, are run for each of the four countries to examine the association 
between women’s empowerment and the ideal number of children after controlling 
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for other variables. First, baseline models with only control variables are run, later the 
three women’s empowerment factors will be added to the full models. 
Cambodia 
The Cambodia 2010 sample includes 6,496 women who have data available for all 
selected variables for the ideal number of children regression models. The baseline 
models include a set of control variables: age and age squared to examine the life 
cycle effect on the ideal number of children, current residence of the women (which 
takes rural residence as the reference category), religion (in which Buddhism is the 
reference category since it is the most dominant religion in Cambodia), CEB (number 
of children ever born as a continuous variable), an interaction between age and CEB 
(age*CEB), husband’s years of education, and husband’s occupation (which takes 
agriculture as the reference category). The full models include all the control variables 
plus the labor force participation, education and household decision-making factor 
scores. A total of six regression models are run. Results for three types of regression: 
OLS (models M1, M2), Poisson (models M3, M4) and Ordered Logit (models M5, 
M6) are reported in table 23.  
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Age and age-squared only show significant associations with the dependent variable 
in ordered logit models, which suggests a curvilinear association of women’s age and 
the ideal number of children that they want. Theoretically, the negative coefficients of 
age and slightly positive coefficients of age-squared suggest a slight U shaped curve 
of age on the ideal number of children: older women have lower ideal number of 
children compared to those who are in younger ages. However, the coefficients of age 
and age-squared are not significant in OLS and Poisson models and in ordered logit 
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regression the coefficient of age-squared is only slightly above 1, which makes the 
line appear almost linear (see Figure 10). If the age range was infinite then the curve 
would appear more evident. But in the age range of the sample, 15-49, it appears that 
women’s ideal number of children follows a roughly linear downward line as they get 
older. 
 
Lower ideal number of children seems to be associated with urban residence, yet, the 
relationship is only significant in the baseline models estimated using OLS and 
ordered logit regression (M.1 and M.5), and is not significant when the labor force 
participation, education and household decision-making factors are added into the 
models.  
Religion (where Buddhism is the reference category) shows a significant association 
with the ideal number of children; there is a significantly higher odds of preferring a 
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higher ideal number of children among Muslim women. In numerical terms, being 
Muslim in Cambodia increases the odds of preferring one higher ideal number of 
children by 1.8 times compared to being Buddhist. However, being Christian or 
Others show no significant difference in the ideal number of children compared to the 
reference category. The association is consistently significant in all three types of 
regression and in both baseline and full models. 
CEB (children ever born) has a very strong and consistent relationship with ideal 
number of children across all models. The statistically significant coefficients indicate 
that a higher number of CEB is positively associated with a higher ideal number of 
children. In ordered logit models, higher number of CEB increases the odds of 
preferring one number higher in the ideal number of children by 78%. The interaction 
between age and CEB is controlled for but does not show any significant coefficients 
in the models.      
It is surprising to find that husband’s characteristics on education and occupation 
show no association with their wife’s ideal number of children across all six models. 
Years of husband’s education tend to associate with a lower ideal number of children, 
yet the coefficients are not statistically significant across all models. Husband’s 
occupation also shows no significant association with fertility: all job categories 
including not working, works in non-manual jobs and works in manual jobs, show no 
significant difference to those who work in agriculture (reference category).  
In the case of Cambodia, of all the three women’s empowerment factors included in 
the full models (M2, M4, M6), only the coefficients of the education factor show up 
significant, while the coefficients of the other two factors are not. The results show 
that education factor scores are negatively associated with the ideal number of 
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children in OLS and ordered logit regressions. The relationship between the education 
factor and fertility preference (operationalized as the ideal number of children) is 
significant at p-value < 0.01. The result is consistent with the literature on the 
relationship between women’s education and their actual fertility and fertility 
preference. Higher scores of the labor force participation factor tend to be associated 
with higher ideal number of children, yet the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
A similar trend is observed in the coefficients of factor scores on household decision-
making, where higher scores in household decision-making tend to be associated with 
higher ideal number of children, but again, the coefficient is not significant.  
In OLS models, the R-squared statistic shows that the models explain about 25% of 
the variation in the ideal number of children of women in Cambodia. Nonetheless, the 
F-test for the OLS models and Chi-squared test based on the -2 Log likelihood 
statistic for the Poisson models do not suggest an improvement of the baseline model 
after adding three women’s empowerment factor scores. Nevertheless, the Chi-
squared test based on the -2Log likelihood statistic for the ordered logit models 
suggests that the baseline model is significantly improved after adding the three 
women's empowerment factor scores at p-value=0.01. 
The results from all 6 models suggest that in this sample of DHS Cambodia 2010, 
only the education factor shows a significant negative coefficient on fertility 
preference, while labor force participation and household decision-making factors do 
not have significant associations with the ideal number of children. Control variables 
for women's characteristics such as age, age-squared, CEB, and religion are 
significant, whereas control variables on the husband’s characteristics such as 
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husband’s years of education and husband’s occupation show no significant 
association.   
Indonesia 
The DHS Indonesia 2012 sample includes 24,479 women who have data available for 
all selected variables for the fertility preference regression models. This is also the 
largest sample size of the four countries studied. A similar model design as that 
presented earlier for Cambodia is used. The baseline models include a set of control 
variables: age and age squared to examine the life cycle effect on the ideal number of 
children, current residence of the women (which takes rural residence as the reference 
category), CEB (number of children ever born) as a continuous variable, an 
interaction between age and CEB (age*CEB), husband’s years of education, and 
husband’s occupation (which takes agriculture as the reference category). Religion 
was not included in the Indonesia DHS questionnaire so the religion variable is 
omitted in the regression models. The full models include all the control variables 
plus the three women's empowerment factors: labor force participation, education and 
household decision-making. A total of six regression models are run. Results for three 
types of regression: OLS (models M1, M2), Poisson (models M3, M4) and Ordered 
Logit (models M5, M6) are reported in table 24.  
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OLS and ordered logit regression results show that age is negatively associated with 
the ideal number of children in models M1, M2 and M5, M6. Nonetheless, age does 
not show up significant in Poisson regression models (M3, M4) in this sample. Age-
squared is also statistically significant across all six models. Theoretically, the 
positive coefficients of age and slightly negative coefficients of age-squared suggest 
a slightly downward curved trend line of age on the ideal number of children, which 
indicates that women at their middle ages prefer slightly higher ideal number of 
children compared to women at younger or older age groups. In the age range of the 
sample (15-49), the ideal number of children follows a curvilinear downward line (as 
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shown in Figure 11), women prefer a higher ideal number of children when they are 
younger but the older they get, the lower the ideal number of children they prefer. 
 
Residence has a very consistent association with the ideal number of children across 
all six models. Urban residence is significantly associated with lower ideal number of 
children at p-value < 0.01 in all models. Model M6 shows that living in urban areas 
decreases the odds of the women to prefer one number higher in the ideal number of 
children by 19%, compared to those who live in rural areas. 
CEB also shows a positive association with ideal number of children in Poisson and 
ordered logit models; one number higher in the number of children ever born 
significantly increases the odds of one number higher in the ideal number of children 
among Indonesian women. There is a significant interaction between age and CEB in 
all models, which indicates that the relationship between the ideal number of children 
and the number of children ever born is moderated by age, i.e. the relationship 
between the number of children ever born and the ideal number of children changes 
as age changes. This result is different from previous results found in the analysis of 
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Cambodia, which shows no interaction between the two variables. Figure 12 shows 
the predicted margins effect of the interaction of age*CEB on the ideal number of 
children in model M2 of OLS regression. Clearly, at the same predicted ideal number 
of children, women at the youngest age group (20 year-old) have the lowest number 
of children ever born compared to two older age groups (30 and 40). Women at age 
40 have the highest number of children-ever-born at the same predicted ideal number 
of children.  
 
Similar to the results found in the Cambodian sample, husband’s years of education 
does not have any associations with the ideal number of children in this sample. The 
coefficients are negative in the three baseline models, and positive in the three full 
models, yet, none of them is significant.  
Husband’s occupation has some significant associations with the ideal number of 
children. Women whose husbands work in agriculture are considered the reference 
category. The results show that this reference group has the highest ideal number of 
children compared to all three other groups: not working, work in non-manual jobs 
 175 
and work in manual jobs. The relationship is almost consistent in all OLS, Poisson 
and order logit regression models. The exception is the group of women whose 
husbands are not working, which does not show significantly lower ideal number of 
children compared to those who work in agriculture in the two Poisson regression 
models (M3, M4) and in the full model estimated using ordered logit regression (M6).      
All the three women’s empowerment factors have significant associations with 
fertility preference in the Indonesian sample with only one exception of household 
decision-making factor in model M4. Labor force participation factor is associated 
with higher ideal number of children. In ordered logit model (M6), it increases the 
odds of preferring one number higher in the ideal number of children by 8.3%. The 
coefficients are significant at p-value < 0.01 in all three models. The results are quite 
unexpected and strikingly in contrary to the initial expectation that higher level of 
engagement of the women into the labor market would lower their actual fertility and 
their ideal number of children.  
Education factor is negatively associated with the ideal number of children in both 
OLS and ordered logit regression models. OLS results show that women who have 
higher scores in the education factor prefer a lower ideal number of children. Ordered 
logit regression results show that higher scores in the education factor lowers the odds 
of preferring one number higher of ideal number of children by 7.5% (model M6). 
The association between women’s education and the ideal number of children is 
significant at p-value < 0.01. The result is expected and consistent with earlier results 
found in the analysis of Cambodia.  
Household decision-making factor scores are associated with a lower ideal number of 
children, which indicates that women who have more involvement in the household 
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decision-making process tend to have a lower ideal number of children. In other 
words, one unit increase in the household decision-making factor scores lowers the 
odds of preferring one number higher of ideal number of children by 4% (model M6). 
The coefficients are significant in both OLS and ordered logit regressions. This 
finding can be interpreted that a woman who has more power in deciding her health, 
her mobility and household spending would prefer a lower ideal number of children 
compared to those who has less power in the household.  
Despite the fact that most variables are significant in the two OLS regression models 
of the Indonesian sample, yet, the R-squares are not very high; around 13% of the 
variation in ideal number of children can be explained by three women’s 
empowerment factors and the control variables in the OLS models. The F-test based 
on the R-squared of OLS models does not show a significant improvement of the full 
model after adding three women’s empowerment factors. However, Chi-squared tests 
based on the -2Log Likelihood of Poisson and ordered logit models show that the 
baseline models are significantly improved after adding the three key independent 
variables of women’s empowerment factors at p-value = 0.001. 
Results from all 6 regression models suggest that all three women’s empowerment 
factors including labor force participation, education and household decision-making 
have significant associations with the ideal number of children of Indonesian women. 
While it is unexpected that higher scores of labor force participation are associated 
with higher odds of preferring higher ideal number of children, higher education and 
household decision-making factor scores are associated with lower odds, as expected. 
Not all the control variables in the Indonesia sample are statistically significant, 
specifically, husband’s years of education has no association with their wives’ ideal 
 177 
number of children. Women’s age and age-squared show an association with the 
ideal number of children, which suggests a curvilinear line, and the coefficients are 
statistically significant. Other control variables including residence, CEB, the 
interaction term age*CEB, and husband’s occupation show significant coefficients on 
the ideal number of children.  
Philippines  
The Philippines 2008 sample includes 7,113 women who have data available for all 
selected variables for the fertility preference regression models. The baseline models 
include a set of control variables: age and age-squared to examine the life cycle effect 
of women’s age on the ideal number of children, current residence of the women 
(which takes rural residence as the reference category), religion (in which Catholic is 
the reference category since it is the most dominant religion in the Philippines), CEB 
(number of children ever born, as a continuous variable), husband’s years of 
education, and husband’s occupation (which takes agriculture as the reference 
category). The full models include all the control variables plus the labor force 
participation, education and household decision-making factor scores. A total of six 
regression models are run. Results from three types of regression: OLS (models M1, 
M2), Poisson (models M3, M4) and Ordered Logit (models M5, M6) are reported in 
table 25.  
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The results in Table 25 show that women’s age is positively associated with their 
fertility preference operationalized by the ideal number of children in OLS models 
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(M1, M2) and model M6 in ordered logit regressions, which indicates that older 
women tend to prefer higher ideal number of children. The coefficients of age-
squared are very small and none of them is significant. For women from 15-49 in the 
sample, the trend line is a straight upward line with almost no curvilinear effect, 
which suggests that women prefer lower ideal numbers of children when they there 
younger but as they get older they prefer higher numbers. If age was an infinite 
number, the trend line would have shown more of the curvilinear effects. 
 
Similar to previous results found in Cambodia and Indonesia, residence has a very 
consistent association with ideal number of children across all six models. Urban 
residence is significantly associated with a lower ideal number of children. The 
coefficient is significant at p-value < 0.01 in OLS and order logit models and p-value 
< 0.05 in Poisson models. 
As the majority of the Filipino population is Catholic, this category is treated as the 
reference group in religion variable. Other denominations of Christianity including 
Protestant, Iglesia Ni Kristo and Aglipay, of which the latter two are local churches 
originated from the Philippines, are kept unchanged to examine if there is a difference 
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among women belonging to different Christian denominations. Islam, which is the 
religion of only a little more than 5% of the population, is one category for the 
religion variable. There is only a small proportion of the sample that has no religion 
(None) or follows other religions (Others). The results show that there is no 
significant difference in the ideal number of children among Christian women, 
regardless of the denominations. There is no significant difference in the ideal number 
of children of women who have no religion or have other religions to Catholics as 
well. Nevertheless, similar to the results found in Cambodia, Muslim women in the 
Philippines have significantly higher ideal numbers of children. In the ordered logit 
regression results, the odds of Muslim women preferring higher ideal numbers of 
children are strikingly high, almost 10.6 times higher than Catholic women at the 99% 
confidence interval (model M6).   
Table 25 also shows that the number of children ever born is closely associated with 
the ideal number of children. In this sample, one number higher in CEB statistically 
increases the odds of the women to prefer one number higher in the ideal number of 
children by almost twice (model M5, M6). This result is expected since when the 
majority of women have met needs for family planning (around 80%) so most births 
are assumed to be intended, therefore it is not surprising that women who already 
have a high current number of children prefer a higher ideal number as well. This 
strong correlation is similar to previous ones found in Cambodian and Indonesian 
data.  
The coefficient of the interaction term age*CEB is statistically significant, which 
indicates that the relationship between the ideal number of children and the number of 
children ever born is moderated by age, i.e. the relationship between the number of 
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children ever born and the ideal number of children changes as age changes. The 
coefficient displays a negative association between age*CEB and ideal number of 
children. Figure 14 shows the predictive margins effect of the interaction between age 
and CEB on the ideal number of children of women at age 20, 30 and 40. It shows 
that at the same predicted ideal number of children, 40 year-old women have the 
lowest CEB and 20 year-old women have the highest CEB. The effect of the 
interaction term age*CEB on ideal number of children is quite interesting and 
contrary to the age*CEB interaction found in Indonesia and Timor-Leste.   
 
Similar to previous results found in Cambodia and Indonesia, in this sample, the 
coefficients of husband’s years of education are not significant in all six models. The 
results suggest that husband’s education has no association with the wife’s ideal 
number of children.  
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Husband’s occupation shows an interesting picture. Only women whose husbands 
work in manual jobs prefer significantly lower ideal numbers of children, whereas 
other groups (husbands not working, and husbands works in non-manual job) show no 
significant difference to the reference group. Low income and the lack of job stability, 
which is often found associated with manual jobs, can be the explanation to the 
relationship between husband’s occupation and their partner’s preference for children. 
In model M6, women whose husbands work in manual jobs have 16.3% lower odds 
of preferring the same number of children as those whose husbands work in 
agricultural jobs. The coefficients are significant at p-value < 0.01 in OLS and order 
logit models and p-value < 0.05 in Poisson models. 
Out of three women’s empowerment factors, only the education factor shows 
statistically significant associations with the ideal number of children in all six 
models. OLS and Poisson regression results illustrate that an increase in the education 
factor score is associated with a lower ideal number of children. Results from ordered 
logit regression also display similar findings: one higher score in education factor 
lowers the odds of the women to prefer one number higher in the ideal number of 
children by 13% (model M6). Even though labor force participation factor seems to 
be associated with higher ideal number of children, yet the coefficients are not 
significant. Household decision-making factor also does not show significant 
coefficients in all three full regression models.  
In the two OLS models, the R-squareds show that the models explain about 27% of 
the variation in the ideal number of children of Filipino women. Nevertheless, the F-
test based on the R-squared of OLS models does not show a significant improvement 
of the full model after adding three women’s empowerment factors. The Chi-squared 
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test based on -2Log Likelihood of the two Poisson models indicates that the full 
model is significantly improved after adding the three key independent variables of 
women’s empowerment factors into the baseline model at p-value = 0.1. The Chi-
squared test based on -2Log Likelihood of the two ordered logit models also suggests 
that the full model is significantly improved after adding the three key independent 
variables of women’s empowerment factors into the baseline model at p-value = 
0.001.  
The results from 6 models suggest that in this DHS Philippines 2008 sample, only the 
education factor shows significant a negative association with the ideal number of 
children, while the coefficients of labor force participation factor and household 
decision-making factor are not significant. Control variables on women’s 
characteristics including residence, CEB, the interaction term age*CEB, and religion 
are significant in predicting the ideal number of children. Control variable husband’s 
years of education does not show any significant association with women’s ideal 
number of children, however, husband’s occupation shows that women whose 
husbands work in manual jobs statistically prefer lower ideal numbers of children 
compared to those have husbands work in agriculture.  
Timor-Leste 
The Timor-Leste 2010 sample includes 3,598 women who have the data available for 
all selected variables. This is the smallest sample size among the four countries of 
study. The baseline models include a set of control variables: age and age-squared to 
examine the relationship between women’s age and their ideal number of children, 
current residence of the women (which takes rural residence as the reference 
category), religion (which takes Christianity as the reference category since it is the 
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major religion in Timor-Leste), CEB (the number of children ever born), an 
interaction term between age and CEB (age*CEB), husband’s years of education, and 
husband’s occupation (which takes agriculture as the reference category). The full 
models include all the control variables plus the three women's empowerment factors 
- labor force participation, education and household decision-making factor scores. A 
total of six regression models are run. Results for three types of regression: OLS 
(models M1, M2), Poisson (models M3, M4) and Ordered Logit (models M5, M6) are 
reported in table 26. 
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Table 26 shows the regression results of six models in OLS, Poisson and ordered logit 
regressions. Age-squared coefficients are significant in OLS and ordered logit 
models, while age coefficients are not significant in any models in this Timor-Leste 
sample. The coefficients of age are positive while the coefficients of age-squared are 
negative, which suggests a curvilinear relationship of age on the ideal number of 
children. The relationship between age and age-squared and the ideal number of 
children follows an up-side-down U shaped line, which peaks at 29. The curve 
suggests that Timor-Lestee women prefer a lower ideal number of children when they 
are younger, then the ideal number increases as they get to middle age, and declines 
afterward. The ideal number of children continues to decline until it gets to even 
lower than when they were at the beginning of their childbearing age.  
 
Residence consistently shows significant coefficients across all six models in Timor-
Leste sample, which is similar to previous results found in the other three countries. 
Urban residence is significantly associated with lower ideal numbers of children. The 
negative coefficients of urban residence are significant at p-value < 0.01 in all six 
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models in OLS, Poisson and order logit regression. In the full ordered logit model 
(M6), urban women have 0.62 times lower odds of having the higher ideal number of 
children than that of rural women.  
There is a high level of homogeneity in terms of religion in Timor-Leste, which the 
descriptive statistics show that 99.57% of the sample is Roman Catholic. This may be 
the reason why the dummy variables of religion do not show any significant 
coefficients. There are very few people in the sample who are practicing Hindu and 
Islam (n = 8), thus the results are neither statistically significant nor meaningful. Even 
though the coefficients of the dummy variable Protestant are negative, the numbers 
are only significant in two OLS models, but not in the other four. Therefore, it seems 
that religion has no significant association with the ideal number of children in the 
Timor-Leste data.   
Quite unexpectedly, CEB shows a weak and inconsistent relationship with the ideal 
number of children in this sample, whereas a very consistent association is found in 
other three countries. In OLS models M1, M2, one number increase in the number of 
children ever born is associated with 16% increase in the ideal number of children 
after controlling for other factors. Ordered logit regression results show that one 
number increase in the number of CEB increases the odds of preferring one number 
higher in the ideal number of children by more than 19%. However, the coefficients 
are not significant in the two OLS and the full ordered logit models (M1, M2, and 
M6). The coefficients are statistically significant in two Poisson models (M3, M4) at 
p-value < 0.01, and in the baseline model of ordered logit model (M5) at p-value < 
0.05. 
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The coefficient of the interaction term age*CEB is statistically significant, which 
indicates the relationship between the ideal number of children and the number of 
children ever born is moderated by age, i.e. the relationship between the number of 
children ever born and the ideal number of children changes as age changes. The 
coefficient displays a positive association between age*CEB and ideal number of 
children. Figure 16 shows the margin effect of the interaction between age*CEB on 
ideal number of children. For the same predicted ideal number of children, women at 
age 20 have lowest number of CEB and women at age 40 have highest CEB. The 
slope is steeper for older women.  
   
Again, husband’s education is found to have no significant association with wife’s 
ideal number of children. The coefficients show that higher years of husband’s 
education may associate with lower ideal number of children expressed by their wife, 
nevertheless, the numbers are not statistically significant across all six models.  
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In the regression results of the Indonesia sample presented earlier, women whose 
husbands work in manual jobs have a significantly lower ideal number of children 
than those whose husbands work in agriculture. In this Timor-Leste sample, 
husband’s occupation shows a different picture. Women whose husbands have non-
manual jobs are found to have significantly lower ideal number of children compared 
to women whose husbands have agricultural jobs. Women whose husbands have non-
manual jobs have about 0.3 (in OLS regression results) to 0.05 (in Poisson regression) 
lower ideal number of children compared to the reference group (agriculture). 
Ordered logit regression models show that women whose husbands work in non-
manual jobs have 30% lower odds of preferring higher ideal number of children 
compared to those whose husbands work in agriculture. All the coefficients are 
significant at p-value < 0.01 in the six models, suggesting that the association 
between husband’s occupation and wife’s ideal number of children is consistent.  
It can be inferred from this result that men who have non-manual jobs (including 
professional, managers, clerical, sales and services), tend to be more modernized and 
they also have higher aspiration for their children’s future, which make them prefer 
lower numbers of children. These men tend to couple with women who have similar 
mindsets and preference for the number of children, which may explain the 
relationship between husband’s occupation and women’s ideal number of children. 
On the other hand, men who work in agriculture prefer higher numbers of children 
due to the labor intensive nature of their jobs and lack of retirement security. Thus, 
they see having children as a resource for labor and old age security that may have 
some associations with their wives’ preference for a higher ideal number of children. 
There are no women whose husbands do not work in this Timor-Leste sample, thus 
the dummy variable has n = 0 and is automatically dropped out of the analysis. 
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Women whose husbands work in manual jobs show a tendency of preferring a lower 
ideal number of children compared to women whose husbands work in agriculture, 
yet, the coefficients are not statistically significant.  
Out of the three women’s empowerment factors, only the labor force participation 
factor is found significant to the ideal number of children in the Timor-Leste sample. 
The coefficients are significant at p-value < 0.05 in OLS and ordered logit models, 
but not significant in Poisson regression models. A higher labor force participation 
factor score is associated with a lower ideal number of children, or in ordered logit 
models, it slightly lowers the odds of preferring one number higher in the ideal 
number of children by 5.9%. A higher household decision-making factor score, which 
indicates that women have more involvement in the household decision-making 
process, tends to associate with a lower ideal number of children, yet, the coefficients 
are not statistically significant. The coefficients of the education factor are negative, 
but surprisingly not significant in any of the Timor-Leste models. This is contrary to 
the results found in the other three countries.  
In OLS models, the R-squareds show that the models explain more than 29% of the 
variation in the ideal number of children of women in Timor-Leste. Nevertheless, the 
F-test based on the R-squareds of OLS models does not show a significant 
improvement of the full model after adding the three women’s empowerment factors. 
The Chi-squared test based on -2Log Likelihood of the two Poisson models indicates 
that the full model is significantly improved after adding the three key independent 
variables of women’s empowerment factors into the baseline model at p-value = 0.1. 
The Chi-squared test based on -2Log Likelihood of the two ordered logit models 
suggests that the full models are also significantly improved after adding the three key 
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independent variables of women’s empowerment factors into the baseline model at p-
value = 0.005.  
The results from 6 models suggest that in this sample of Timor-Leste 2010, the labor 
force participation factor is significantly linked to the ideal number of children, while 
education and household decision-making factors are not significant. Control 
variables on women’s characteristics, including urban residence, CEB, and the 
interaction term age*CEB, are significant, while age and religion are not. Husband’s 
years of education does not show any significant coefficients on wife’s ideal number 
of children. However, husband’s occupation shows that women whose husbands 
work in non-manual jobs prefer significantly lower ideal numbers of children 
compared to those whose husbands work in agriculture.  
5.3. Summary and Interpretation of the Results 
The results from OLS, Poisson and ordered logit regressions show that women’s 
empowerment factors and background control variables do not have uniform 
associations with the ideal number of children in Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines 
and Timor-Leste. Certain women’s empowerment factors are significant in some 
countries but not others. Likewise, only some of the control variables are significant 
but they vary across countries. In this section I will first summarize the coefficients 
and discuss the relationships between the control variables of women’s background 
and the ideal number of children, then I will discuss more extensively the associations 
between women’s empowerment and the ideal number of children.  
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 Women’s background and the ideal number of children  
Women’s background characteristics are controlled for in the regression models of the 
ideal number of children by including a set of control variables on women’s age, 
residence, religion, the number of children ever born, and the husband’s 
characteristics including education and occupation.  
As the most frequently used control variables in fertility analysis, age and age-
squared are significantly related to women’s fertility preference in terms of the ideal 
number of children in Cambodia and Philippines but not in Indonesia and Timor-
Leste. 
The interaction term age*CEB shows how the relationship between age and the ideal 
number of children changes as CEB changes. The interaction does not show any 
effects on the dependent variable in Cambodia. In Indonesia and Timor-Leste, it 
shows the expected association between age and CEB on the ideal number of 
children: at the same predicted ideal number of children, older women have higher 
CEB than younger women. The interaction means older women have higher number 
of children ever born than younger ones. The interaction is interestingly opposite in 
Philippines, where younger women actually have higher CEB compared to older ones, 
provided that they all have the same predicted ideal number of children. The result in 
Philippines is interesting and unexpected; it may signal an increase in the country’s 
total fertility rate in the future.   
The four countries selected in this study provide appropriate data to examine the 
relationship between religion and fertility preference in different countries. The most 
dominant religion in Cambodia is Buddhism, in Indonesia it is Islam, and in 
Philippines and Timor-Leste it is Roman Catholic. The regression results from 
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Cambodia and Philippines show that women who practice Islam seem to prefer a 
higher ideal number of children compared to women who practice the dominant 
religion (in Cambodia it is Buddhism and in Philippines it is Catholicism). Results 
from the ordered logit regression shows that being Muslim is associated with 80% 
higher odds of preferring one number higher in the ideal number of children 
compared to being Buddhist in Cambodia, and a shocking 10.5 times higher odds 
compared to Catholics in the Philippines. The literature has consistently found an 
association between religion and actual fertility and fertility preference. Similar 
results which suggest the preference for high fertility among Muslims are found by 
Morgan et al. (2002), while studying 30 developing countries using DHS data. In 
another study, Heaton (2011) found that Muslims in Thailand, where Buddhism is the 
major religion, also exhibit higher fertility preference. As the number of women who 
do not practice Catholicism in Timor-Leste is very small (less than 1%), the 
homogeneity in religion means no significant relationship between religion and 
fertility preference in this country. In Indonesia, there are no data on religion, thus this 
variable is omitted from the regression models.  
In the case of Cambodia and Philippines, being Muslim in countries where Buddhism 
and Catholicism are the major religions is significantly associated with higher odds of 
preferring a higher ideal number of children. Interestingly, Muslim women living in 
Indonesia, a Muslim-dominant country, actually have the lowest average number of 
CEB (2.30) compared to the remaining three countries (2.54 in Cambodia, 3.01 in 
Philippines and 3.83 in Timor-Leste). It would be useful to look at the relationship 
between religion and fertility preference in Indonesia to see if similar patterns could 
be found. Unfortunately the lack of data on religion in Indonesia data does not allow 
such analysis.  
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The lowest average number of CEB in Indonesia may be attributed by the effective 
family planning program, which was introduced in 1970. The family planning 
program had successfully decreased Indonesia’s TFR from 5.6 in 1965-70 to 2.2 in 
2005-2010 (Knodel et al. 1999), which also implies a decline in the number of 
children ever born. In Cambodia, the TFR has been slowly declining since the 1960s 
but the country’s National Family Planning program only started in 1994. In 
Philippines, even though the family planning program started in the 1970s, it was seen 
as unsuccessful and in constant debate with the Roman Catholic Church on 
contraceptive use. Timor-Leste, a newly independent country which is still in the 
beginning of its demographic transition, started to have a National Family Planning 
program in 2004, 2 years after the country’s independence. Timor-Leste’s total 
fertility rate only began to decline in the period from 2005-2010.  
The associations between urban residence and fertility preference have been 
consistently found in this study, as expected from the literature. Regression results 
from the four countries suggest that urban residence is associated with a lower ideal 
number of children. Even though Table 22 shows that the proportions of women 
living in urban areas vary greatly in the four countries, from 30% (in Timor-Leste) to 
48% (in Indonesia), living in urban areas lowers the odds of the women preferring the 
same number of ideal number of children by 10% in Cambodia, 19% in Indonesia, 
15% in Philippines, and 39% in Timor-Leste, in comparison to their counterparts who 
live in rural areas.  
The number of children ever born also consistently shows positive coefficients in all 
countries across six regression models. Women who currently have higher numbers of 
children ever born also prefer higher ideal numbers of children. One number higher in 
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CEB increases the odds of one number higher in the ideal number of children by 96% 
in Philippines, 78% in Cambodia, 23% in Indonesia and 19% in Timor-Leste. The 
strong relationship shows that women who already have higher numbers of children 
are the ones who prefer a higher ideal number of children. On the other hand, it is 
possible that they might have adjusted their ideal number of children to justify their 
currently high number of children ever born. Since the proportions of met need for 
contraception are relatively high in all four countries, it is expected that most births 
are wanted. Moreover, the ideal number of children expressed by women in all four 
countries is higher than the current number of children ever born, thus, it is reasonable 
to assume that most births are wanted. In low fertility societies, CEB may potentially 
enhance the effects of labor force participation, since some women may delay 
childbearing while participating in the labor force. As a robustness check, regression 
models without CEB were run for all four countries and the results were nearly 
identical.  
It is important to take into account the husband’s characteristics while studying the 
ideal number of children as the decision about children is usually a joint decision of 
both husband and wife. Thus, all the regression models control for the husband’s 
education and occupation. Some studies on fertility in developing countries such as 
Tanzania and Indonesia suggest that wife’s education is more a significant factor in 
the couple’s fertility than husband’s education (Larsen and Hollos 2003, Schultz 
2005, Breierova and Duflo 2004). This study also implies that, in all four countries, 
the husband’s education is not at all significant to his wife’s ideal number of children.  
Nonetheless, husband’s occupation shows some association with his wife’s ideal 
number of children, yet the association is not uniform across countries. In Indonesia, 
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women whose husbands work in any types of jobs but agriculture have a significantly 
lower ideal number of children. It seems that agricultural work, which requires 
intensive labor, is quite strongly associated with the couple’s preference for high 
fertility driven by the demand for labor. In the Philippines, only women whose 
husbands work in manual jobs have a significantly lower ideal number of children 
compared to the reference group (women with husbands who work in agriculture). 
The financial hardship and low job stability which is often associated with manual 
jobs may shape the couple’s preference for lower ideal numbers of children, since 
they do not have enough resources to raise a big family. In Cambodia, different 
husband’s job categories seem to have no difference on wife’s ideal number of 
children compared to the reference group. Even though the relationship between 
husband’s job categories and wife’s ideal number of children vary depending on the 
country, all job dummies show negative coefficients compared to the reference group 
(jobs in agriculture). Agriculture jobs are labor intensive, which may encourage 
couples to have more children as a potential source of labor and old age security. This 
tendency has long been observed in transitional societies, thus it is not surprising to 
observe a similar trend in this study.  
 Table 27 shows a summary of the coefficients and their significance in the regression 
models of the 4 countries.  
 196 
 
The summary table shows that most of the control variables of the women’s 
characteristics are statistically significant across all four countries, however, control 
variables on the husband’s characteristics such as types of occupation only show 
some associations in Indonesia but are not consistent across four countries, whereas 
husband’s education is not significant in any of the countries.  
Women’s empowerment factors and the ideal number of children 
The relationships between each of the three women’s empowerment factors and the 
ideal number of children are examined after controlling for the women’s and their 
husband’s background characteristics. Results from three types of regression show 
that fertility preference in terms of the ideal number of children is associated with 
different factors of women’s empowerment in different countries. Three types of 
regression: OLS, Poisson and ordered logit are used in the models, however, since the 
condition of Poisson regression (the variance does not equal the mean) is violated in 
all four samples, a summary of the directions of the associations between women’s 
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empowerment factors and the ideal number of children is reported for only OLS and 
ordered logit regression in Table 28. 
  
Labor force participation tends to be associated with a higher ideal number of children 
in Cambodia, Indonesia and Philippines and a lower ideal number of children in 
Timor-Leste. However, the coefficients are only statistically significant in Indonesia 
and Timor-Leste. Theories on demographic transitions consider female labor force 
participation at the beginning of the industrialization process one of the causes for 
actual fertility and fertility preference to decline as the role incompatibility between 
being mother and worker increased. Yet, in the case of three Southeast Asian 
countries, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Philippines, women’s involvement in the labor 
market shows a tendency of higher ideal number of children. Higher scores in the 
labor force participation factor indicate a higher level of involvement in the labor 
market; the scores account for the seasonality of the job (full time/part time), 
paid/unpaid jobs, self-employed or employee, and women’s earnings compared to 
their husband. This positive relationship of female labor force participation and the 
ideal number of children is statistically significant in Indonesia, where the current 
average CEB and the average ideal number of children is at the lowest compared to 
the other three countries (2.30 and 2.69 respectively).  
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Female labor force participation tends to be associated with higher ideal number of 
children in Cambodia and Philippines; however, the coefficients are not statistically 
significant in these countries. The positive relationship may imply that participating in 
paid employment means that women can financially afford childcare and childrearing, 
and having more children does not put them under financial hardship, which resulted 
in the higher ideal number of children. Childcare in Indonesia at preschool ages 
largely depends on nannies and extended family members, while formal education for 
schoolchildren costs money and only elementary education is free, thus it is quite a 
financial commitment for Indonesian parents to bring up children. Bradley (1995) 
hypothesizes that lower fertility is partly the result of the competition under economic 
scarcity, especially in the competition for employment. Preference for low fertility 
may prevail as children become more of a burden than a benefit. The prospect of 
having several unemployed children may look like a long-term cost rather than a 
potential benefit. Unemployed or underemployed parents may also feel reluctant to 
have large families. From Bradley’s point of view, it actually makes sense for women 
who have higher scores in labor force participation in a country with already declining 
fertility like Indonesia to express a higher ideal number of children since they can 
financially afford a larger family.  
On the contrary, labor force participation factor is statistically associated with lower 
ideal number of children in Timor-Leste, where the average CEB (3.83) and the 
average ideal number of children (5.41) are the highest in the four countries of study. 
This relationship is more in line with previous literature on the fertility transitions in 
countries at the beginning of the industrialization process, which suggests the 
incompatibility between work and family, and children is considered a cost instead of 
a benefit are major causes for couples to prefer lower numbers of children (Mason 
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1987, Jejeebhoy 1995, Rindfuss and Brewster 1996, Kabeer 2001, 2005a). Timor-
Lestee women who have higher scores in the labor force participation factor are more 
involved in the labor market, and they are found to prefer a lower ideal number of 
children.  
The results bring an interesting observation of the opposite directions of the 
relationship between the labor force participation factor and the ideal number of 
children. The involvement of women in the labor market seems to be associated with 
a higher ideal number of children in the country with the lowest CEB (Indonesia), and 
a lower ideal number of children in the country with the highest CEB (Timor-Leste). 
These results imply that female labor force participation may have a balancing effect 
on the ideal number of children depending on current fertility. At the country level, 
female labor force participation has long been cited as one of the determinants in the 
decline of women’s fertility since the beginning of the industrialization process. 
Nonetheless, recent studies have shifted to the notion that female labor force 
participation also has positive effects in countries with low fertility levels, which 
keeps them around the replacement level and not to further decline to very-low 
fertility levels.  
In a review of developed countries with low fertility levels, McDonald (2000) 
proposes that gender equality, or in his words, “gender equity”, (in both family and 
public domains) is the key to keep fertility level at a balanced level, i.e. it decreases 
fertility in high-fertility societies, and increases fertility in low-fertility societies to 
keep them from falling to very-low-fertility levels.  Similarly, other studies have 
found a positive relationship between female labor force participation and the total 
fertility rates at country level in developed countries in recent years (Billari and 
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Kohler 2004, Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari 2011, Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari 2009, 
Rindfuss, Guzzo, and Morgan 2003). These studies were done at the country level and 
are not comparable to this study, which looks at the individual level. However, results 
from this study have found evidence that female labor force participation at individual 
level exhibits a two-way association with women’s fertility preference in these four 
developing countries in Southeast Asia. My analysis has found support for the notion 
that women’s empowerment factors at individual level, specifically through female 
labor force participation, seems to balance out the ideal number of children: it is 
associated with a lower ideal number of children in the country where women have 
the highest average number of children ever born – Timor Leste; and in contrary, it is 
associated with a higher ideal number of children in the country where women have 
the lowest average number of children ever born – Indonesia. This finding suggests 
that the mechanism through which gender equality keeps fertility levels neither too 
high nor too low may lie on the involvement of women into the labor force.  
 The education factor has a universally negative association with the ideal number 
of children in all four countries. The coefficients are statistically significant in 
Cambodia, Indonesia, and Philippines but not in Timor-Leste, where there is a 
tendency observed. In this study, the education factor is measured by women’s 
literacy and highest level of education studied or completed. Women’s education is 
often associated with better occupation options after finishing school, better access to 
knowledge about reproductive health, and higher aspiration for their children, all of 
which may lead to the preference of a smaller family size. This finding in the sample 
of four Southeast Asian countries is consistent with the large body of literature that 
has been suggesting education is associated with lower fertility and aspects of fertility 
including fertility preference (Cochrane 1983, Bongaarts 2003, Dixon-Mueller 1993). 
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Studies of women’s empowerment in other developing countries such as Turkey, 
Taiwan and Tanzania also found similar results (Gore 2010, Lee 2009, Larsen and 
Hollos 2003).  
The relationship between the household decision-making factor and the ideal number 
of children is only statistically significant in Indonesia. It shows tendencies of 
negative associations in Philippines and Timor-Leste and positive association in 
Cambodia. The household decision-making factor measures different aspects in the 
women’s family life, such as: who makes decisions related to her health, household 
spending and visiting relatives. Only the results in Indonesia show a significant and 
negative association between the household decision-making factor and the ideal 
number of children, while it is not significant in Cambodia, Philippines and Timor-
Leste. Out of the four countries studied, Indonesia is the only country with Islam as 
the dominant religion. This finding suggests that higher levels of household decision-
making are associated with lower ideal numbers of children despite the potential 
gender segregation influence of Islam. A similar result was found in Guinea in a study 
of four Sub-Saharan countries on women’s empowerment and ideal family size (Lee 
2009). The authors find that women who have higher level of empowerment in the 
household tend to prefer lower ideal number of children. The tendencies of the 
negative association between household decision-making and the ideal number of 
children are observed in Philippines and Timor-Leste and the association is confirmed 
in Indonesia. This result further emphasizes that higher level of women’s autonomy is 
associated with a preference for a lower ideal number of children and the association 
is strongest in Indonesia. Previous studies found that Indonesia is quite gender 
egalitarian in Southeast Asia.  
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In conclusion, all of the three women’s empowerment factors extracted through 
principal axis factoring (in chapter 4) show significant associations with women’s 
fertility preference measured by the ideal number of children. The education factor 
shows the most uniform and consistent negative relationship with the ideal number of 
children across all four countries. Higher scores on the education factor are associated 
with lower ideal numbers of children. The labor force participation factor shows 
mixed relationships with the ideal number of children. A higher level of labor force 
participation is associated with a lower ideal number of children in the country with 
the highest average CEB and average ideal number of children (Timor-Leste); and 
vice versa, it is associated with a higher ideal number of children in the country with 
the lowest average current CEB and ideal number of children (Indonesia). The 
household decision-making factor is negatively associated with the ideal number of 
children in Indonesia, where female autonomy in the family may be more restricted 
due to religious beliefs.  
Previous studies have found that different aspects of women’s empowerment play a 
role in the decline of women’s fertility in developing countries. The results from this 
study support the notion that women’s empowerment which includes labor force 
participation, education and household decision-making are found to have significant 
impacts on women’s ideal number of children in the four Southeast Asian countries 
studied. Nevertheless, the relationship between women’s empowerment and fertility 
preference is not a simple negative linear one but it varies depending on the context of 
the country. Evidence from this study proposes that female labor force participation 
may have the balancing effect on the ideal number of children, which is associated 
with lower individual fertility preference in high fertility countries and higher 
individual fertility preference in low fertility countries. It may indeed be a factor that 
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keeps fertility at a balanced level. Recent studies on upward fertility trends, which are 
found associated with gender equality, have been found in developed countries. 
However, there have not been any studies that look into developing countries with 
declining fertility levels. Perhaps future study could see this as a potential missing gap 
in the literature.  
Household decision-making also behaves differently than expectation; it is expected 
that higher levels of household decision-making are universally associated with lower 
fertility preference, yet, the relationship is significant only in Indonesia. There may be 
some distinctive characteristic of Indonesia that makes it stand out, or it could be a 
measurement issue, for example, the kind of decisions made in the household in 
Indonesia are different to those in other three countries, thus not as well measured. Or 
it could be the effects of religious and cultural norms that prevail in the country. 
However, this is primarily the author’s speculation.  
Education appears to have the most consistent and negative relationship with fertility 
preference, which is well documented in the literature. Nonetheless, it does not imply 
that education is the strongest women’s empowerment factor in lowering fertility 
preference. The consistent relationship might be attributed to the straightforward 
measurement of education (women’s literacy and the highest level of education 
studied or completed) which is relatively well-measured across the data sets with 
almost no margin for biased interpretation. 
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CHAPTER 6: WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT AND SON 
PREFERENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA  
International non-governmental organizations working in developing countries have 
long recognized the importance of empowering women in demographic transitions 
and socio-economic development. The World Bank recognizes that the relationship 
between gender equality and development goes both ways: better nutritional status,  
education and income of mothers are associated with better child health outcomes – 
from immunization rates to nutrition and child mortality, and also children’s 
education (The World Bank 2012). The United Nations have been emphasizing the 
role of women in demographic processes since the Beijing Fourth World Conference 
on Women in 1995. In their most recent report, Gender Equality and Sustainable 
Development, the UN put a strong emphasis on the role of women’s education and 
employment in fertility and mortality decline, the improvement of “missing girls” 
problem in societies with son-preference, and promotion of sustainable development 
(UN Women 2014).  
Women’s empowerment is found to be one of the driving factors of socioeconomic 
development, especially in developing countries. Marginal status of the women has 
been argued as the cause of poverty and rapid population growth (Jacobson 1992). 
Low status of the women in the family in both decision-making and economic power 
are strong incentives for women to have more children, especially sons, to increase 
their status in the household as well as for economic survival. Gender inequality is 
also the major cause for high female mortality and female infanticide and limited 
access to education and the labor market for girls and women.  
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In societies where the status of women is low, son preference may exist as a result. 
Son preference has been found in various studies on fertility preference and behaviors 
in East Asia and South Asia, where strongly subordinate gender roles are also 
imposed on women (Repetto 1972, Larsen, Chung, and Gupta 1998, Brunson 2010). 
The topic of son preference is important in research on fertility since it is strongly 
correlated with completed fertility where the phenomenon is widespread. It also 
affects the equal treatment of girls and women in the family as well as the society. 
The degree of son preference in a society can be considered a rough indicator of the 
status of women (Williamson 1976a, Arnold and Liu 1986) 
Williamson (1976b) observed that son preference had existed in different parts of the 
world, including the United States and Europe since the 1930s. Other studies also find 
evidence of son preference in parts of Asia. In East Asia, son preference has been 
observed in countries including China, Hong Kong SAR, Korea and Taiwan (Park 
and Cho 1995, Coombs and Sun 1978, Das Gupta et al. 2003). Similarly, son 
preference has been found in South Asian countries such as India, Bangladesh and Sri 
Lanka (Das Gupta et al. 2003). In the modest number of studies that look at son 
preference in Southeast Asia, evidence of son preference has not been found at similar 
magnitudes as in East and South Asia (Das Gupta et al. 2003). It is most notably 
found in Vietnam, where Confucian values are more prevalent, but not so prevailing 
in other Southeast Asian countries (Goodkind 1995b).  
Understanding son preference is important for a few reasons including the fact that it 
affects family size, since couples will keep trying to have children until they reach 
their desired number of sons. Population policy should understand the underlying 
reason for high fertility in societies where son preference is prevalent. A second 
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reason is to evaluate the implication of using technology for sex selection. And third, 
son preference is considered a rough indicator for gender equality (Williamson 
1976a). Societies with no sex preference are more likely to be gender egalitarian. The 
research questions that I would like to examine in this chapter are: (1) Is there a son 
preference in Southeast Asia? And (2) What is the relationship between women’s 
empowerment and son preference?  
Son preference has not been an intensive topic of study in Southeast Asia as the 
magnitude of the phenomenon is not believed to be as prevalent as in East and South 
Asian countries. Nevertheless, the question if there is son preference among women 
in Southeast Asia has never been explicitly answered in a cross-country study with 
large-scale and nationally representative data. In this chapter I will attempt to 
explicitly answer the question if son preference exists in Southeast Asia.  
If there is a preference for sons among Southeast Asian women, I want to look into 
the relationship between women’s empowerment factors and son preference. How is 
such preference associated with factors such as female labor force participation, 
female education and female household decision-making? Are there patterns that can 
be found in how women score in their empowerment factors and their preference for 
specific sex of their children?  
In this chapter, I review the relationship between women’s empowerment and son 
preference in the literature, the prevalence of son preference in different regions in 
Asia and its consequences for women’s empowerment and overall socieconomic 
development. In a later section of this chapter, micro data on four Southeast Asian 
countries, Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines, and Timor-Leste, are used to examine if 
there is son preference among the women of these countries. Finally, regression 
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analysis is applied to find the relationship between women’s empowerment factors 
and son preference.  
6.1. Review of Literature 
How Does Women’s Empowerment Affect Son Preference?  
In countries where son preference is strong, there is a strong link to the low status of 
women (Arnold and Liu 1986). Williamson (1976b) considers son preference is a 
rough indicator of gender equality in the society; societies with no sex preference are 
more likely to be gender egalitarian. Therefore, studying son preference is essential to 
understand the social factors in promoting gender equality.  
Das Gupta et al. (2003) suggest that women’s status changes dramatically over the 
life-cycle in most of the countries in East and South Asia, where the kin/property and 
normative systems favor males. Young girls and young mothers in the family usually 
have very limited autonomy, and their access to the household resources only increase 
in later stages in their life cycles, especially when younger women come into the 
family through marriage with their sons and take over the daily jobs that they had to 
do before, which are often considered marginalized.   
In a study of 1,062 women on son preference and their status in the family, measured 
by the wife’s decision-making power, autonomy, and the extent to which the husband 
shares housework in the family in southwest China, Li and Lavely (2003) find that 
85% of the respondents said that it was important to have at least one son and 75% 
expected a son to provide financial resources in their old age. The two most cited 
reasons for why sons are important are cultural and economic, and given the 
persistence of the familial institution of patrilocal residence and male inheritance, 
 208 
they expect that son preference in China is going to change very slowly. Indeed, the 
study finds that women’s status is negatively associated with the perception about the 
importance of having a son. Specifically, women who have higher scores on the index 
which includes items on autonomy, power, the extent that their husband shares 
housework, and exposure to media, are negatively associated with son preference.  
Das Gupta et al. (2003) propose that women’s paid employment increases household 
decision-making, and that women’s paid employment would reduce son preference. 
However, how rapid the process is going to be depends on the mediation of public 
policy. They claim that female education and employment can change the preference 
for sons and that would lead to more gender equality for the next generation so that 
sons and daughters would be able to receive equal treatment.  
A study that compares fertility patterns in North and South India finds that the higher 
level of autonomy of women in the South accounts for the lower fertility of the 
region. Son preference resulting from patriarchy in India is found to be the cause of 
the disparity in education, sex ratio at birth, age at marriage, and female labor 
participation (Malhotra, Vanneman, and Kishor 1995). Other researchers have found 
discrimination against women and son preference in different parts of the world 
including Pakistan, Taiwan, Vietnam, China, Bangladesh, Kenya and Africa as a 
whole (Bradley 1995, Kabeer 2005a, Shoaib, Saeed, and Cheema 2012, Lee 2009, 
Goodkind 1995a, Bélanger, Khuat, and Jianye 2003, Wu, Ye, and He 2012, Mason 
and Taj 1987, Rossi and Rouanet 2015). 
The relationship between fertility and women’s empowerment is a reciprocal one. 
When fertility declines, it brings more symmetrical gender systems into the family, 
thus empowering daughters in the natal family. In India, as fertility declines, the 
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number of families with children of one gender increases. Allendorf (2012) argues 
that the increase in the number of families with children of only one gender brings 
more equal gender roles to sons and daughters. In that way, daughters enjoy greater 
freedom and better opportunities. Having families with fewer children also means 
more resources for the children, more equal investments for both daughters and sons, 
and inheritance will also be passed down to daughters as well. Allendorf (2012)’s 
study implies that son preference and the cultural preference for large families often 
leads to the disempowerment of women, while the decline in fertility brings greater 
equality to sons and daughters and empowers women.  
Previous studies on women’s empowerment often look at women’s empowerment in 
two domains: inside-the-household and outside-the-household. Inside-the-household 
factors include indicators such as women’s household decision-making, autonomy, or 
the extent that the husband shares housework. Outside-the-household factors include 
indicators such as women’s education and employment. All the studies seem to 
converge on the notion that as women’s empowerment improves, the preference for 
sons will decline, and the decline of son preference together with the decline in 
fertility will lead to more gender equality for the children. Therefore, it is important to 
examine if there is a son preference in Southeast Asia and the relationship between 
women’s empowerment and son preference. Nonetheless, there has not yet been a 
conclusive study on the topic, which integrates cross-country quantitative data for 
precise measurement of women’s empowerment and son preference. This study aims 
to fill this gap in the literature.  
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Son Preference in Different Regions 
Preference for male children has long been a topic of research in population and 
fertility preference. According to Williamson (1976a), sex preference favoring boys 
has been found in many different parts of world, including the United States, different 
parts of Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa. 
Repetto (1972) looks at son preference in developing countries in Asia and Africa 
including India, Bangladesh and Morocco and proposes two hypotheses: If son 
preference exists, there should be a negative correlation between the sex ratio of 
children and total fertility; and that birth intervals should be longer following a male 
live birth than a female live birth.  He uses the sex ratios of numbers of surviving sons 
in the total number of living children (%) of the first three surviving children; and also 
the percentage of living male children among total children born alive. He found that 
families with a higher proportion of sons tend to have higher fertility, which is 
opposite to the expectation that they have reached their desired number of sons and 
then limit their total fertility. He suggested that if sons contribute more to the 
household income, then the couples that have higher proportion sons would not feel 
the pressure of population and then would not try to limit their family size, which 
leads to having higher total fertility than those with a higher proportion of daughters.  
The issue of son preference in Asia has been a focus of research on fertility preference 
in the context of fertility transitions, especially in China, Taiwan and Korea. In Asia, 
Das Gupta et al. (2003) suggest that son preference is often strongest in countries with 
strong Confucian values, including East Asian countries like Taiwan, Korea, Japan, 
China and Vietnam. Various studies have found that son preference is substantial in 
China (Arnold and Liu 1986, Arnold 1992). Arnold and Liu (1986) analyzed 
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interview data from more than 1 million respondents in 1982, in the early years of 
China’s one-child policy, and found that son preference was prevalent in most parts of 
China at the time. The authors claimed that the prevalence of son preference in China 
is a reflection of women’s status. According to them, gender equality was guaranteed 
in the constitution but in practices and family life, preference for sons was still 
significant. Couples whose first child was a son were more likely to use contraception 
than those whose first child was a daughter. In the one-child policy promotion 
campaign of China, couples with daughters were less likely to hold the one-child 
certificate, which gave significant benefits to the family and to the children’s 
education and job assignment later on, thus daughters of these families grew up facing 
significant disadvantages compared to others’. The authors also observed that son 
preference often existed side by side with the desire of having at least one child of 
each sex (Arnold and Liu 1986). In the period from 1989-1990, Das Gupta et al. 
(2003) estimated that the number of girls missing in China in 1000 female live births 
ranged from 61 to 94. 
Researchers have also found evidence of son preference in Korea in the 1990s 
(Larsen, Chung, and Gupta 1998). In Korea in 1992, the number of girls missing in 
1000 female live births was 70 (Das Gupta et al. 2003). Taiwan, a country with strong 
Confucian values, also has a long history of son preference (Lin 2009, Coombs and 
Sun 1978). Yet, in recent years, son preference has been declining in both Korea and 
Taiwan (Lin 2009, Chung and Gupta 2007). In Taiwan, Lin (2009) suggests that son 
preference is gradually being replaced by “gender indifference”. In addition to the 
gradual diminishment of son preference, the preference for high fertility has also 
diminished. In Taiwan, the preferred number of children has decreased from 4.0 in 
1965 to 2.6 in 1985, and to 2.0 in 2002. The percentage of women who think “there is 
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no need to have children” increases with their education levels. Only 0.93% of 
women with elementary education agree with this statement, but the number increases 
considerably to 7.20% among women with university educations (Lee 2009). The 
major reason for this is the economic burden associated with child rearing.   
Son preference is found not only in countries with Confucian values, but is also found 
to be widespread in South Asian countries. Arnold and Liu (1986) find extremely 
strong evidence of son preference in South Asian countries such as Bangladesh, 
Nepal, and Pakistan. Amin and Mariam (1987)’s study in Bangladesh in 1969 and 
1979 suggests that son preference has been rooted in the agriculture practices (rice 
cultivation) which is very labor demanding, thus men’s labor is favoured. They found 
that son preference has a negative association with contraceptive use and a positive 
association with the desire for additional children, regardless of socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics. Dyson and Moore (1983) found that higher fertility and 
son preference was more pronounced in Northern India where there was more female 
subjugation.  
Ethnographic study by Brunson (2010) in Nepal points out that cultural values play an 
important role in how son preference is prevalent in the society. Brunson (2010) 
interviewed Nepalese Hindu women about their perception concerning the importance 
of having a son, and found that for them, having at least one son is important for 
funeral rites, which a daughter cannot perform. The woman herself would feel bad if 
she gave birth to a girl. Another reason why the women thought sons were important 
is that they bring daughters-in-law into the family while their own daughters are 
considered lost to other families after marriage given the practice of the bride going to 
live in the village of the of the groom’s male kin. Sons and their wives will stay with 
 213 
the parents and take care of them when they age (Brunson 2010). Das Gupta et al. 
(2003) suggest that patrilineality is very important to son preference since daughters 
are not usually allowed to inherit land. It is also important to have sons to maintain 
the family lineage and ancestor worship. They also suggest that the position of the 
mother in the family only became stable after she gave birth to a son, and then her 
position improved when the sons brought in daughters-in-law.  
Nonetheless, a preference for sons does not mean daughters are completely 
undesirable. Even in countries where son preference is more dominant, a gender 
composition which include at least a daughter and two sons are favored. For example, 
in Korea in 1971 the most preferred gender composition of offspring was two males 
and two females; and in rural India in 1961-62, was two males and one female. 
Marrying a daughter into a high-status family can potentially enhance the family’s 
status within the family. Where brideprice exists, marrying daughters can help parents 
to pay for brideprice for their sons (Skinner 1997). 
 
Consequences of Son Preference  
As mentioned earlier, son preference is a result of gender inequality and it can make it 
even more intensified. Son preference can lead to preference for high fertility and an 
imbalanced sex ratio in the population due to sex-selective abortions.  
Son preference had been viewed as a cause for high fertility since couples would try 
until they have a son, which is a cause for slowing down the demographic transition 
(Brunson 2010, Larsen, Chung, and Gupta 1998, Chowdhury and Bairagi 1990). A 
study in 1979-1980 in Pakistan found that son preference was very strong in the 
country and it significantly affected the desire for more children (Ali 1989).  
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Nevertheless, the relationship between son preference and high fertility in fact has 
recently been proven otherwise in China (probably due to the one child policy), Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam. All these countries still have a preference for sons but 
the total fertility rates have been declining significantly. The common assumption is 
that when gender preference diminishes, parents no longer desire children of one 
gender over the other, and this may in turn influence fertility. However, Mason (1987) 
claims that the impact of gender preference on fertility is unclear. She argues that, if 
that principle was valid, the fertility of Korea and Taiwan would be higher than 
replacement level, since there is still a strong preference for boys in these countries. 
In fact, the fertility in these two countries is well below replacement level.  
Similarly, in Bangladesh, son preference and larger family preference are still strong, 
but these preferences seem to have little impact on fertility. In Bangladesh, son 
preference is suggested to be the factor that drives women to stop wanting more 
children (Chowdhury, Bairagi, and Koenig 1993). Low total fertility while the 
preference for sons still exists causes even more gender imbalances at lower birth 
parity, which is referred to as the “intensification association” (Brunson 2010).This is 
where couples intentionally use technology, including sex-selective abortion, to 
manipulate the outcome of the pregnancies.   
When son preference is still prevalent while the desire for high fertility diminishes, 
couples may use sex-selective abortion to make sure they have a son. In the study of 
sex-selective abortion in three countries, China, India and South Korea, Das Gupta et 
al. (2003) found that Korea had the highest rate of sex-selective abortion, which was 
70 excess abortions per 1000 female live births in 1992. The high rate was believed to 
be the result of the accessibility in Korea to technology, compared to China and India 
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at the time. In China, the stringent population policy that only allows urban couples 
only allowed to have one child, together with son preference, led couples to use 
advanced technologies to induce sex-selective abortion (Das Gupta et al. 2003, 
Goodkind 1996). Miller (2001) claims that female-selective abortion is practiced 
predominantly in China, Taiwan, Korea, Pakistan and India, and even in Asian 
immigrant populations in the United States and Canada.  
Together with sex-selective abortion, or pre-natal sex selection, female infanticide, or 
post-natal sex selection has long been observed in China and India (Das Gupta et al. 
2003). The main cause of female infanticide is believed to be the need to pay dowries 
for daughters in India and the one-child policy under the pressure of maintaining the 
paternal family line in China. 
Son preference has demographic consequences that have been pointed out in the 
literature, one of which is the extreme imbalanced sex ratio at birth. Chowdhury and 
Bairagi (1990) proposed that sex preference would result in an imbalanced sex ratio at 
birth. Studies in Taiwan and Korea have found evidence for such a phenomenon (Park 
and Cho 1995, Coombs and Sun 1978). Sex ratio at birth in China, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and Korea in 1990 ranged from 109 to 112 boys to 100 girls. Sex ratio at birth 
in China in the period 2005-2010 was about 119-120 boys to 100 girls (Guilmoto 
2012). Biologically, the sex ratio at birth ranges around 105 boys to 100 girls, but 
more boys die in infancy, so the sex ratio is about equal at age one. According to Das 
Gupta et al. (2003), the sex ratio at birth in China and Korea started to rise sharply 
around 1985, when sex selection technology became more wide-spread. However, it 
is important to note that fertility decline and technology are not causes of son 
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preference; rather,  they “intensify the manifestation of gender bias where bias is 
already strong” [159].  
Researchers have raised concerns over the extreme imbalanced sex ratios in China, 
which are predicted to cause profound impacts on the country’s future population 
(Johansson and Nygren 1991, Das Gupta et al. 2003, Ebenstein 2008). Son preference 
in combination with declining fertility has been predicted to cause a marriage squeeze 
since the 1990s. As the total number of births gets smaller every year and men are 
seeking younger women for marriage, the surplus of men in each birth cohort 
increases. The excess of men in society has raised concerns about an increase in 
violence among a large and growing cohort of single men, the expansion of sex 
industry, and the worsening of the problem of women trafficking for the sex industry 
(Hesketh and Zhu 2006). 
The skewed sex ratio may give women more benefits in inheritance and can 
advantage positions in the marriage market. In turn, this could lead to more equal 
social gender structure (Park and Cho 1995, Hesketh and Zhu 2006). However, other 
authors are skeptical about such notions. The marriage squeeze would result in early 
marriage for girls, which in turn could lowers girls’ education and paid employment 
potential due to early marriage. Therefore, a skewed sex ratio at birth as a result of 
son preference might be worse for women’s empowerment, not better, which is 
contrary to common expectations. 
Is There A Son Preference in Southeast Asia? 
Southeast Asia has been suggested to be traditionally one of the most “gender-equal” 
regions, where people maintain a bilateral kinship system on both their mother’s and 
father’s side (Blumberg 2015, Hirschman and Teerawichitchainan 2003, Hirschman 
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and Guest 1990). Blumberg (2015) proposes that in Southeast Asia, or a “wet” region, 
the method of agricultural production relies on irrigated rice fields. Agricultural 
production is so labor intensive that both genders are producers. As a result, the 
kinship system in Southeast Asia is bilateral or matrifocal, which gives women almost 
equal inheritance and relatively equal position.  
Son preference has not been found as a striking issue in Southeast Asia, except 
Vietnam (Fuse 2010). Arnold and Liu (1986) use results from the World Fertility 
Survey to reveal that son preference is weak among women from Indonesia (except 
for the first child). In the Philippines, sons were preferred for the first child, but 
daughters were preferred slightly more at every other parity. A mild to moderate 
degree of son preference was found in Malaysia, Thailand, and Sri Lanka, and 
extremely strong evidence of son preference was found in Bangladesh, Nepal, and 
Pakistan (Arnold and Liu 1986). 
Using DHS data, Arnold (1992) reviewed 26 countries in Africa, Latin America and 
Asia from 1986-1989 and found that the most common fertility preference is a 
combination of at least one child of each sex. Unfortunately, the data for Asia include 
only Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand, and did not include China, India and 
Bangladesh, where evidence of son preference is most prevalent. Nevertheless, he 
also found that son preference is more prevalent in North Africa and Sri Lanka, but 
not consistently strong. Arnold suggested that evidence from his earlier studies and 
others’ did not really show a strong relationship between sex preference and fertility 
since parents usually reached their minimum desired number of sons and daughters 
earlier in their childbearing career by mere chance, so there was only a small 
proportion of parents who would have a higher number of children than they would 
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have had without son preference. Arnold (1992) also claimed that the accurate 
measurement of parental preference of children’s sex can be difficult to be 
“articulated or candidly expressed” [93]. He found that women were less likely to 
have more children once they had at least one child of each sex. The tendency for a 
specific sex of the children is not really pronounced in Indonesia, with the proportion 
of women currently using contraception being similar in all sex compositions of 
living children in birth order from 1 to 3. And the proportion of women who wanted 
to have another child was lower when they already had at least one child of each sex.  
Das Gupta et al. (2003) suggest that son preference is not detected in Southeast Asia 
thanks to the prevailing bilateral kinship system in Southeast Asia, in which 
relationships in both male and female lines are recognized and actively used. They 
also suggest, rather optimistically, that there is little evidence of gender discrimination 
in this region. Skinner (1997) states that matrilineal family systems, where the 
preferred sex of single heir is female, and marital residence is uxorilocal (the groom 
moves to the bride’s household after marriage) are found in some parts of mainland 
and insular Southeast Asia. As a result, gender neutral heirship is also the norm in 
areas of Southeast Asia. The senior woman in the family in Southeast Asia usually 
controls the household budget, and women vendors predominated in local markets.  
In a study in Malaysia in 1988 using the Malaysian Family Life Survey data, Pong 
(1994) found a strong son preference among ethnic Chinese. They prefer having all 
sons or a combination of sons and daughters, preferably with more sons than 
daughters or at least an equal number of them. The other two major ethnic groups in 
Malaysia, Malay and Indian, did not show a consistent son preference.  
Results from small sample interviews with Singaporean women reveal that son 
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preference is still strong among the older generation women but is changing toward 
the tendency of preferring a combination of both sexes in the younger generation 
women (Teo et al. 2003). 
In Vietnam, the ethnographic study by Bélanger, Khuat, and Jianye (2003) finds that 
the desire for sons stands out as a crucial issue that affects gender and 
intergenerational relations to a great extent. They observe that having a son is a social 
norm that exerts an enormous pressure on everyone participating in the study, 
regardless of education, employment, socioeconomic status, lineage or political role. 
The most recent study by Fuse (2010) used DHS data from 50 developing countries to 
explore sex preferences of women. Four Southeast Asian countries are included in the 
study: Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam. Using the proportion of the 
ideal number of sons over the ideal number of daughters to measure sex preference of 
children, Fuse suggests that in Cambodia, Indonesia and Philippines, women prefer to 
have more daughters than sons, while Vietnamese women still have a higher 
preference for sons than daughters. This study is mainly a cross-national descriptive 
analysis and the author did not further analyze factors that affect such preference. 
Fuse (2010) suggests that future research which looks into country-level analysis will 
be worthwhile.  
Table 29 shows the sex ratios at birth (boys/ girls) of 10 Southeast Asia and 
developing countries in East Asia and the Pacific using data from the World 
Development Indicators in 2011, 2012 and 2013 (the latest data available) (The World 
Bank 2016). 
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Macro data from the World Development Indicators show that except for Vietnam, all 
Southeast Asian countries have sex ratio at births from 1.03-1.07, which are very 
close to the biological norm of 1.05 boys/ 1 girl. In Vietnam, the sex ratios at birth for 
three years are around 1.11 – 1.12, which are the highest in all Southeast Asian 
countries. The higher sex ratio at birth in Vietnam is attributed to son preference 
under the strong Confucian values which prevail in the country. The data from the 
World Bank are consistent with the previous ethnographic literature on son preference 
in Southeast Asia.  
An overview of the literature reveals that there have not been many studies on gender 
preference in Southeast Asia. Most of the research about son preference in Southeast 
Asia are either based on qualitative interviews with small sample sizes or merely 
descriptive. This study aims to carefully examine if son preference is found in 
Southeast Asia using quantitative data at country level. It even goes even further to 
examine the relationship between women's empowerment factors and son preference 
in Southeast Asia.  
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6.2. Data, Methods and Operationalization of Variables 
The Data 
Data used in this study are from the countries’ Demographic and Health Surveys 
(DHS), which are implemented by the U.S Agency for International Development 
(USAID). Access to the data was granted by the Demographic and Health Survey 
program after a formal request for accessing data for research purpose was submitted. 
Out of six Southeast Asian countries with DHS data available, only four which had 
the latest data available (Phase 5 and 6 of the survey) were selected for this study; 
they are DHS Indonesia 2012, DHS Cambodia 2010, DHS Philippines 2008 and DHS 
Timor-Leste 2010. Other countries either have no data available (Singapore, Brunei, 
Malaysia), the latest survey was too long ago (Thailand 1987), or the latest survey is 
not a standard survey (Vietnam 2005 AIDS Indicator Survey; Laos Special Survey 
2011-12, Myanmar Special Survey 2015 – ongoing). At the time this study was 
completed, data from the DHS Cambodia 2014 and DHS Philippines 2013 became 
available, unfortunately they were not available soon enough to be included in the 
analysis done in this study. This study uses data from the women’s questionnaire, 
since the focus is on women’s empowerment and their fertility preference. All these 
data sets have large and nationally representative sample sizes, detailed questions on 
different aspects of women’s empowerment as well as their fertility preference. 
The original DHS samples include all women aged 15-49, however, in this study, the 
target sample only includes women who have valid women’s empowerment scores. 
For the regression analysis, only women who have no missing values in all the 
variables are included. Table 30 shows the original sample sizes and selected samples 
that are being used for this analysis.  
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The Dependent Variable 
Different measures of son preference have been proposed in the literature. At country 
level, son preference can be validated by the total number of missing girls in 1000 
female live births, or the total number of female abortions in 1000 female live births 
(Das Gupta et al. 2003). Another way to look at sex preference is to examine sex ratio 
at birth. Dalla Zuanna and Leone (2001) use sex ratio at last birth (M/F) multiplied by 
100; the expectation is that natural sex ratio at birth fluctuates around 105, and if son 
preference exists, the couple might stop bearing children after birth of a son, so this 
ratio will be higher than 105. Similarly, Clark (2000) uses the actual sex composition 
of the total number of children ever born (transferred to sex ratio) to determine if the 
proportion is normal. For example, Clark (2000) finds that the average CEB of the 
women in the Indian sample is 3.5, with 1.8 sons, which yields a proportion of 0.514, 
which is equivalent to a sex ratio of 1.06 (0.514/0.486= 1.057), which is pretty close 
to the biological norm of 1.05. This simple calculation is useful in looking at sex 
ratios at country level, thus a similar application is used in this study. 
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Various suggestions for measuring son preference at individual level have been 
proposed. Repetto (1972) uses two ratios to represent son preference; the first one is 
the ratio of the numbers of surviving sons over the total number of living children (in 
per cent) of the first three surviving children, and the second one is the ratio of living 
male children among total children born alive.  
Amin and Mariam (1987) use the desire for additional children (as a dichotomous 
variable) and sex composition of existing children as a control variable to measure for 
son preference. The authors expected that if there was a higher proportion of 
daughters to sons in the sex composition of current number of children, married 
women would express their desire to have more children. This measurement of son 
preference is similar to what Ali (1989) did in the study in Pakistan by measuring the 
desire for more children after controlling for the presence of at least a son in the 
existing children (dichotomous).  
Rossi and Rouanet (2015), in a study of fertility behavior in Africa, use birth spacing 
as a measurement of son preference. The authors suggest that, if the couple have son 
preference, the birth spacing may be shorter following the birth of a girl than a boy. 
However, this measurement could be biased if they already have boys before the girls.  
In this study, son preference is measured by the ideal number of sons divided by the 
ideal number of children. This approach is similar to Clark (2000) in his study of son 
preference in India. The ideal number of sons is a good measure for women’s 
preference for children since it assumes that no birth is unintended, and all births are 
“wanted”, and the ideal number indicates the perfect hypothetical number of children 
a woman wants regardless of any constraints such as biological, health or economic 
concerns. Most studies use actual fertility to look at son preference, but not the 
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number of sons divided by the ideal number of children. Even though son preference, 
in terms of the ideal number of sons, does change depending on different the life 
stages of the respondents, this issue can be controlled for by adding variables on 
women’s age into the regression models. An advantage of using the ideal number of 
sons to operationalize the dependent variable instead of actual number of sons is that 
it is not affected very much by whether or not the women have completed their 
childbearing, whereas using the number of sons ever born would be greatly affected 
by this fact. Actual fertility where women have not reached completed fertility could 
yield a different ratio and may indicate a different interpretation about the preference 
for  gender of children.  
The Demographic and Health Surveys used in this study have detailed sections on 
fertility preference of the respondents, including questions on the respondents’ desire 
to have another child, desired length of time before having another child, the ideal 
number of children, and the ideal number of sons and daughters. Women with living 
children were asked: “If you could go back to before you have had any children, and 
could choose exactly the number of children to have in your whole life, how many 
children would that be?” Women with no living children were asked: “If you could 
choose exactly the number of children to have in your whole life, how many children 
would that be?” Then they were asked a question about gender preference of the 
children: “Out of such, how many of these children would you like to be boys, and 
how many would you like to be girls and for how many would the sex not matter?” 
At country level, i.e. in all eligible samples of women in each country, if there were 
truly no preference for any gender, the ideal number of sons divided by the ideal 
number of children would equal 0.5. The ideal number of children is expressed in 
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whole numbers such as 1, 2, or 3 etc; it is unlikely that they would use decimal 
numbers to express the ideal number of sons and the ideal number of children. If there 
is a preference for sons, the number is statistically larger than 0.5. This measurement 
is meant to measure the preference for the ideal ratio, not actual fertility. 
At the individual level, the ideal number of sons divided by the ideal number of 
children is regressed on three women’s empowerment factors to examine which of 
those factors have an association with this ratio. Specifically, which type of 
empowerment and which level (high/low) would be associated with a preference for 
sons? 
Key Independent Variables 
The three key independent variables are the factor scores of women’s participation in 
the labor force, women’s education and women’s involvement in household decision-
making, which are extracted through principal axis factoring (as described in Chapter 
4). The scores are actual individual scores based on how the women answered the 
questionnaires regarding these three aspects of women’s empowerment. The fourth 
concept explored in chapter 4, women’s use of contraception, is not used as one of the 
key independent variables in this chapter since it did not show up as an identifiable 
factor in principal axis factoring.  
Women’s labor force participation factor is dominated by four indicators which take 
into account the engagement of the woman in the cash economy through types of 
employment (if she works for herself, family members or someone else) and types of 
payment that she receives; occupation; continuity of employment throughout the year 
(full time or part time); and earnings compared to the husband’s earning. The 
education factor is dominated by two indicators: women’s literacy and women’s 
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highest level of education studied or completed. The household decision-making 
factor is dominated by three indicators: decisions related to health (issues when 
seeking medical help), decisions related to household spending (who controls how to 
spend the money) and decisions related to visiting relatives (who decides). The 
detailed operationalization of these factors is described in chapter 4. 
It is expected that an increase in factor scores of all three women’s empowerment 
factors is associated with a lower ideal number of sons and vice versa, i.e. women 
who have lower empowerment scores would prefer a higher number of sons. 
Control Variables 
Women’s son preference is hypothesized to result from their background 
characteristics, thus, a set of control variables including age, urban residence, 
religion, children ever-born (CEB), and proportion of surviving sons in the total 
number of CEB. Husband’s education and husband’s occupation are also controlled 
for. 
Women’s age may be associated with a preference for sons; some studies imply that 
older women may prefer more sons than daughters (Amin and Mariam 1987). But to 
the contrary, Clark (2000) found that age has no effect on son preference. Women’s 
education and urban residence is negatively associated with high son preference 
(Arnold and Liu 1986, Ali 1989, Repetto 1972, Amin and Mariam 1987). In China, Li 
and Lavely (2003) suggest that women’s education is a strong indicator, and 
husband’s literacy may have effects on son preference in the way the literate men are 
more likely to adopt a more gender egalitarian view in the family. Their results 
confirm the expectation, however, husband’s literacy is no longer significant when 
controlling for women’s status in the family.   
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Heaton (2011) studied 30 developing countries using DHS data and finds that religion 
has an effect on fertility preference, including a stronger son preference. He also 
points out that Muslim women have substantially higher fertility than Christian 
women, while there is not much difference between Catholic and Protestant women. 
Being Muslim and Hindu is found significantly associated with a preference for sons 
in India (Clark 2000). In this study religion is accounted for to examine its effects on 
son preference. 
Repetto (1972) includes a set of control variables in his study in Morocco, including 
duration of marriage, current or past use of contraceptives, education, and mother’s 
participation in the labor force prior to marriage. He uses mother’s participation in the 
labor force prior to marriage instead of current employment in order to “eliminate the 
confusion between the high opportunity costs and the work-inhibitory effects of a 
young family” [74]. Basically, it means women’s employment status may change 
after marriage especially among young women of childbearing age. Thus, taking 
employment prior to marriage into account may reduce the difference between 
younger mothers and older ones. He also uses the proportion of living children 
currently enrolled at school to capture the socioeconomic aspiration of the family, the 
average education costs of children and the income forgone from child labor, as well 
as type of family: nuclear or extended.  
The current number of children ever born (CEB) is controlled for to examine its 
relationship with the preference for sons. Larger family size, or a higher number of 
CEB is found significantly associated with a higher actual proportion of sons and a 
higher ideal proportion of sons (Clark 2000).  
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The gender composition of existing children ever born is used as a control variable as 
suggested in the study by Clark (2000) in India. It is expected that a composition of 
existing children which includes more sons than daughter will be negatively 
associated with son preference since the couple already have more sons than 
daughters. Only a few studies have used the sex composition of children ever born to 
control for the desire for more children (Clark 2000, Ali 1989, Amin and Mariam 
1987). In this study, the number of sons ever born divided by the total number of 
children ever born is included in the regression models. Using this sex composition of 
existing children is more well-fitted than using of a dummy variable that represents 
the presence of at least one son, as suggested by Ali (1989). 
Since women’s preference for sons may be influenced by their husband’s preference, 
control variables on the husbands’ background including education and occupation 
are also taken into account.  
Modeling 
Since the dependent variable is the ideal number of sons divided by the ideal number 
of children, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to run the analysis since 
the dependent variable is normally distributed, with most values clustering at the 
center; and the error terms are also normally distributed. The most significant 
advantage of OLS regression is that it produces easy to interpret results. Therefore, in 
this study, OLS regression models are run to examine the associations between 
women’s empowerment and son preference in the four countries of study.  
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6.3. The Results 
This section presents the results from descriptive statistics and the tests for son 
preference at the country level. Later, the results from regression models of son 
preference on women’s empowerment factors are discussed. Ordinary Least Squared 
regression models are run for each of the four countries to examine the associations 
between women’s empowerment and the ideal number of sons divided by the ideal 
number of children after controlling for other variables.  
Descriptive statistics  
Table 31 shows the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables and control 
variables used in this son preference analysis. The samples for this analysis include 
women who have all valid factor scores (see Chapter 4), and have no missing values 
in any of the selected variables (the Final eligible N).  
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The average age of the women in the four samples ranges from 30 to 33; women in 
Timor-Leste are a bit younger and women in Indonesia are a bit older than average. 
About a third to half of the women in each country sample are residing in urban areas. 
The Indonesia and Philippines samples have higher proportions of women living in 
urban areas than the other two countries. The religion variable is grouped into four 
major groups for easier description, including Buddhist, Muslim, Christian, and 
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Others. The major religion in Cambodia is Buddhism, in Indonesia is Islam, and in 
Philippines and Timor-Leste is Catholicism.  
The average number of children ever-born or CEB ranges from the lowest, 2.3 in 
Indonesia, to the highest, 3.8 in Timor-Leste. The average number of surviving sons 
and daughters are the sum of the number of son or daughters either living in the 
household or living elsewhere. The number of children ever-born may be higher than 
the number of surviving sons and daughters since some births may not results in 
surviving children. In all four countries, on average, each woman has about one living 
daughter and one living son, even though these numbers are highest in Timor-Leste, 
around 1.7 sons and 1.7 daughters per woman.  
The ideal number of children in each country is higher than the actual CEB in that 
country. It ranges from 2.69 in Indonesia to a strikingly high 5.41 in Timor-Leste, and 
around 3.1 to 3.2 in Philippines and Cambodia. On average, women in all four 
countries express a higher ideal number of daughters than ideal number of sons. The 
pattern is also similar to the ideal number of children. The lowest numbers are 
expressed in Indonesia – around 1.1 children of each sex; and highest are in Timor-
Leste – around 2.5 children of each sex. 
The average years of education vary quite significantly among women in the four 
countries. Cambodian women only have a modest 6.1 years of education. Indonesian 
and Timor-Leste women have around 9 years of education. Filipino women have the 
highest average years of education, around 10.5 years. Compared to their husbands, 
Cambodian women have about one year less in education; Indonesian women have 
only slightly less education than their husbands. Surprisingly, women in Philippines 
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and Timor-Leste even have an average of one year more education than their 
husbands.  
Occupation of the women is operationalized from 7 jobs categories in the 
questionnaire into 4 categories: does not work, agricultural jobs, manual jobs and 
non-manual jobs. The dynamic of women’s jobs vary greatly among the four 
countries. In Cambodia, only 17% of the women do not work, while in Indonesia and 
Philippines this number is more than twice as much (31% and 41% accordingly), and 
in Timor-Leste it is more than three times (61%). The majority of women in 
Cambodia work in either agricultural jobs (38%) or non-manual jobs (33%). In 
Indonesia, the most popular type of jobs that women hold is non-manual, and only 13-
14% works in each category of labor demanding jobs such as agricultural and manual 
jobs. The distribution of occupation of Filipino women is very diverse, 41% do not 
work, while another 41% work in manual jobs, and only a little more than 1% work in 
agricultural jobs. In Timor, the majority of women do not hold employment; 61% of 
them have not worked in the past 12 months. The majority of women who work have 
manual jobs, only a few of them have agricultural or non-manual jobs.   
Looking at the husband’s occupation, almost all women’s husbands have jobs, only 
roughly 1% were not working at the time of survey. The most popular types of jobs 
for the husbands are agricultural, manual and non-manual jobs. In Cambodia, the 
numbers of men who work in those three types of jobs are quite similar, with slightly 
more men working in agricultural jobs. In Indonesia, more men work in manual and 
non-manual jobs. In the Philippines, the majority of men work in manual jobs. And in 
Timor, men mainly work in either agricultural or non-manual jobs, very few men 
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work in manual jobs compared to the other three countries (8%). But, except for 
Timor-Leste, the majority of the women also work.  
Son Preference at Country Level 
The descriptive statistics in Table 30 shows a tendency of a higher ideal number of 
daughters than the ideal number of sons. Previous studies have suggested various 
methods to measure son preference at macro level. This study uses the ideal sex ratio, 
which is measured in two ways, first, by the ratio of the ideal number of sons and the 
ideal number of daughters; and second, by the ideal number of sons divided by the 
ideal number of children. These numbers are examined to make this study of son 
preference in Southeast Asia comparable with previous literature.  
Table 32 presents the actual sex ratio and the ideal sex ratio of children expressed by 
the selected women sample women in the four countries and the results from a t-test 
to see if the proportion of the ideal number of sons over the ideal number of children 
is statistically less than 0.5, with the assumption that if the woman did not have any 
gender preference, she would state the ideal number of sons to be half of the total 
ideal number of children. 
The actual sex ratio and ideal sex ratio is calculated by the formulas below: 
 
Actual  sex  ratio =    𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑑𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 
Ideal  sex  ratio =    𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙  𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑠𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙  𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑑𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠   
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Table 32 also shows the significance test of son preference at the individual level. 
Since it is measured at individual level, the answers are whole numbers such as 1, 2, 
or 3 etc. It is unlikely that they would use decimal numbers to express the ideal 
number of sons and the ideal number of children. If there was no gender preference, 
individual women would express the ideal number of sons to equal half the ideal 
number of children. Therefore if there is no gender preference, the proportion of sons 
in the ideal number of children should be 0.5. 
 
Since the natural sex ratio at birth in the population is 1.05 (or 105 boys for every 100 
girls), the actual sex ratios of sons/daughters in these four countries are pretty close to 
the natural rate, ranging from 1.03 to 1.07. These ratios imply that women may not 
have chosen sex selective technology to have more children of a specific sex. The 
ideal sex ratios of sons over daughters in the four countries are all under 1.0, which 
means women prefer to have a higher proportion of daughters than sons in the ideal 
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combination of their children. The ratio is lowest in Cambodia (0.86) and highest in 
Timor-Leste (0.98).  
Another way to look at the combination of sex of the children is by looking at the 
ideal number of sons divided by the total ideal number of children. If the number is 
less than 0.5, it means the ideal combination includes fewer sons than daughters. On 
the other hand, if this ratio is larger than 0.5, there is a preference for more sons than 
daughters, if it equals to 0.5, there is no preference for either sex. Results from t-tests 
show that the ideal number of sons divided by the ideal number of children is 
significantly less than 0.5 in all four countries. The tests have shown that, on average, 
there is no evidence that women in Southeast Asia prefer a higher ideal number of 
sons in the total ideal number of children. This is true in a Muslim country, a 
Buddhist country and two Roman Catholic countries: Indonesia, Cambodia, 
Philippines and Timor-Leste respectively. 
This result has revealed that the pattern of sex preference of the children in Southeast 
Asia is very different from other parts of Asia. Son preference has been found 
prevalent in East and South Asia. Even though recent studies point out some signs 
that such preference is diminishing in Taiwan and Japan, it remains pretty strong in 
other countries in the region, including China, Korea, India and Bangladesh. 
Southeast Asian women, on the contrary, tend to prefer a combination of more 
daughters than sons. Southeast Asia has been found to maintain a bilateral kinship 
system (Hirschman and Guest 1990, Hirschman and Teerawichitchainan 2003), which 
mean people maintain relationships with both mother’s and father’s side after 
marriage, thus women posses a relatively high status in comparison to their 
counterparts in other countries where a patrilineal kinship system is dominant. 
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Southeast Asia is believed to be traditionally the most “gender-equal” region 
(Blumberg 2015). Analysis from this study has confirmed that at country level, there 
is no evidence that son preference exists in Southeast Asia.  
Son Preference at Individual Level  
Descriptive results and t-tests have shown that at country level, on average, there is no 
evidence for son preference among Southeast Asian women. In fact, there may even 
be a preference for daughters. Nevertheless, it does not preclude the possibility that 
less empowered women want more sons, if in general, the sample of women has a 
slight daughter preference. In this section, the relationship between women’s 
empowerment factors and son preference are examined at the individual level. Son 
preference at the individual level is measured by the ideal number of sons divided by 
the ideal number of children. Higher proportions signal stronger preferences for sons. 
It is expected that women’s higher scores in the labor force participation factor, the 
education factor, and the household decision-making factor are associated with lower 
son preference. 
Table 33 shows the correlations of son preference and three women's empowerment 
factors (labor force participation, education and household decision-making) without 
any of the control variables.  
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The correlations show that, without controlling for any other variables, in all four 
countries, three women's empowerment factors are negatively associated with son 
preference (second column of each country table). The only exception is employment 
factor in Timor-Leste, which shows a small positive correlation. In Cambodia, there is 
a strong correlation (.21) between education and employment, which indicates women 
who have higher education tend to have higher involvement in the labor force as well. 
In Philippines, education is moderately correlated with employment (.32) and 
household decision-making (.20), Filipino women who have higher education tend to 
be more involved in employment and have more power in household decisions. In 
Timor-Leste, there is also a moderate correlation between education and household 
decision-making (.26). None of the three women's empowerment factors in Indonesia 
seem to correlate with each other. 
Regression models are analyzed to examine the associations of the three women's 
empowerment factors on son preference. Table 34 shows the OLS regression results 
of son preference on three women’s empowerment factors including female labor 
force participation, education and household decision making, after controlling for the 
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women’s and their husband’s characteristics. Control variables on women’s 
characteristics include women’s age, residence in urban or rural areas, the number of 
children ever born (CEB), the proportion of the number of surviving sons in the total 
number of children ever born, and the main religion practiced in each country 
(country-specific religion dummy variables). Additionally, the regressions include a 
set of control variables for the husband’s characteristics, including husband’s 
education in years, and a set of husband’s occupations which take agricultural jobs as 
the reference category.  
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It seems that the preference for sons does not change with women’s age since age and 
age-squared show no significant association with the preference for sons in all four 
countries. The interaction between age and CEB also are not significant in Cambodia, 
Philippines and Timor-Leste, and only significant in Indonesia. Residence in the 
urban area is significantly associated with lower preference for sons in Cambodia, but 
is associated with higher preference for sons in Timor-Leste, and not significant in 
Indonesia and Philippines.  
The number of children ever born (CEB) is only significant in Indonesia, while not 
significant in any of the other countries. Control variable the number of surviving sons 
divided by CEB shows positive and statistically significant associations in all four 
countries. The association could imply that women who had already given birth to 
more sons tend to state their preference for a higher number of sons. This could be a 
genuine preference, or it could be a rationalization for the existing higher proportion 
of sons as suggested by Bongaarts (1990). The results suggest that religion is not 
strongly associated with son preference, except for the case of the small Muslim 
minority in the Philippines, where being Muslim is significantly associated with 
higher level of son preference. Husband’s characteristics including education and 
occupation have almost no significant association with wife’s fertility preference 
including the ideal number of children and the preference for sons.  
Education, as one of the women’s empowerment factors, does not seem to have any 
significant association with son preference in all four countries. The small and 
positive coefficients suggest that higher education level tends to be slightly correlated 
with higher son preference, but none of the coefficients is statistically significant. 
This result is very much different from the earlier analysis on the ideal number of 
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children where higher education is strongly associated with the preference for a 
smaller ideal number of children. It is also different from the previous study by Das 
Gupta et al. (2003) in East and South Asia. It seems that the pattern of son preference 
in Southeast Asia is different from other previously studied regions in Asia: it is non-
existent in these four countries. 
Labor force participation factor is only statistically significant in the Philippines, 
where one higher score in labor force participation factor is associated with 0.007 
lower deal number of sons divided by the ideal number of children. It seems that 
Filipino women who are more involved in the labor force are a little more likely to 
prefer a lower number of sons compared to those who have less involvement in the 
labor force. Even though the coefficients suggest a negative relationship, labor force 
participation is not statistically significant in the other three countries.  
Household decision-making is consistently and statistically significantly associated 
with lower son preference in three countries: Cambodia, Indonesia and Philippines. In 
this study, the household decision-making factor is measured by women’s 
involvement in decisions related to health, mobility and spending. Women who have 
higher scores in the household decision-making factor tend to have a weaker son 
preference, i.e. they prefer a lower ideal number of sons in the total ideal number of 
children. One score higher in household decision-making factor is associated with 
0.008 points lower in son preference in Cambodia, 0.005 in Indonesia, and 0.007 in 
Philippines. The results are all statistically significant. In Timor-Leste, one score 
higher in household decision-making is associated with 0.004 points lower in son 
preference, however the coefficient is not statistically significant. This result is 
consistent with previous studies on household decision-making and son preference in 
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East and South Asian countries which also find that higher level of women's 
empowerment is often associated with lower son preference and vice versa (Das 
Gupta et al. 2003, Li and Lavely 2003). What we see here is closer to  daughter 
preferences than son preferences in keeping with the higher traditional levels of 
gender equality in Southeast Asia.  
Regression results show that women’s son preference, measured by the ideal number 
of sons divided by the total ideal number of children, is more associated with 
household decision-making than with the education or labor force participation. The 
results suggest that in Southeast Asia, the relationship between women's 
empowerment and the preference for sons depends more on the “inside the 
household” factors (i.e. household decision-making) rather than “outside the 
household” factors (i.e. education and employment).  
6.4. Interpretation and Discussion 
Son preference can cause seriously imbalanced sex ratios at birth, female infanticide, 
and a marriage squeeze due to a large number of men who cannot find their partners. 
It also causes unequal treatment of girls and women in education and employment 
opportunities. Southeast Asia has been suggested to be traditionally the most “gender-
equal” region, where people maintain a bilateral kinship system on both their 
mother’s and father’s side (Blumberg 2015, Hirschman and Teerawichitchainan 
2003). Therefore, the issue of son preference has not been historically noted as a 
serious problem that reduces gender equality, as in East and South Asia countries 
such as China, Korea, India or Bangladesh. Since it is not viewed as an alarming 
issue, few studies have systematically looked at the presence or absence of son 
preference in Southeast Asia with high quality quantitative data. This study has 
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offered a piece of evidence to fill in the missing gap in the literature on son preference 
in Southeast Asia: it does not exist.  
Actual sex ratios of surviving sons to daughters in Southeast Asia are very close to the 
natural sex ratio at birth, which is about 105 boys for every 100 girl. Thus, it can be 
inferred that sex selective technology is not or rarely used to achieve a preferred 
gender combination of children. Analysis using data from four countries has revealed 
that at country level, there is no evidence of a preference for sons among Southeast 
Asian women. In fact, there is even a preference for a higher number of daughters 
than sons. The ideal combination of gender of the children is often one with more 
daughters than sons. This notion is consistently expressed by women in all four 
countries. This finding is consistent with earlier studies on Southeast Asia by Fuse 
(2010) and Das Gupta et al. (2003).  
Daughter preference was historically found in previous studies, usually among the 
minorities, some of them include the Mundugumor of New Guinea (Mead 1935), the 
Tiwi of North Australia (Hart, Pilling, and Goodale 1966), or the matrilineal tribal 
societies in Meghalaya, India (Narzary and Sharma 2013). Daughters were considered 
assets in these societies and the control of women brought power and alliance, and 
more offspring. Women are considered economically productive to the households. 
The Minangkabau in Indonesia is considered the world’s largest matrilineal group. 
Despite the fact that Islam arrived since the 1200s to 1300s in the country, it has not 
changed the pre-Islam kinship system of the region, which allows women to inherit 
equally (Blumberg 2015). Evidence of the preference for daughters in modern 
societies in Southeast Asia shows that the pattern of preference for sex composition of 
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the children of the region is very much different from the rest of Asia where son 
preference is more prevalent and women have far less gender equality. 
Nonetheless, no evidence of son preference at country level does not necessarily infer 
that son preference does not exist among some groups of women. Some women may 
prefer more sons but their preference is averaged out in the samples. Therefore, an 
analysis at individual level was done to examine which background characteristics 
and women’s empowerment factors are associated with son preference. The most 
significant finding from this analysis is that household decision-making is the key 
determinant to women’s preference for sons. Women who have lower scores in 
household decision-making power tend to prefer more sons than daughters. Female 
labor force participation and education does not show much of an impact on son 
preference, which is very different to previous findings on the ideal number of 
children. Education and employment are not associated with women’s preference for 
sons; the level of decision-making power in the family is the critical factor.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
Decades of research on women’s empowerment have broadened our knowledge on 
the concept and the tremendously influential effects that it brings to women 
themselves and to overall socioeconomic development (Batliwala 1994, Sen 1993, 
Coleman 2004, Malhotra and Schuler 2005). Improvement in aspects of women’s 
empowerment such as education and employment and household decision-making 
have been found significant in lowering the fertility rate, reducing child mortality, 
improving children’s health, reducing the preference for sons and improving girls’ 
education (Dixon-Mueller 1993, Lee 2009, Bongaarts 2003, Mason 1987, Jejeebhoy 
1995, Brewster and Rindfuss 2000, Subbarao and Raney 1995, Axinn and Barber 
2001).   
Nevertheless, conceptualizing and measuring women’s empowerment has been a 
subject of debate among scholars and international non-governmental organizations 
alike. Scholars often conceptualize women’s empowerment either as a process or a 
goal. As a process, women’s empowerment is an ongoing process with no final goal, 
through which women’s actively gain more power for themselves, gaining control of 
both resources and ideology to improve their lives (Sen and Batliwala 2000, Kabeer 
1999, Mosedale 2005, Lee-Rife 2010, Batliwala 1994). As a goal, women’s 
empowerment is about the ability to control their life and can be measured by the 
accomplishments of women in different aspects of their life (Tengland 2008, Bradley 
1995, Parpart, Rai, and Staudt 2002, Desai 2010).  Not only the conceptualization of 
women’s empowerment is a matter of debate but measuring the concept has been a 
challenge as well.  
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In this research, I was able to measure women’s empowerment at the individual level 
in the context of developing countries. I also found that fertility preferences, including 
the ideal number of children and son preference, are associated with women's 
empowerment factors in four countries of study.  
Measuring Women's Empowerment: Contraceptive Use is No Longer a Factor of 
Women's Empowerment  
Numerous ways of measuring women’s empowerment have been suggested, mostly at 
country level. Nonetheless, the lack of micro data in developing countries and the 
paucity of comparable data have been repeatedly mentioned as major issues in the 
measurements (Beteta 2006, Wu, Ye, and He 2012, Desai 2010). To date, 
measurements of women's empowerment have usually been done at country level and 
focused on ranking the countries on a global scale. While country’s indexes may be 
useful in having an overall perception about the situation of women in different 
countries, they can be very different from the actual situation of individual woman in 
each country, since women’s empowerment is a context-specific concept (Mosedale 
2005, Odutolu et al. 2003). Previous literature has proposed that empowerment is 
relative and contextual (Mosedale 2005,Tengland 2008). It is relative in the sense that 
“people have more or less power depending on their specific situation and they can be 
relatively powerless in one situation and relatively powerful in another” (Mosedale 
2005)[251]. Odutolu et al. (2003) insists that empowerment is context-specific; it 
differs in different cultures, situations and stages of the lifecourse. Malhotra, 
Schulerm, and Boender (2002) in a study in Bangladesh find that contraceptive use 
was once considered empowering, but when more than half of the married women in 
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rural areas have used it since 1990s, it has become normative and does not necessary 
imply a higher level of women’s empowerment.  
While ranking countries in terms of the empowerment level of the women is useful 
and significant on a global scale, scholars have questioned the common element of 
current indexes of women's empowerment which includes a country’s income as part 
of the measurement, since it is much harder for a poor country to perform well in 
terms of women's empowerment on such indexes (Lopez-Claros and Zahidi 2005). 
Similarly, while it is important to measure the representation of women in politics, 
women’s representation in the national political domain, such as the number of seats 
in the parliament, is not necessarily proportional with the level of empowerment that 
an individual woman experiences.  
Therefore, it is crucial to measure women’s empowerment in a context-specific 
manner, at individual level, especially in the context of developing countries, where 
the concept of empowerment can be measured very differently. This study is one of a 
few that have looked at measuring women's empowerment at individual level, and 
more importantly, using data from four developing countries in Southeast Asia. It has 
filled a significant gap in the literature on measurement indexes of women's 
empowerment.     
Theories on women's empowerment at the individual level have suggested four main 
components of the concept, including women’s labor force participation, education, 
household decision-making and contraceptive use. Results from developing countries 
in Southeast Asia, including Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines and Timor-Leste, 
suggest that the components of women's empowerment are different than previously 
suggested in the literature. This study has found that women's empowerment factors 
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in developing countries include women’s labor force participation, education and 
household decision-making – but not contraceptive knowledge and use. 
One of the problems with various current indexes on measuring women's 
empowerment is that they are mainly based on data in developed countries, where 
more data are available, while in fact women in developing countries are facing much 
more challenging obstacles in their quest of empowering themselves. Empowering 
women may have very different meanings in developed and developing countries. For 
example, female labour force participation in developed countries almost always 
means paid employment with employer’s benefits. Therefore, measuring women’s 
employment can be straightforward, based on their salary and full time/part time 
status. Whereas, participating in the labor force in poor countries does not necessarily 
mean paid employment. Working women in poor countries may get unpaid jobs, for 
example, when they work for family members and are paid in-kind in return for the 
labor. This research has overcome such discrepancies between measuring women's 
empowerment in rich and poor countries by creating an index that specifically takes 
into account different indicators of female labor force participation, such as their work 
status (currently working or not), full time or part time, type of job, employers, and 
cash or in-kind payment. Significantly, it also measures the women’s income in 
relation to their husband’s. High-income or low-income women can be viewed 
differently when their husband’s earnings are taken into account.  
While women’s education is most consistently measured by the level of women’s 
literacy and the level of education studied or completed in both developed and 
developing countries, measuring household decision-making is very context-specific. 
The type of decisions made at household level in rich and poor countries can vary 
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greatly. Decisions that may be unequivocally made by women themselves in 
developed countries, such as those related to their health and their freedom to visit 
family and friends, may, in the context of poor countries where women still have 
limited access to resources, mean a difficult negotiation process for their own 
empowerment. Household spending decisions are usually jointly made by the couples, 
and in poor countries, the level of involvement of the women in such decisions means 
a higher level of equality with their husband.  
There is a strong emphasis in the literature on the relationship between reproductive 
and sexual control and women’s empowerment and egalitarian gender systems 
(Malhotra 2012). Much of the fertility decline in developing countries was achieved 
through an increase in contraceptive use. Allendorf (2012) points out that the 
percentage of women of reproductive age in developing countries using contraception 
rose from 9% in 1960 to 61% in 2009. Measurements of women's empowerment to 
date have considered contraceptive use one of the empowering factors to women. 
Surprisingly, it is not found to be one of the components of women's empowerment in 
Southeast Asia. The reason might lie in the availability of contraceptive use through 
government subsidy in developing countries. Government-subsidized family planning 
programs and lowered prices on contraceptives have made contraception much more 
accessible even in developing countries. All the four countries of study have National 
Family Planning Programs, which started in the 1970s in Indonesia and Philippines, 
in 1994 in Cambodia, and Timor-Leste, a newly founded country, the National Family 
Planning program only started in 2004. In Cambodia, 70% of ever-married women 
are currently using contraceptives or intend to use them. In Indonesia, this number is 
78% and in Philippines, it is 73%. Although it is the country with the lowest 
contraceptive use prevalence, Timor-Leste has 37% of ever-married women using 
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contraceptive or intending to use them. The high prevalence of contraceptive use may 
suggest that it is not necessarily an empowering factor since it is becoming a norm. 
In the four countries of study, it seems that contraceptives are no longer only 
accessible to a small group of women privileged enough to afford them, even in 
poorer countries. Contraceptive use can be empowering in countries where the 
prevalence of usage is low, but it is not very empowering in countries where there is a 
high prevalence of family planning usage. The case of Bangladesh suggests that the 
use of contraception was once considered empowering, but when more than half of 
the married women in rural Bangladesh have used it since the 1990s, it has become 
normative and does not necessarily imply a higher level of empowerment (Malhotra, 
Schulerm, and Boender 2002). On the other hand, couples no longer desire to have 
large numbers of children, which makes using contraception a sensible choice. 
Therefore, although contraceptive use was once considered an empowering factor for 
women, it is no longer so since it has become a popular norm even in developing 
countries in Southeast Asia. The finding that contraceptive use was once considered 
an empowering factor but no long the case once again strengthens the notion that 
women's empowerment is a contextual: what is considered empowering in one 
situation may not be in another context (Oxaal and Baden 1997). Future research 
should be more watchful when considering contraceptive use as one of the 
empowerment factors for women in countries where contraception is readily 
accessible.  
The Relationship between Women’s Empowerment and the Ideal Number of 
Children 
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Earlier research looked at female education, employment and household decision-
making independently and their effects on fertility and fertility preference, yet, few 
have looked at all the aspects of women's empowerment as a fully conceptualized 
notion. To date, previous studies have proposed a negative relationship between each 
women’s empowerment factors and fertility preference, i.e. women with higher 
education, higher employment status and higher household decision-making tend to 
prefer lower number of children. This research has found that the ideal number of 
children is significantly associated with three factors of women’s empowerment in the 
four countries of study. However, the associations are not simply negative as 
previously suggested, most notably, the relationship between female labor force 
participation factor and fertility preferences. The association between labor force 
participation and fertility preference is not uniform across countries: higher levels of 
involvement in the labor force are associated with lower ideal numbers of children 
among Timor-Leste women, who currently have 5.3 children on average, whereas 
higher levels of involvement in the labor force are associated with higher ideal 
numbers of children among Indonesian women, who have 2.2 children on average.  
Female labor force participation since the beginning of industrialization has been 
considered a major factor in theories on the fertility transitions. Previous studies 
suggest that higher level of involvement of women in the labor force is often 
associated with lower fertility preference and actual fertility (Mason 1987, Jejeebhoy 
1995, Rindfuss and Brewster 1996, Kabeer 2001, 2005a). In this study, it is 
interesting to find that female labor force participation has the tendency to be 
associated with higher ideal number of children in Cambodia and Philippines and to 
be positively significant in Indonesia. The positive association may lie in the financial 
aspect of female labor force participation and fertility preference. 
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At the macro level, economic depression has been found as one of the explanations 
for fertility decline in different parts of the world (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988, 
Sobotka, Skirbekk, and Philipov 2011). At the individual level, Bradley (1995) 
hypothesizes that lower fertility is party the result of competition under economic 
scarcity, especially in the competition for employment. Preference for low fertility 
may prevail, as children become more of a burden than a benefit; it becomes more 
expensive to have children. The prospect of having several unemployed children may 
look like a long-term cost rather than a potential benefit. Unemployed or 
underemployed parents may also feel reluctant to have large families. From the 
economic point of view, it actually makes sense for women who have higher levels of 
labor force participation in a country with already declining fertility like Indonesia to 
express a higher ideal number of children since they can financially afford a larger 
family.   
Results from this study suggest that women's empowerment has a balancing effect on 
fertility; where women in high fertility country express lower ideal numbers of 
children and women in lower fertility country express higher ideal numbers of 
children than their actual fertility. It also implies that the mechanism through which 
women’s empowerment keeps fertility at replacement level may be women’s labor 
force participation. Similar findings, though very limited, were recently found in 
developed countries where a positive relationship between female labor force 
participation and the total fertility rates is found at country level (Billari and Kohler 
2004, Brewster and Rindfuss 2000, Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari 2009, Rindfuss, 
Guzzo, and Morgan 2003). Nonetheless, no similar results have been found in 
developing countries. Results from this research indicate that the involvement of 
women in the labor force is important in reversing the drastically declining fertility,
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which already happened rapidly in some developing countries, especially in East 
Asia, where the total fertility rate averages a very low 1.3 children per woman. 
Blumberg (2015) suggests that the total fertility rates in Southeast Asia is not as low 
as in East Asia since Southeast Asian women tend to get more help as the result of 
their economic independence. 
Education and household decision-making are found to have consistent and negative 
relationships with the ideal number of children after controlling for background 
characteristics of the woman and her husband, i.e. women with higher education and a 
higher level of household decision-making tend to prefer a lower ideal number of 
children. 
The Relationship between Women’s Empowerment and Son Preference 
Son preference is another important aspect of fertility preference. It also implies a 
lower level of gender equality and a high level of fertility in countries where access to 
sex selective abortion is limited and/or expensive, since couples keep trying to have 
children until they reach the desired number of sons. Women try to bear more sons to 
improve their status in the family as well as to ensure a means of economic survival 
and old age security. Son preference is shaped by cultural traditions and community 
norms such as the expectation of the elderly couple to live with the oldest or youngest 
son when they no longer have income. Son preference often exists in societies with a 
high prevalence of patriarchy and it may have a significant influence on reproductive 
decisions (Hayase 2005). A strong preference for sons may be associated with a low 
prevalence of contraceptive use, since couples keep trying to have children until they 
have the desired number of sons (Bélanger, Khuat, and Jianye 2003).  
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Strong son preference leads to serious disadvantages and discrimination for women 
and girls, such as higher girls' mortality and limited access to social and economic 
resources in India (Malhotra, Vanneman, and Kishor 1995). Researchers have found a 
correlation between discrimination against women and strong son preference in 
different parts of the world (Bradley 1995, Kabeer 2005a, Shoaib, Saeed, and Cheema 
2012, Malhotra, Vanneman, and Kishor 1995, Lee 2009, Goodkind 1995a, Wu, Ye, 
and He 2012). Son preference has not been a focus of study on Southeast Asia, partly 
because the issue has not been considered as pronounced as in East and South Asia, 
such as in China, Korea, India or Sri Lanka. Previously, some studies on gender 
preference in Southeast Asia were done in small sample size case studies and were 
mainly qualitative. This research on how son preference proves absent in Southeast 
Asia, where women’s empowerment is greater than East and South Asia, is the first 
one on the topic that uses micro data with a quantitative methodology.  
This regression study has found that at country level, there is no evidence of son 
preference in these four countries in Southeast Asia. Actual fertility date shows that 
the sex composition of children is very close to the natural sex ratio of 1.05 boys to 
1.0 girls, which indicates that prenatal sex selection and sex selective abortion are not 
at play. The ideal sex ratios expressed by women in the four countries suggest that, on 
average, women generally prefer to have more daughters than sons (.86 boys/1.0 girl 
in Cambodia; .95 boys/1.0 girl in Philippines; .98 boys/1.0 girl in Indonesia and 
Timor-Leste). This result is similar to the study done by Fuse (2010) which suggests 
that in Cambodia, Indonesia, and Philippines, women prefer to have more daughters 
than sons. It is also consistent with the literature that Southeast Asia is “historically 
considered gender egalitarian”, which makes gender preference in the region very 
different than in Eastern and Southern Asia, where greater gender inequality and 
 254 
strong son preference are found. In recent years, however, economically successful 
East Asian countries like Korea and Japan and Taiwan are witnessing the change 
toward no gender preference of children by prospective parents. 
Even though the country level data show that son preference does not prevail in the 
four Southeast Asian countries of study, at the individual level, women who have 
lower power in the household decision-making process tend to prefer a higher number 
of sons; in this study, the household decision-making factor is measured by the 
women’s involvement in decisions related to health, mobility and spending. The 
relationship is statistically significant in Cambodia, Indonesia and Philippines, and 
shows a negative but not significant association in Timor-Leste. This result is 
consistent with previous studies on household decision-making and son preference in 
East and South Asian countries which also found that higher level of women's 
empowerment is often associated with lower son preference and vice versa (Das 
Gupta et al. 2003, Li and Lavely 2003). The results suggest that in Southeast Asia, 
women who have stronger son preference are often ones with lower power in the 
household decision-making process. Surprisingly, son preference is not at all 
associated with the education factor in any of the four countries. The labor force 
participation factor is only significant in Philippines, where higher scores of labor 
force participation are associated with lower son preference. 
The interpretation that can be made from the results is that in Southeast Asia, son 
preference is mostly associated with inside-the-household factors such as household 
decision-making, rather than outside-the-household factors such as women’s 
education and employment. Since the samples include only ever-married women, this 
result suggests that son preference seems to depend on the actual power relation 
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between the woman and her partner in making decisions related to the household. The 
level of involvement of women in education and labor force does not necessarily 
comprise a direct power negotiation between the two sexes, while inside the 
household, if the woman does not have much power in the household decision-
making process, it is likely that their partner is the one who makes most decisions in 
the process. When essential decisions such as the ability to decide to seek for health 
when sick, decisions on daily family spending, and decisions on when to visit family 
or relatives are made by the husband, the woman may feel like they have very little 
control over her life and realize that sons will have more power and freedom when 
they grow up while girls would end up powerless like her in her own household, 
which may explain a stronger preference for sons. Additionally, the socio-cultural 
context also plays a role in the women’s preference for sons. Women who are 
embedded in the patriarchal ideology that devalues girls would be more likely to 
prefer sons to daughters.  
Previous studies have found that the bilateral and gender-equal family and kinship 
systems in Southeast Asia are closely associated with the more equal treatment of 
women (Skinner 1997, Blumberg 2015, Blumberg and Mee-Udon 2002). Even though 
this study mainly focuses on women's empowerment and how its factors affect the 
lack of son preference in Southeast Asia, it does not undermine the family and kinship 
systems that shape the daughter preference in the region 
In conclusion, my research on women’s empowerment in Southeast Asia has 
overcome the measurement and contextual obstacles that have often been cited in the 
literature. The index on women's empowerment has captured the actual level of 
empowerment of individual women efficiently, utilizing data from developing 
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countries, which is usually lack in current international indexes. It has also have a 
very broad application in more than 90 developing countries where data are available. 
My research has also found that women's empowerment factors are one of the keys in 
women’s fertility preference including the ideal number of children and their 
preference for sons. Most significantly, the results signifies that female labor force 
participation is the key in keeping fertility preference at a balanced level in the future, 
especially when rapid fertility decline happen even in developing countries. The study 
also finds that son preference among Southeast Asian women is more the result of the 
lower decision-making power inside the household rather than the results of outside-
the-household factors such as women’s education and employment.  Overall, 
women’s empowerment factors are influential in the fertility preferences of Southeast 
Asian women. 
The issue of comparable data for measuring women’s empowerment in developing 
countries is frequently cited. Future studies, which apply the measurements developed 
in this study, can be a potential solution, using Demographic and Health Surveys Data 
in more than 90 developing countries where data are available. It is possible to have 
an internationally comparable index of women's empowerment at the individual level. 
Comparable research in developing countries should investigate if contraceptive use 
is still one of the factors which empowers women, or if it is no longer the case as 
usage is now much more widespread. 
Future research can also look more closely at how female labor force participation is 
changing women’s fertility preference and actual fertility, especially in developing 
countries where female labor force participation can have very different meaning than 
in developed countries. Does female labor force participation moderate the correlation 
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between fertility preference and actual fertility? And as developing countries have 
been joining the global trend in fertility decline, will female labor force participation, 
as an aspect of women's empowerment, help prevent low and lowest-low fertility? 
Comparable data in South Asian countries, where the issue of son preference is 
currently most pressing, can also be used to examine if the level of power of the 
woman in the household is the most influential factor in the issue.  
The literature suggests that the relationship between women's empowerment and 
fertility can go both ways. It means that higher level of women's empowerment can 
affect changes in fertility, but the decline in the preference for high fertility and son 
preference also leads to higher levels of women's empowerment. This research has 
only examined the one-way relationship from women's empowerment to fertility. 
Future research can definitely look into the reverse relationship, specifically, to what 
extent fertility impacts women's empowerment, to further postulate the two-way 
relationship.  
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